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2ABSTRACT
The main focus of this thesis is on the measurement of 
concentration, determinants of levels and changes in 
concentration, and its effect on the levels and changes in 
performance in the large scale manufacturing sector in 
Pakistan at three points of time, 1970,1978 and 1984. 
Published census of manufacturing industry data and other 
sources are utilized to develop estimates of selected 
variables, covering 41 sectors of production. In this way 
the thesis is the first of its kind in developing countries 
that attempts to analyze from a dynamic perspective the 
structure-performance hypothesis. A subject which was in 
the past approached only in terms of static analysis.
On the basis of the results revealed by this enquiry 
the thesis argues that the manufacturing sector is 
dominated by large size establishments. This concentration 
stems from technological and financial discontinuities 
prevailing in the sixties. In the subsequent period tight 
government regulatory policies, public and private 
investment decisions, were largely instrumental in shaping 
the structure of manufacturing industries which on balance 
remained as concentrated as before.
A second part of the thesis attempts to find 
confirmation of the hypothesis that structure affects 
performance. \Je find a frail and declining relationship 
between structure and performance thus there is little 
support for the argument advanced in earlier
studies that structure exerts a strong positive influence
3on performance. The thesis argues that in the sixties the 
concentrated oligopolies were able to secure high profits 
which originated from their power to set prices 
irrespective of the reductions in the cost of production 
realized through technological and financial 
discontinuities. Unlike the sixties, in the subsequent 
period not only were prices controlled,but also increased 
cost resulting from internal and external changes squeezed 
the share of the profit, and smuggling more actively and 
product differentiation modestly also exercised their 
influence on the performance of the manufacturing sector.
Finally the thesis shows that the relevance of the 
structure performance model varies from case to case and 
both the forces of monopoly and efficiency are at work to 
determine the performance of the manufacturing sector.
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CHAPTER I
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE (1950-87)
AN OVERALL VIEW 
(With Reference to the Growth of the Manufacturing Sector)
With the inception of Pakistan industrial development has 
been given top priority in the economic development strategy 
of the country. It was done so because of a number of reasons: 
First, reliance on agriculture as an engine of economic 
development meant that sustained growth in per capita income 
would be' far less than what it would be with industrial 
development. Thus for rapid growth in per capita income, it 
was considered necessary that the surplus labour be- shifted 
from agriculture to industry and other related areas of 
development; where labour productivity is relatively high. 
Second, exports of agricultural raw material would earn limited 
income from abroad, as world demand for these goods grew 
slowly. Third, the burden of disequilibrium in the balance of 
payment, created by the import of raw material and machinery 
for industrial development, wouLd ultimately be borne by the 
industrial sector through growth in manufacturing output and 
exports.
The factual position of Pakistan's development till 
sixties and seventies has been reported before^Papaneck 
[1967],Lewis [1969] and [1970] and Amjad [1984]. This chapter 
reviews the pattern of growth over the longer period
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1950-87.In this way the chapter prepares a background for the 
detailed inter-industry structural analysis in the coining 
chapters. This chapter reviews the growth, structural change, 
and the policy and non-policy determinants of industrial 
growth. In this respect special attention is paid to the 
foreign trade policies, dependence between the growth of 
industry and agriculture, domestic savings, investment, 
external assistance, nationalizations, regulatory and non 
regulatory policies of various regimes all of which were 
instrumental in shaping the structure of the Pakistan economy, 
directing its growth and that of industry in particular.
Growth and Structural Change: 
Pre Plan and Plan Period (1950-55, 1955-1970):
Tables 1.1 to 1.3 present the changes in the structure of 
production and employment that occured during the period 
1955-1987 as well as the growth rates in manufacturing, other 
sectors and GNP.1 /. In the first place it is noted that the 
composition of GNP has changed substantially, the share in 
GDP of agriculture has declined, of industry doubled (18.1%), 
construction almost quadrupled, of electricity and gas has
1. Census of Manufacturing Industries excludes establishments 
that do not use power and employ less than 10 workers, the 
informal sector. Although published estimates of the share of 
the informal sector in manufacturing employment and value 
added are not available, it is widely believed that it employs 
more than 80 percent of labour, engaged in manufacuring 
activities and account for about 20 percent of total 
manufacturing value added.
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Table l.l: Sectoral Distribution of Output 1951-88.
______________________________________(Percentages)____
Output at Constant 
1959-60 Prices 1951 1961 1971 1977 1983 1988
Agriculture 59.71 48.9 41. 9 29.77 23.70 23 . 76
Manuf actur ing* 9.2 14.5 18.1 15.28 18.30 20.58
Construction 1.44 3.46 4.2 4.8 5.0 5.72
Electricity & Gas 0.22 0.56 1.98 2 . 69 3 . 0 3 . 63
Services & others 29.43 32.58 33 .82 47.46 49.9 46. 31
* Includes large and small scale manufacturing.
Source: Estimated from National Accounts, Statistics Division, 
Government of Pakistan as reported in IBRD
(1978,1980,1988).
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Table 1.2: Sectoral Distribution of Employment (1951-88).
(Percentage).
Employment 1951 19 61 1971 1977 1983 1988
Agriculture 67.5 61.0 57 .7 53 .71 52.73 49.24
Manufacturing* 10. 0 13 . 6 12 .4 13 .39 13.54* 14.23*
Construction - - 3.34 4.12 4 .80 6. 01
Electricity & Gas - - 0.25 0.67 1.13 0.73
Services & others 22 . 5 25.4 26.31 28 . 08 27 . 80 29.79
* Includes large scale manufacturing.Also includes 
manufacturing and min- ing for 1983 and 1988.
Source: Estimated from, Population Census of 1951, 1951 Labour 
Force Survey's, various issues as reported in IBRD
(1978,1980,1988).
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Table 1.3: Overall and Sectoral Growth Rates
(At Constant 1959-60 Factor Cost).
% oer annum
First
Plan
1955-60
Second
Plan
1960-65
Third
Plan
1965-70
Non
Plan
1971-77
Fifth
Plan
1977-83
Sixth
Plan
1983-88
Agriculture 1.0 3.7 5.6 2 .48 4.0 3.7
Min ing* 10.0 11. 7 3.4 2.89 8.2 10.2
ManufacturinglO.3 11. 6 8.1 1.70 10. 6 8.0
(Large scale) (23 . 0) (16.9) (9.9) (2.5) (7.7) (7.5)
Construction 10.1 22 . 0 5.7 6.96 6.5 -
Utilities 6.5 14. 6 9.9 5.3 9 . 2 -
Transport 4.5 11.5 5.0 4.2 8.8 -
Others 6.0 6.0 10. 9 7.4 12 . 5 -
GDPA 4.1 6.6 6.2 3 . 6 6.7 6.9
* Includes mining and quarrying, construction, electricity, 
gas and water.
A GDP and GNP at market prices have been different since mid 
1970's when net factor income from abroad, particularly from 
Pakistan's working abroad in Gulf states, began to 
increase dramatically.
Source: Estimated from National Accounts Data, Statistics
Division, Government of Pakistan as reported in IBRD 
(1978, 1980,1988).
19
multiplied many fold. A similar shift though relatively less 
sharp is observed in the sectoral distribution of employment. 
The share of agriculture has been declining but it is still 
the major absorber, and the share of the manufacturing 
sector increased from 10.0 percent during the early period to
12.4 percent in 1970. Other sectors providing more jobs are 
transport, communication, construction and services.
Table 1.4 provides comparison about structural changes in 
GDP across five developing countries mainly India, China, 
Brazil, South Korea including Pakistan. It also shows that 
the share of manufacturing in GDP has grown fast in S.Korea 
followed by Pakistan, which has grown steadily.
Industrial growth measured at 1960 constant factor cost 
was 23 percent per annum in the First Plan (1950-60) , 17
percent during the Second Plan (1960-65) and 10 percent during 
the Third Plan (1965-70). Growth of the industrial sector was 
not accompanied by rapid increase in the agricultural sector; 
mainly in the earlier period, later in sixties Pakistan was 
able to reduce the large difference in the growth rate of the 
two sectors. With the Green Revolution came the introduction 
of favourable prices, technology, water and input facilities. 
This development removed the fears that growth in the 
industrial sector tout A .not be sustained unless the effective 
demand in the rural areas increased and the raw material for 
domestic industries W«s provided without any shortage.
The differences in the economic performance in different 
periods is revealed more clearly in the use of resources Table
20
Table 1.4: Structural Changes in GDP (1966-84) Pakistan
and Some Developing Countries.
Developing
Sectors Pakistan India China Brazil S.Korea countries
Agriculture
1966 37.1 47.8 37.5 15. 9 34.9 28.6
1978 17.8 38. 6 29.8 14.0 20.2 21.4
1984 28.1 36.1 35.3 13 .4 13.9 20.8
Manufacturing
1966 15.2 14.3 30.3 27.2 18.6 21.1
1978 16.2 17.0 37.5 27.5 27.8 22 . 2
1984 20.7 14.9 32 . 5 27.2 27. 8 20.6
Minting
1966 0.5 1.0 4.4 0.8 1.9 4.5
1978 0.5 1.4 5.5 0.7 1.4 6.2
1984 0.5 3 . 3 6.7 1.2 1.4 7.8
Construction
1966 4.3 5.1 3 . 2 5.4 3.7 4.5
1978 4.9 5.3 3.7 5.8 7.9 5.9
1984 5.1 5.7 4 . 6 5.4 8.4 5.7
Services
1966 42.9 31.9 24.5 50. 8 41.0 41.1
1978 60.6 37.7 23.5 52. 0 42.7 44.3
1984 45.6 40.0 20.9 53.8 48.7 45.1
Source: Taken from Pakistan Industrial Regulatory Policy
Report.Volume II 1988. World Bank Document Industry, 
Trade and Finance Division.
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1.5. Here contrasts in various sub periods are note worthy. 
While investment increased only marginally during 1955-60 it 
doubled in the Second Plan 1960-65, rising to 24 percent of 
GNP. Both the public and the private sector played their role 
in the expansion process. At the same time domestic savings 
increased from 6.6 to 13.6 percent and exports expanded at 
the rate of 8.5 percent per annum in volume terms. The net 
result of these trends was that two third of the investment 
expenditure was financed by our own resources, and the share 
of total investment financed through net capital inflows 
increased only from 37 to 40 percent.
However, these trends were reversed by mid 1965 due to 
the war with India, termination of U.S grant for military 
purposes and poor crops in 1966 and 1967 which meant diversion 
of foreign exchange to import of food along with the burden 
of financing imports rising at 8 percent per year. This led to 
the revision of development strategy which meant: (a) Shift
in allocation of resources from capital intensive and long 
gestation projects towards sectors with more favourable 
capital output ratios and (b) Shift in development priorities 
from industry to agriculture. Thus the greatest adjustment to 
the change in resource availability fell on the manufacturing 
sector. Both new investment and utilization of existing 
capacity was affected. And in order to reduce new investments, 
investment priorities were changed, capacity expansion was 
limited to industries based on domestic raw material and to 
export oriented industries.Although the events in the third
22
Table 1.5: Saving, Investment, Exports and Imports
as a % of GNP at Market Prices (1955-88).
1955 1960 1965 1970 1977 1983 1988
Fixed Investment 7.6 12.0 23.9 14.31 17. 2 13 .76 14.19
Public n.a 5.8 11. 4 6. 68 12 .1 8.20 8.21
Private n.a 6.2 12.5 7 . 7 5.1 5.5 5.9
Domestic Savings6.6 9.2 13. 6 9.0 8.6 4.9 9.4
NationalSavings 6.6 9.2 13 .6 9.0 11.1 12.6 13.7
Public n.a 2.8 0.7 1.0 2.4 1.9 0.4
Private n.a 6.4 12 .9 8.0 8.7 10.7 13 . 3
Export of goods 5.0 
and services
8.7 8.4 7.7 9.0 10.2 12 .1
Imports of goods5.5 
and services
14.7 17.4 14.5 18 . 5 20.0 19 . 3
Foreign savingsas n.a 
% of fixed 
Investment
36.9 39.8 19.2 28.87 19. 6 15. 3
*. Data refers to all Pakistan, West Pakistan and former East 
Pakistan.
A Given the large worker's remittances in 1970's and 198 0's 
the appropriate measure of saving in Pakistan's economy is 
national rather than domestic savings after the period 
1970-88.
Source: Derived from Data in the National Accounts, Planning 
and Development Division as reported in IBRD
(1978,1980,1988).
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plan had affected the domestic conditions adversely, the 
overall achievements of the Third Plan period were not 
discouraging. The GDP growth was only fractionally less than 
that achieved in the Second plan. This was mainly so due to 
the (a) Expansion in agricultural production (b) Achievements 
in the export of manufactured goods via increasing the 
allocation of investment in export oriented industries and 
also through the Export Bonus Scheme (see b e l o w ) - „
However the biggest disappointment during the Third Plan 
was in the performance of the manufacturing sector. The 
resource shortage led to limited investment and as a result 
the manufacturing sector recorded a marked slow down from the
16.9 percent per annum growth rate achieved in the Second 
plan to almost 10 percent per annum in the Third plan period.
Non-Plan Period 1971-77:
Political disturbances which had started in late 1960's 
ended with the crises of 1971 and consequent separation of the 
former East Pakistan. The new government took over amidst 
deteriorating economic growth. The development strategy of the 
new government also identified manufacturing as the major 
engine of development. But unlike the previous government 
favouring import substitution for consumer goods and export 
oriented industries the priorities of the new government were 
different, they were to concentrate on big, sophisticated 
industrial units to increase self-sufficiency in the
24
intermediate and capital goods industries.
In view of the concentration of income and ownership, the
main cause of political disturbances of late sixties, the
government took some drastic steps like in early 1972 it
nationalized 31 largest manufacturing firms, life insurance
and most petroleum distributing companies.2/. Followed by
vegetable ghee in 1973, banks and shipping in 1974 and the
export trade of Pakistan's two principal export products,
Cotton and Rice. Reforms favourable to labour and to smaller
farmers were introduced. In May 1972, the Rupee was devalued
and adjusted from Rs.4.76 to Rs.9.90 to the dollar, and the
Export Bonus Scheme was terminated. Although these reforms
were introducted to improve the efficiency of the
manufacturi ng sector and ensure a fair and equitable
distribution of income,instead the percentage share of both
f a ,
manufacturing and agriculture m  GDP declined and in^case of 
agriculture the percentage share also declined in employment 
where as that of ^ manufacturing industry remained more or less 
the same.
Industrial performance in terms of growth was 
, 1k*disappointing m Aseventies. After a spurt m  manufacturing 
output in 1973 and 1974, reflecting a recovery from earlier
2. Ten basic industries, were removed from the large scale
private sector, namely iron and steel, basic metals, heavy 
engineering, ele^rical equipment, automotive assembly and 
manufacture, tractor assembly and manufacture, chemicals, 
petrochemicals and natural gas. Thus limiting private sector 
to textiles, light engineering and consumers goods such 
as sugar and cigarettes.
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disruptions, there was no growth in the last three years of 
the Bhutto government. Growth rate in large scale 
manufacturing reached the lowest percent of 4.7 per annum ever 
since 1955-60. Agricultural sector which had shown a gradual 
increase in growth rates, in the past now slowed down from 5.6 
percent per annum in the Third Plan (1965-70) to 2.48 percent 
in the Non Plan period. One of the main factors undermining 
growth in agriculture was the repeated set backs caused by 
exceptional weather conditions. Decline in these two major 
sectors of the economy led to a decline in the GDP growth to
3.6 percent per annum, even lower than the rate of growth 
achieved in the first plan period 1955-60. Decline in 
industrial growth occured despite large public investment in 
the industrial sector; which at constant prices (1969-70) 
increased from Rs 65 million in 1970-71 to Rs 1563 million in 
1977. In other words public investment as a percentage of GNP 
increased from 7.4 percent in 1970 to 12.1 percent by 1977. 
However increase in public investment is neither accompanied 
by increase in private investment, nor was it matched by 
increase in savings. The inflow of capital from abroad 
reflects the failure to mobilize domestic savings, private 
savings dropped considerably, partly due to a decline in 
profits and partly due to the high rate of inflation which 
accelerated from 10 percent in 1972-73 to about 3 0 percent in
1973-74 and 1974-75. With a decline in private savings 
obviously private investment also dropped to 5.1 percent per 
annum even less than half of what it was in 1965. Public
savings were negligible largely because revenues
remained low, and subsidies (for wheat, fertilizers, plant 
protection etc) increased.
Although devaluatio n led to^fincrease in exports until
1974, but with the declining growth of the manufacturing and
agricultural sector (floods in 1973 and pest attack in 1976
caused damage to cotton crop and cotton exports) and the world
recession in 1974, exports increased by only 9 percent between 
ltd.
1974-77, thusAaverage annual growth rate was only fractionally 
>r\
Ifortjthe Second Plan period (1960-65) . Besides export 
earnings, remittances increased from U.S $124 million in 
1972-73 to approximately U.S $500 million in 1977. But the 
terms of trade took an unfavourable turn as the rise in world 
oil prices increased the petroleum and oil product bill from 
Rs 649 million in 1972-73 to Rs 4918 million in 1977. And the 
world wide inflationary pressure caused the import prices 
index to rise much faster than export prices. The increase in 
imports between 1970-77 was from 10.4 percent per annum to
18.5 percent. Although import of all luxury items was banned, 
to carry on the development program of the government import 
of development items was liberalized.3/.
On the whole the new government's development strategy 
did not bring immediate results in terms of growth rates. 
Output remained almost stagnant at constant 1969-70 prices,
The import license system was changed by the new government. 
Now a) 327 items mentioned in the free list could be obtained 
from any where through licenses, (b) the tied list contained 
2 5 items which could be imported from tied sources. ?
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employment increased only slightly between 1972-77 and 
productivity fell in the same period despite huge public 
investment during 1971-77. The biggest set back was the marked 
slow down in the private sector's participation in investment 
activities which led to the closure of many firms and the 
consequent decline in the manufacturing sector.
The Military Government 1977-87:
In mid 1977 the military government took over amidst external 
and internal traumas that the economy and the manufacturing 
sector in particular had received. Its first half of 
developmental phase (1977-83 Fifth Plan) was based on ad-hoc 
policies introduced from time to time. At the same time 
industrial policy was turned around i.e. policies pursued in 
the early and mid 1970's of achieving industrial development 
through the rapid expansion of the public sector were 
gradually reversed. The industrial strategy during the fifth 
plan was quite similar to the one adopted in the first, 
second and third plan periods like import substitution in 
basic industrial inputs, increase in manufactured exports, 
increased emphasis on agro-based industries etc. In the second 
phase of development, Sixth Plan 1983-88, the government 
outlined the industrial policy in its Industrial Policy 
statement (1984), laying emphasis on change in the industrial 
structure towards a more sophisticated engineering chemicals 
and basic metal, because of their high weight in value added.
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Performance of the manufacturing sector has been 
encouraging and improved since the late 1970s. The 
manufacturing sector GDP grew at an annual average rate of
9.5 percent between 1977 and 1986. This means a significant 
improvement when compared with the 3.3 percent annual growth 
rate of manufacturing GDP experienced in the 1970-77 
period.4/. Consequently, the share of manufacturing in GDP 
rose from 16.5 percent in 1981 to 2 0.58 percent in 1988, 
reversing the declining trend of the 1970's. Much of the 
growth in large scale manufacturing stemmed from increase in 
output in cotton yarn, sugar, fertilizer, cement, steel 
products,and tractors. In addition, to that output and exports 
in the small scale, unorganized sector (which produces 
garments, towels, hosiery, leather products, etc.) have been 
increasing rapidly in the later period.
However, the manufacturing sector failed to generate 
sufficient employment. Slow generation of employment is 
manifest in the share of manufacturing sector in employment 
which has increased only marginally. Although these trends 
indicate increase of labour productivity in the manufacturing 
sector, it is quite possible that higher labour productivity
4. Growth of the industrial sector came despite (a) the Afghan 
crisis faced by the military regime, which led to increased 
defense expenditure and uncertain political and economic 
environment inside the country, (b) repeated disturbances in 
Karachi the main industrial centre, which led to the imposiion 
of curfew every now and then.
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is related to the investment pattern overtime.5/. While
comparing the rate of industrial growth in Pakistan with other
developing countries, Table 1.6 . iAows that between
1972 and 1984 the average annual growth in manufacturing GDP
in Pakistan was 12.7 percent per annum. Xh)$ was higher than
about half the developing countries in the sample despite the
slow rate of growth between 1970-77.6/.
ih.
The share of A agriculture sector in GDP and employment 
declined to 27.8 percent and 24.1 percent by the end of the
Comparing capital-output ratios between 1964-86 as reported
below, we notice that these ratios have declined, which
suggest that increase in production 
increased capital formation:
is largely due to
Year Capital/labour 
Ratio
Cap ita1/Output 
Ratio
1964-72 43,033 3 .42
1972-79 8,270 3 .60
1979-83 157,100 1.57
1983-86 48,083 1. 82
1979-86 75,338 1. 68
Source: Economic Survey 1986-87 (p.87), Planning and 
Development Division, Government of Pakistan.
Pakistan's growth performance in comparison with that of Korea 
is interesting. In 1972 the size of GDP and manufacturing GDP 
in Korea and Pakistan was not dissimilar. Korea had a GDP of 
$10.6 billion, Pakistan $9.3 billion; Korea's manufacturing 
GDP was 2.3 billion, Pakistan's was $1.5 billion. Thus, the 
importance of manufacturing in GDP was higher in Korea 
(manufacturing value added was 22 percent of GDP in Korea in 
1972, compared to 16 percent in Pakistan).
By 1984 the differences had become more sharp Korea's GDP in 
1984 had gone to $83.2 billion while Pakistan's was $ 31.1
billion. Manufacturing GDP rose to $23.7 billion in Korea in 
1984, or roughly 12 times in 1972 level, as against $ 6.3 
billion or about four times the 1972 level in Pakistan. 
However, under the liberalized policy environment of the 
eighties Pakistan's manufacturing GDP actually grew faster 
than Korea's. [World Bank, Pakistan's Industrial Regulatory 
Policy Report Vol.II January 1988],
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Table 1.6: Average Annual Growth Manufacturing GDP
(1972-84).
(% per annum)
Brazil 11.1 India 9.8 Pakistan 12.7
Chile 3.2 Indonesia 20.0 Philppines 12.4
China 7.9 Korea 20.0 Thailand 16.0
Columbia 13 .0 Malaysia 19.9 Turkey 13 . 0
Egypt 14.9 Mexico 11.1
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1986-87;
Pakistan Economic Survey 1985-8 6 as reported in World 
Bank, Pakistan Industrial Regulatory Policy Report 
Vol. II January 6, 1988.
31
Fifth and Sixth Plan period. Variations in production, almost 
each year, due to weather conditions are reflected in reduced 
agricultural growth to 2.2 percent in 1987 and lowered the 
satisfactory 4.4 percent average growth in the sector recorded 
since the beginning of the sixth Plan to 3.5 percent between 
1983-84 and 198 6-87.However, declining trends of the
agricultural sector and the resulting deficient demand for 
manufactured goods was to some extent compensated by the 
increased inflow of remittances, which had a favourable 
impact, on manufactured output.Gilani Iqbal and Khan[1981].
Other indicators of economic performance have been 
mixed. Private sector investment was largely confined to 
projects with short pay offs. Total private investment has not 
yet increased since new public sector commitments have been 
limited as a matter of policy, fixed investment/GNP ratio fell 
from 17.2 percent in 1977 to 13.76 percent in 1983 and it 
almost remained at the same level in 1988. Although national 
savings/GNP ratio remained above the levels of the early 
1970's it increased only marginally from 12.6 percent in 1983 
to 13.7 percent in 1987 (the same as was in 1965). It 
increased slowly because the increase in domestic savings was 
partially offset by falling net factor income from abroad. The 
improvement in national saving rate originated solely from the 
private sector. Public savings have fallen in most years 
since the early 1980's. The investment rate in Pakistan during 
this regime was unusually low in relation to the GDP growth 
rates picking up from 4.4 percent in 198 3 to 6.6 percent
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towards the end of the Sixth Plan period. One likely 
explanation for such a situation might be that Pakistan has 
over the past decade, been depleting its existing capital 
stock and neglecting maintenance and replacement investment, 
thus attaining high income growth with low investment at the 
expense of future growth.
It is also noteworthy that there was a marked shift in 
the pattern of resource use during the Sixth Plan period from 
external to domestic sources. The inflow of net external 
resources (factor income and external financing) declined from 
about 11 percent of GNP in the first two years of the plan to 
9.0 percent in 1986 and 6.3 percent in 1989, due to growing 
interest payments on foreign debt and falling remittances.
The Determinants of Manufacturing Growth:
A first major determinant of the rapid growth in manufacturing 
was the disequilibrium in the supply and demand conditions 
created by Partition. In 1947 Pakistan inherited a very small 
base of the industry relative to the size of the economy. Thus 
a large proportion of growth in manufacturing was in response 
to the disequilibrium in the product market. A second 
important determinant of manufacturing growth was the trade 
and exchange control policies of the government. These 
policies aimed at favouring the manufacturing sector so as to 
enhance the earnings of this sector. The purpose of doing so 
was to attain a high rate of saving, capital accumulation and
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the creation of an active entrepreneurial class. Although, by 
doing so, inequalities in income were created, it was 
considered important to do so in the early years so as to 
achieve fast rate of growth via high rate of saving and 
investment. The crucial link between the inequality of income 
and fast growth was profits of the entrepreneurial class; thus 
fast growth was considered as a function of income inequality 
Haq [1963]. This strategy of development had important 
aspects: first, in the early years government chose to manage 
its trade policies and meet the pressure of demand for imports 
through a licensing and quantitative controls scheme. Second 
export tax on major agricultural raw materials meant that the 
terms of trade were turned against agriculture and in favour 
of the manufaturing sector. Since most of the agricultural 
produce were used as input of the manufacturing industry, the 
availability of low cost inputs along with low money wages, 
made investment in the manufacturing sector highly profitable 
[Lewis 1970]. Third, investors were provided with foreign 
exchange, earned by agricultural exports, to import capital 
goods and industrial raw materials. It may be added that the 
scarity of the foreign exchange was not reflected in the price 
paid by the license holders. Finally, the tariff policies 
ensured market for the domestically produced manufacturing 
goods by raising their prices significantly above world market 
prices. Thus isolating the manufacturers from pressures of 
international competition and enabling them to earn above
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normal profit.7/. These profits were reinvested to accumulate 
capital and expand investment. 8/.
Besides the above mentioned incentives, in 1959^Export Bonus 
Scheme was introduced through which export incentive was given 
to the manufacturing sector only.9/. It meant that the growth 
of the manufacturing sector was not to be constrained by the 
limited domestic demand, instead the sector was encouraged to 
exploit the advantages that might accrue from the export led 
expansion in the scale of production.10/.
In the second phase of development 1971-77, as reported 
earlier, growth of the manufacturing sector was disappointing. 
The government argued that stagnation in production was mainly 
due to the external factors, the world recession and oil 
shock which worsened the terms of trade, and unfavourable
7. It is widely believed that profits earned were about 50 to
100 percent on capital invested [Stern and Falcon 
1970].
8. The re-investment profit ratio was estimated to be 75 
percent. [G.Ranis 1961]
9. The Export Bonus Voucher scheme was introduced in 1959. The
scheme entitled an exportor to get, in addition to the amount 
of rupees converted at official exchange rate, a certain 
percentage of the value of his export earnings in the form of 
a Bonus Voucher. This voucher entitled the holder to either 
(i) have an equivalent amount of foreign exchange for the 
import of any item on the Bonus list (over 2 00 items) or (ii) 
sell the voucher in the market. Given the scarity of foreign 
exchange, such vouchers usually sold at a premium of between 
150 and 18 0 percent of their face value
10. Donges and Riedel [1971] tested econometrically the impact 
of the scheme on the manufacturing exports and found that the 
scheme substantially influenced the growth of manufactured 
exports.
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weather conditions.11/* it might well be so, however, the 
impact of some of the policy decisions on private investment 
and the constituent decline in manufacturing growth cannot be 
ignored.
First, nationalization of 1972 and the constant eros ion 
of profit margins through increased taxes in the remaining 
industries considerably reduced the private industrial 
initiative which was considered an essential element of growth 
by the previous government. More importantly what depressed 
the private sector investment mostly was the manner in which 
nationalization was carried out, the fear of further 
nationalization and the absence on the part of government of 
a clear and consistent approach towards the private sector 
detered both domestic and foreign investment. Although it was 
possible to invest in new industries, yet virtually no new 
investment took place because the psychological impact of 
nationalization of ten industries was magnified by a number 
of factors; a) the fact that industrialists were already very 
sensitive as they had already lost assets in the former East 
Pakistan, b) the slowness in issuing compensation which was
11. The import bill was swo lien by the increased oil prices
which increased from $63 million in 1972-73 to $ 405 million 
in 1976-77 about 17 percent of total imports. Besides Oil, 
import bill increased by the increased cost of Fertilizers, 
capital goods imports, edible oils and other consumer goods. 
But in certain respect the economy benefitted from the rapid 
increase in oil prices since 1973. The oil price increae 
added some $300 million to Pakistan's imports by 1976-77. On 
the other hand, it started the Middle East boom which 
attracted Pakistani labour and worker's remittances increased 
from $93 million in 1971-72 to $ 100 million in the year
1977-78.
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felt to be unfair, c) the fact thatAnationalizations of 1972
were followed, despite repeated reassurances by the
government, by the nationalization of life insurances in 1972,
, P.ghee production m  1973, banking and ship^ng in 1974, and 
flour milling, rice husking. The uncertain ty created would 
have been less and its impact of shorter duration if the 
nationalization had been carried out all at once.
Second, the tightening of government control over new 
investment through investment sanctions, which were made 
compulsory and price controls led to restricted entry.12/.
12. Investment sanctioning (licensing) policies, introduced in 
early 1970's consist of a criterion that require private 
investors to obtain clearance from Federal and Provincial 
governments prior to establishing certain new projects or 
expanding existing capacity. The need for prior authorization 
and the level at which it is decided depend on the project's 
size, location and the amount of machinery and raw materials 
to be imported.
Investment sanction was required for projects that: (i) 
involve investment costs in excess of a pre-determined size 
limit (Rs.50 million or $ 20 million); or (ii) require 
imported imputs which exceed 60 percent of the projects total 
annual material inputs costs, if they also exceed 2 0 percent 
of fixed assets or (iii) involve direct foreign investment, 
or (iv) a list of specified industries includes industries 
for reasons (a) national security and defense (b) religious 
and socio-economic considerations; (c) price regulations; (d) 
projects of national importance; and (e) capacity 
utilization.
In addition to this there are import license limits on import 
of machinery and import of industrial inputs in large 
quantities may be approved on the basis of sanctioned 
capacity. Like this investment sanctions implicitly set 
quantitative restrictions on capital and raw material imports, 
thus serving as a non- price rationing mechanism for 
allocating foreign exchange.
Government also controlled prices of manufactured goods in 
order to; (i) redistribute income and minimize political 
disruption by keeping prices of critical consumer goods low 
and stable (ghee and phar- m&ceuticals etc) ; (ii) stimulate 
downstream industries by keeping down prices of intermediate 
products (fertilizer and fuel); and (iii) stimulate investment 
by ensuring adequate return (cement). Exfactory and retail
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Whatever private investment was made it was restricted to 
traditional and familiar industries. About 50 percent of 
investment went into textiles and the rest to food production 
(largely sugar refining), paper and paper products, electric 
bulbs, ceramics etc. Of the textile investment the bulk went 
into the traditional activities of producing coarse yarn and 
unfinished cloth, and very little into processing of fine 
yarn, the finishing and blending of fabrics.
Third, the termination of the Export Bonus Scheme, 
reduction in investment incentives, price controls, increase 
in labour cost per man and devaluation of rupee, increased 
the cost of production.13/.
Finally, public investment, although highest for the 
first time since partition, was mainly incurred on long 
gestation projects like steel which was to start yielding by 
1980's. Thus prolonged execution phases, along with 
inadequacy of funds led to the decline in growth rates.
prices for a range of products is regulated through 
official procedures at both the provincial and federal levels 
to add sufficient margin to costs to allow a 15 percent to 
20 percent return on investment for a plant operating at a 
speecified capacity utilization level.
13. Labour cost per man trippled between 1972-77 part of
this increase was due to the increase in wages announced by 
the government and the rest could be due to the emigration of 
skilled labour to the Middle East. Gilani, Khan and Iqbal 
[1981], One of the reasons for devaluation w^s to improve the 
competitive position of the manufactured exorts; however the 
adverse impact of devaluation was that it increased the cost 
of investment (where import of machinery and raw material was 
involved) this in turn increased the internal price structure 
and thus the competitive position of Pakistan industry was 
further deteriorated, instead of making any improvements, 
discouraging private sector investment.
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Obviously, returns on investment in projects like steel, 
fertilizer and cement, were to be realized with a lag, which 
tou?dl extend from 4 to 8 years. Just as declining trends in 
investment m  1965-70 resulted m Adownward trend m  output in
1970-77 and increased investment in 1971-77 was to lead to
. , , , ,
accelerated growth inflate seventies and early eighties. This
phenomenon is well understood when data about investment is 
examined together with output growth over
In addition to that, the government was burdened with a 
number of tasks and objectives, like protection to low income 
groups from domestic price increases through subsidies, increases 
in salaries and wages, all of which made it impossible for it 
to improve efficiency of the nationalized industries.
The recovery in the economy since 1977 was aided by 
several factors, including higher domestic demand associated 
with i) remittances which led to increased manufacturing 
investment by the established producers in areas where demand 
was to increase like construction and related industries ii) 
better crops and rising rural income due to price incentives 
to farmers.14/. Besides domestic demand^ improved foreign 
demand for Pakistan's exports also led to increased
14. Support/procurement prices for crops have generally been set 
in line with international parity prices, to provide inceifoves 
to the farmers. Input subsidies for fertilizer, pestricides, 
seeds and tractor line took a large proportion of bugetary 
resources. Farmers also received subsidy for irrigation water. 
The agriculture sector has also been exempt from income tax, 
while other taxes like Zakat and Usher (religion based taxes) 
are levied on agriculture^ land and/or output, their revenue 
is small. S.K. Qureshi, [1984].
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manufacturing output, to be exported abroad.15/.
However, credit must also be given to the various policy 
changes introduced by the government as mentioned below.
The relaxation of administrative controls, investment 
sanctioning in particular has helped to sustain the upturn in 
industrial activity.16/. To restore the confidence of the 
private sector the agricultural processing industries taken 
over in 1976 were denationalized and a number of industrial 
incentives similar to those existing during the 1960's like 
tax holidays, excise and import duty concessions, easier 
access to imported raw materials, concessionary credit, income 
tax provisions and direct cash rebates have been granted to 
encourage private investment and exports.17/. The government
15. The contribution of manufactured goods to total exports has 
increased from 44 percent to 53 percent between 1970-87 and 
the share of semi-manufactured goods has fallen (Annex 
1—B) .
16. In the recent past although government has increased 
investment sanctioning limits in some of the industries. But 
the contribution of controlled investment had one favourable 
impact on the performance of industry that excess capacity was 
discouraged and existing capacities were fully utilized.
17. Since early 1980's the government has taken periodic steps 
to liberalize trade. (The measures undertaken initially were 
aimed at ren^ vihfr- most of the additional non-tariff barriers 
introduced in late 1970's in response to the second oil shock 
and resulting foreign exchange stringency). This was done by 
two types of measures. Fisrt, import quotas on non capital 
imports were removed. The number of commodity categories 
subject to import licensing value ceiling was reduced from 
406 in 1980-81 to 5 consumer goods in July 1983. Second, 
banned and restricted items were slowly liberalized. Between 
1980 and 198 6 100 commodity categories, consisting of mostly 
raw material and capital goods, were added to the free list.
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also introduced constitutional safeguards against arbitary 
nationalization of industries in the future and private 
investment in cement, fertilizer, tractors and automobiles 
was permitted. It could not denationalize all the units and 
return them to the original owners because of the contractual 
agreement made domestically and abroad. However, the 
deregulation and decontrols process was expedited following 
the announcement of the 1984 Industrial Policy Statement, and 
pressure from the World Bank and IMF to relax investment 
sanctioning regulations and price controls.
These measures have led to an improvement in private 
sector confidence, while private sector industrialist are 
generally still hesitant to commit themselves to large scale 
investment involving long pay back periods, there has been a 
sharp increase in proposals for relatively smaller scale 
private investment projects.
However, Pakistan continues to depend on import bans and 
restrictions for protection to import substitution industries 
and restricted import of luxury consumer goods. About 39 
percent of the commodities still remain on the banned list of 
items. About 59 percent of these banned items are consumer 
goods, and another 30 percent raw materials for consumer 
goods. In addition, there are more than 100 commodities on 
the Restricted Import List. Also distinct from these bans and 
restrictions value limits on cash imports of machinery are 
still being maintained along with over all investment 
sanctioning rules.
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Another noteable feature of trade policy in eighties was 
that there were a substantial number of duty free categories 
with full/partial duty exemptions. There were 250 duty free 
categories, including items such as petroleum products, 
machine tools, agricultural machinery, pharmaceuticals, 
pesticides, insectecide, fertilizer and cereals etc.
The government also realized that price controls had a 
major bearing on private sector attitude. The Deregulation 
commission of 1985 recommended relaxation of price controls 
because not only was the application of policy cumbersome, it 
was not conducive to efficient factory operations nor did it 
provide adequate incentive for further investment.Ii two 
sub-sectors where substantial scope for private investment 
exists namely fertilizer and cement, the pricing issue has 
been a major deterent to private sector involvement. Recently
private investment has been allowed in cement and 
fertilizers.
Lastly it is quite possible that huge investments made by
the previous government in long gestation projects like steel
. . WP.mill, fertilizers, cement etc showed^in higher growth rates
in the manufacturing sector in the eighties. Public sector
inherited from the previous government was quite large, a
massive investment program of Rs.4 0 billion was underway. And
the military government was not commit ed to any new
investments, except to completing the on going projects. This
may have its impact on economic growth in the coming years.
When data about investment in terms of constant and
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current prices (Table 1.7) is studied together with output 
growth in manufacturing it is clear that growth of output 
depends on investment with a lag, in long gestation projects 
like steel, fertilizer, and cement the lag may extend from 4 
to 8 years, thus* declining trend in investment in 1964-70 and 
1977-82 resulted in downward trend in output in 1970-77 and 
1982-87, whereas investment increased in 1970-77 and 1982-87. 
The increased investment in 1970-77 led to accelerated growth 
of 10.8 in 1977-82. And increased investment in 1982-87 will 
also have a positive effect on manufacturing growth in the 
successive years.
In short, the transition from rapid growth of the 1950's 
and 1960's based on easy and highly protected import 
substitution to a more diversified and outward looking mode 
of industrial development was interupted in the 1970's by 
both external and internal traumas. This interruption in the 
form of tight government controls left little opportunity for 
a systematic industrial policy to ensure conditions 
favourable for growth, specially so in the private sector. 
The incentive system of 1978-88 and the ad-hoc measures 
(including de-regulations and decontrols) taken to raise 
economic activity have to some extent reversed the declining 
trends of growth.
Growth Within the Manufacturing Sector:
(A Micro Economic Review)
This section concerns itself in detail with the response of
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Table 1.7: Growth Of the Manufacturing Sector
(in % per annum based on constant prices).
Period Investment Investment Value
current constant added
___________________prices____________prices__________________
1964-70 5.0 1.4 8.4
1970-77 22.8 6.2 3.7
1977-82 6.7 - 2.6 10.8
1982-87 11.1 6.1 7.8
Source: Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Government of 
Pakistan (1986-87).
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the manufacturing sector to the policy instruments of the 
various sub periods, and the unforseen internal/external 
shocks received by the economy from time to time.
The response of the manufacturing sector is measured in 
terms of the percentage share in manufacturing value added of 
in dustries grouped according to major product use: consumers, 
intermediate and capital goods industries. At a micro level 
the percentage share of 36 selected sectors in manufacturing 
value added, employment and capital assets is also measured 
for the period 1959-84.
It is of interest to observe the response of the 
industrial sector to the policies adopted and the 
internal/external shocks received by the economy in various 
sub-periods.18/. Table 1.8 provide in summary form, the 
pattern of percentage share of consumer, intermediate and 
capital goods industries in manufacturing value added, while 
Table 1.9 provides a more disaggregated view.19/.
In the early period the percentage share of the consumption 
goods sector was exceptionally high, as high as 53.93 percent 
in 1959. It is tempting to explain this growth solely in 
terms of the relatively greater disequilbrium in this sector
18. The policy instruments of various sub periods have also 
influenced the structure of industry to a large extent, 
the discussion of which is postponed till the later 
chapters.
19. According to CMI 1984-85 there are some 154 sub sectors
out of which only top 3 6 sectors ranked according to their 
share in total manufacturing output, employment and assets 
have been selected. See Annex l.A for details.
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Table 1.8: Percentage Share of Consumer, Intermediate and 
Capital Goods Industries in Large Scale 
Manufacturing Value Added (1959-84).
% share
1959 1965 1970 1976 1978 1984
Consumer goods 53 .93 55.47 63 .98 60.92 55. 18 54.56
Intermediate 13 .52 21.35 15.97 17.09 23 .49 21.88
goods 
Capital goods 14.49 18.57 15. 10 18.17 21.0 23.50
Source: Derived from Census of Pakistan, Karachi, Islamabad, 
(various issues).
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in respect of supply and demand condition, and the tight
licensing policy for competitive goods. But the consumer
goods industries enjoyed two other advantages compared with
other producers. In the first place, almost all these
industries largely used domestically produced, mainly
agricultural, raw material which was purchased at very low
prices i.e. vegetable ghee, sugar, tobacco, beverages and
textiles industries are some of the examples using domestic
raw material.20/. In contrast intermediate and capital goods
industries which were dependent on imported raw materials were
at a disadvantage.21/* Second, the size of the domestic 
market for consumer goods was larger than - for
the intermediate and capital goods industries, i.e.
fertil izer, petroleum refining, cement, iron and steel,
machinery and transport industries.
Another interesting fact manifest in Table 1.8 is that 
the share of the consumer goods in the period between 1959-65 
had increased only marginally, while the share of the 
intermediate and capital goods industries increased 
substantially. This change was the result of first, 
accelerated public and private investment which was 
facilitated by the increased flow of external assistance;
20. Besides domestic raw material these industries also used 
simple technology made available locally
21. Other industries using domestic raw material were fertilizer 
and cement but due to insufficient demand their growth in the 
early period was slow.
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second, the introduction of the export bonus scheme led to 
liberal import of raw materials (mainly iron and steel) and 
capital goods. Third, agricultural production improved with 
^Green Revolution and the policy of favourable prices for food 
crops led to increases in income and consequently increases in 
demand for intermediate and capital goods.
However these trends were reversed since 19 65-70 with 
1U consumer goods industry again appearing as the main source of 
growth. The factors responsible for this change were war with 
India, and the effects of poor crops in 19 66 and 1967 on 
imports along with decline in external assistance, which 
meant the ability to import i& raw materials and equipment was 
adversely affected. As a result of the changing environment,
rbu
the liberalization ofAimport program was abandoned and the 
old system of tight quantitative restrictions was restored. 
This change once again favoured the consumer goods industries 
and the intermediate and capital goods industries were 
seriously affected due to shortage of inputs and^rise in 
import costs.
The period between 1971-77 gave priority to intermediate 
and capital goods industries with a decline in the consumer 
goods industries, mainly _ in . Textiles. Decline
in the industry is also reflected in the decline of Pakistan's 
share in world Textile market.22/. Declining productivity of
22. _  Pakistan is one of the lowest cost cotton producer
in the world, but Annex l.C shows that its share of world 
trade in cotton yarn declined from 28.0 percent in 1975 to
8.5 percent in 1977 where^as its share in cloth declined from
7.6 percent to 4.5 percent.
48
capital (due to old technology) and labour, and falling 
profits have mainly contributed to the decline in the textile 
industry. The most important causes of these difficulties 
have been the floods in 1973 & pest attack in 1976 damaging 
cotton crops & exports, the world textile re .cession in 1974 
and 1975, acute labour problems and the various restrictions 
and other measures imposed on the private sector during the 
early 1970's. For example, production and export incentives 
were abolished in 1972 and export duties introduced on both 
yarn and fabrics as well as an excise duty on domestic sales 
of fabrics. Imported capital goods were subjected to import 
tariffs ranging from 40 percent to 100 percent. These measures 
raised capital costs of the textile industry significantly and 
adversely affected the financial position of the mills. The 
constant threat of nationalization which prevailed until 1977
and the textile recession of 1974/75 further affected the
> ■ • •profitability of^textile industry.
In addition, during the early 1970's labour unions 
obtained relatively large increases in wages, fringe benefits 
and virtually unlimited job security without a corresponding 
increase in productivity. This led to an increase in labour 
costs, which burdened the textile industry even more. In 
contrast to the consumer goods industry, the intermediate and 
capital goods industries, mainly belonging to the public 
sector have shown increase in their percentage share in 
manufacturing output. These sectors include chemicals, iron
and steel and machinery. However, this increase in percentage 
share in manufacturing output is quite insignificant relative 
to the large public investment made in the same period Table
07 , B0
1.9."/. It then means that the interpret at in of data about 
these two sectors is not so easy for the period 1971-77 in 
particular. The main cause of marginal increase in output in 
intermediate and capital goods industry was that most of these 
industries are long gestation projects, and return on 
investment is not paid off in the short run. Therefore the 
output growth in both the intermediate and capital goods 
industries must be interpreted in the light of the lag effect 
of investment on output; particularly in long gestation 
projects like fertilizers, cement, iron and steel, as they 
were in various stages of implementation and were to start 
yielding in early. 1980's. By the same reason, the lag effect 
of decline in investment in intermediate and capital goods in 
late 1960's may also have showed in the slow growth of these 
industries in the early 1970's.
In addition to the above mentioned factors, the threat of 
nationalization, withdrawal of concessions, increase in the 
price of capital and imported raw materials; lack of internal 
funds and labour costs remained as major obstacles to new
Public sector investment in projects including fertilizer, 
cement, Karachi steel mill increased rapidly from 1971 to 
1977. But this rapid growth in investment by the public sector 
levelled off in the last two years of the regime and was 
marginally above the 1970 level of total capital formation in 
industry. Only the pattern of investment by the private and 
public sector were reversed.
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Table 1.9: Percentage Share in Manufacturing Value Added 
Employment and Capital Assets (1959-84, selected sectors) .
% Share
Industry_______________ 1958 1970 1976 1978 1984
Consumer Goods
l.Food
Value added 8.3 14.8 22.14 19. 0 20. 62
Employment 6.7 9.1 8.9 10. 9 13 . 17
Capital 21. 02 15. 91 11. 95 17. 61
:.Beverages
Value added 0.4 0.6 1.51 1.72 2 . 38
Employment 1.3 0.5 0.59 0.77 0.94
Capital - 6.0 0.77 2.98 3 . 63
3 .Tobacco
Value added 5.6 9.0 8.28 12.04 13.19
Employment 1.0 2.6 1.49 2.05 2.21
Capital - 6.0 0.77 2.98 3.63
4 .Textiles
Value added 40.2 31.4 24.23 17.79 16.13
Employment 50.0 45.2 44.70 45.26 38.17
Capital - 28.73 25.17 23.19 16.47
5.Footwear
Value added 2.59 0.32 0.13 0.15 0.11
Employment 1.81 0.65 0.36 0.34 0.24
Capital - 0.20 0.12 0.36 0.10
6.Printing
Value added 2.3 1.2 1.13 1.09 1.17
Employment 1.6 1.7 1.67 2.01 2.17
Capital - 1.59 0.81 1.52 1.85
Intermediate Goods
7.Paper
Value added 1.7 1.3 1.64 1.32 1.30
Employment 1.0 1.2 1.67 1.28 1.59
Capital - 4.40 4.57 0.99 1.37
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8.Leather
Value added
Employment
Capital
9.Rubber
Value added
Employment
Capital
10.Chemicals
Value added
Employment
Capital
11.Petroleum
Value added
Employment
Capital
Capital Goods
12.Non Metals
Value added
Employment
Capital
13.Basic Metal
Value added
Employment
Capital
14.Metal Products
Value added
Employment
Capital
15.Machinery
Value added
Employment
Capital
1.48
1.24
0.34
0.37
5.34 
3 .37
5.9
2.5
3 .1 
3.2
2.5
3.5
1.18
0.85
0.39
1.32
1.59
1.24
6 . 66 
3 . 81 
13 . 0
2.5
3.2
4.0
3.1 
4.10
2.4
3.4 
3 . 63
1.2
2.4
2.87
1.2
3.1
0.87
1. 05 
2.59 
0. 98
1.25
1.95
0.92
6.83 
6.85 
12. 07
3.57
5.35
5.91
3 .31 
3 . 72 
9 . 65
1.59 
2.39 
1.11
2.90
2.99
5.76
2.38 
0.80 
2 .19
1.93 
2 .11 
0.35
7.54
4.63
20.24
4.92
0.66
7.16
4 . 69 
2 . 66 
3 .79
4.80 
3.78 
6.12
1.52 
2 .27 
1.42
2.13
3.49
5.15
1.60
0.98
1.37
1. 62 
2 . 09 
1. 32
9.91 
4.68 
13 .47
1.5
0. 95 
6.26
8.97 
4.06 
4 . 78
5.15
7.33
12.82
1.17 
1.89 
1. 68
2.38 
3 .37 
3 .17
16.Electrical Machinery 
Value added 1.1 3 .15 1. 05 3.15
5 2
Employment - 1.0 3.16 0.73 3.58
Capital - 0.87 2.26 1.34 5.04
17.Transport Equipment
Value added 0.90 2.59 6.41 3.96 2.71
Employment 2.0 3.66 4.25 4.46 3.75
Capital - 3.40 3.68 9.26 4.60
Source: Calculated from Census of Manufacturing Industries, 
Statistic Division,Federal Bureau of Statistics, 
Government of Pakistan, Karachi, Islamabad (varios 
issues).
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investment, thus private sector investment declined to its 
lowest level, (as it was limited to the consumer goods 
industry mainly). Moreover returns on industry when compared 
to returns- on trade and real estate did not appear so 
attractive.
In the third phase of development (1977-84) the response
of the industrial sector shows only a marginal decline in the
consumer goods industries. One of the consumer goods industry
showing decline in production is sugar. This fall was due to
a combination of several factors. The sugarcane crop was
adversely affected by pest attack and decline in the area of
production. In addition, a capacity tax on sugar factories led
to diversion of sugar cane from sugar manufacture to "gur" and
unrefined sugar, the prices of which were relatively high. On
the other hand, after a decline, production of cotton yarn
increased; encouraged by improved domestic and international
demand and some policy measures taken, including the
exemption of yarn products from excise duty and introduction
of a compensatory rebate of 7% on yarn exports. However,
production of cotton cloth, continuing an eight
year decline, fell further. This decline occured despite good
to
international demand and the provision of similar^but stronger 
incentives given to yarn, and the compensatory
rebate on finished cotton cloth exports, for example was 12%. 
This decline led to serious difficulties in the industry.
However the marginal decline in the consumer goods 
industry from 55 percent to 54 percent would have been more
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than what it was in 1984, ^  increase in demand for
consumption goods was not sustained by the inflow of 
remittances from abroadt „ >
> ‘ b) world
demand for our exports, mainly textile, had not increased, or 
^government had not relaxed its control over the industrial 
sector and ^ increased investment in textile and food, 
(hydrogented oil, sugar) was not undertaken.
In contrast to the consumer goods industry, intermediate 
and capital goods industries showed positive response because 
of the continued priority received by the two sectors. For 
example, iron and steel, fertilizer and cement took up about 
one third of such investment. Considerable investment has 
also been going on in petroleum refining, textile (to replace 
the old technology and improve the productivity and external 
competitiveness of the sector) bulbs, plastics and drugs etc. 
Thus, industries showing increase in output were fertilizer 
industry, because of the expansion of capacity at the Multan 
plant; and steel production which was attributable to large 
imports of iron and steel scrap. However production of cement 
declined due to damage caused by heavy rains to cement plants 
in Sind and mechanical problems. Productive capacity in 
cement, formerly a major exporter has lagged seriously behind 
the growth in domestic demand.
Growth in the intermediate and capital goods industries 
seem to be slow relative to the investment expenditure 
incurred which reached its peak during^early 80's in the two
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sectors. This may be so because of the Karachi steel mill and 
other major industrial projects, mainly cement and fertilizer, 
were still ir^various stages of implementation and public 
sector was not commited to further investments in long 
gestation projects.
It may also be so due to the decline in the private 
sector participation in the economic activity due to the 
uncertain political conditions internally and externally 
(Afghan crisis) and the private entrepreneurs preference to 
invest in projects with easy entry and short payoffs. The 
second oil shock (late 70's) also had its impact on the 
growth of the two sectors through increased prices of 
imported raw materials and capital goods.
To sum up, the consumer goods and more traditional 
industries like textile^ silk,and leather have shown either 
a declining or an erratic behaviour in their output growth, 
and percentage share. Nevertheless industrial output is still 
concentrated in a few sectors including the following:
Value Added 
1981 1984
Food 20.0 20.63
Textile 18.6 16.13
Tobacco 13.30 13 .19
51.9 49.94
The pattern of industrial growth outlined above also implies
, , , . . i Tfct- ,
a significant redistribution of a work force with reduced
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employment in traditional industries such as textile, silk, 
fabricated metal products, and the appearance of employment 
opportunities in sectors such as vegetable ghee, tobacco, 
chemical products, garments, plastic, electric bulbs etc in 
the last twenty years. However textiles are by far the largest 
industrial employer, 38.17 percent of industrial employment 
followed by food manufacturing which employs 13.17 percent of 
the total employed in manufacturing sector.
Employment 
1981 1984
Textile 39.81 38.17
Food 12.56 13.17
52.54 51.34
Moreover (Annex 2.B) demonstrates that the rapidly growing 
industries are vegetable ghee, sugar, tobacco, beverage, 
fertilizer, iron and steel, cement and more recently petroleum 
refining, mostly so because of the increase in demand. 
Summary :
The section reports the percentage share of industries 
grouped as consumer goods, intermediate and capital goods, in 
manufacturing value added along with the impact of policies 
introduced in various sub periods; on the growth of these 
industries. It also reports the percentage share of 3 6 selected 
industries in manufacturing value added, employment and 
capital assets.
Consumer goods industries grew rapidly in the early 
period and only marginally between 1959-65. After receiving
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a boost for the second time between 1965-70 its percentage 
share in manufacturing has continously declined ever since. 
In contrast, in the early period, both the intermediate and 
capital goods industries had^ relatively small share in 
manufacturing value added, about half of the percentage share 
of the consumer goods industry. Between 1959-65 government 
policies were turned in favour of the two sectors thus their 
percentage share in value added increased. Scarcity of 
foreign exchange in 19 65-7 0 led to a decline in imports 
consequently a reduction in the percentage share of the two 
sectors in manufacturing value added. However after 1970, 
their importance increased, and their combined share has 
increased at almost 50 percent of total manufacturing value 
added.
At a more disaggregated level, it is noticed that besides 
cigarettes, hydrogenated oil, sugar, cement and fertilizers, 
some new industries like iron and steel and petroleum 
refining w&re increasing their share in manufacturing value 
added, employment and capital. Whereas traditional
industry like cotton textile has shown declining importance 
in manufacturing value added, employment and capital assets.
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
introduction:
In this chapter the first task at hand is to evaluate the 
economic theory underpinning most of the empirical work done 
on industrial structure and performance. In doing so
we will engage in a discussion about the structure of 
industry and the Structure —  Performance paradigm and point 
out the conflicting hypothesis that one comes across in this 
field. We will also evaluate the relevance of the Structure 
—  Performance hypothesis in examining the structure and 
performance of the manufacturing sector in the industrially 
less developed countries. In the light of such a discussion 
we will then review the empirical work done on the industrial 
structure and performance in the manufacturing industry of 
Pakistan and point out its limitations.
Bain's [1951] paradigm provided a theoretical 
underpinning for a great deal of empirical work on the 
Structure - Conduct - Performance relationship over the past. 
And results of almost all the earlier studies lend support to 
the hypothesis. What it states is that the presence of various 
"barriers to entry" to an industry determines its„leyel of 
concentration (structure). High levels of concentration in
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turn facilitate cooperative price behaviour (conduct). This 
collusive behaviour then leads to high profits (performance)
i.e.
Barriers to - Structure - Conduct - Performance
Entry (concentration) (collusion) ( profits)
Hence the cause of high profits is high concentration, so the 
usual micro economic implications follow.1/* From this it then 
seems public policy implication are clear but in fact all this
1. The postulated relationship between concentration and profits 
comes from the understanding that^smaller the number of firms 
the higher the CR , the easier it would be for firms to 
collud .e by restraining their short run profit maximization 
tendencies. However such an understanding is not based on 
well defined theoretical models. Cowling, and Waterson [197 6] 
have developed a theoretical model explaining the above 
relationship more explicity.
They begin with the profit equation of the ith firm in an 
industry where N firms produce a homogenous product.
*  II. = PX. - c(X) - Ft. (I) i = 1....... N.
They assume same level of cost for all the firms. And the 
inverse demand function takes the following form,
p = f(X) = f( x, + xt + —  ----- + x„) (Z)
First order conditions for profit maximization are
dII-==P + X. f(X)dX - c(X) = 0  i = 1....... N O )
dXt v dXi.
where
dX = 1 + d-S/Xj - 1 + A- 
dX; dX
v
substituting in the above equation,summing over N firms and 
manipulating thier equations they obtain the following 
expression,
P ~ c(XA = -1 + X (h)
P NE
Thus the Lerner1 Index of monopoly power is oppositely 
related to the number of firms in the industry and elasticity 
of demand. If E is constant across industries, a fall in N 
will reduce output and price will rise, which in turn should 
increase the price cost margin. For more general model see 
footnote 3 chapter 5.
He Where II = Profit 
X = Output 
F — Fixed cost 
c = Variable cost
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is a mixture of half explanations. Is this a good paradigm in 
explaining why there are inter-industry differences in 
concentration, and particularly in the way concentration, and 
performance are related? This idea of a chain of causation 
running from structure to conduct to performance has come to 
be increasingly questioned.
The Structure-Performance analytical framework is derived 
from the traditional micro economic theory of perfect 
competition and monopoly. If we study the assumptions of 
perfect competition and compare them with what we observe in 
practice we notice in the first instance that instead of many 
small firms the economy is dominated by medium/large firms 
with significant market shares. Explanations regarding this 
phenomenon of concentration of the manufacturing sector 
provided by traditional micro economic theory are weak: it
provides loose explanations about the determinants of the 
structure of industry, and it is commonly hypothesized that 
economies of scale, barriers to entry and size of market are 
the determinants of concentraction George and Curry [1983]. 
Such an approach gives only a snap-shot view of the 
competitive process, because it relies on static analysis. For 
a complete and a more reliable analysis it is important that 
the enquiry is extended over a longer period of time.In that 
case one will not only be identifying whether the factors that 
determine the levels of concentration at one point of time are 
the same for another point of time, but will also investigate 
if the variables explaining the levels of concentration are
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important in explaining the changes in concentration as well. 
Thus a-priori no firm predictions can be made about the 
determinants of concentration. It is quite possible that the 
variables expl^ning the levels of concentration at one point 
of time may not be relevant at other points of time, and for 
explaining changes in concentration. Similarly it is difficult 
to identify whether the top firms having a significant market 
share previously are the same in order of ranking over a 
period of time. Small firms may grow and in the long run, 
dominate the market. Or all firms start from the same initial 
position but over time turn out different in size even when 
each firm has the same probability attached to its growth 
rate. It then implies that the relative growth of firms depend 
on purely chance effects. Kalecki,M. [1945]).
What then determines concentration? From the above 
discussion it is understood that concentration is partly 
determined by systematic forces such as the optimum size of 
plant, capital / labour ratio, industry size, government 
regulatory policies, and partly by random forces like luck, 
uncertainty, change in political and economic enviornment 
both internally and externally, etc. For empirical analysis it 
is relatively easy to measure the effect of the systematic 
forces, as data sources, although not very reliable, are 
available. However it is not possible to specify and 
statistically measure the random variables. They can vary from 
firm to firm and need not be related to the size of firm. 
Hymer and Pashigian [1962] Edwin Mansfied [1963]; Singh and
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Whittington [1968] and [1975] and Marcus [1969].
Furthermore, from the traditional micro theoretic view,
we understand that the aim of the firms is to maximize
profits. Obviously to them the number and size of firms under
©
perfect competition and monopoly are the important determinants 
of performance. Under perfect competition price equals 
marginal cost, there are no profits in the long run and 
resources are optimally allocated. On the contrary high sales 
prices, excess profits, X- inefficiency, excess capacity and 
high wages are the evils associated with monopoly power. Such 
an explanation of performance under perfect competition and 
monopoly is static and leaves little scope for changes 
overtime which affect performance from a broader view point. 
Whatever explanations of performance are offered by theory 
when compared with real world we notice that the optimizing 
behaviour of a firm is just a part of a set of often 
complicated and conflicting objectives. Large firms may be 
aware of their size and market power and in order to secure 
and maintain their dominant position they may have to satisfy 
various groups like customers, the government authorities and 
the trade unions by passing on part of their profits to the 
. workers in the form of high wages and other 
benefits. So optimizing behaviour does not imply short run 
profit maximisation but a number of objectives for which the 
firm tries to attain a certain target.
Similarly, Jacquemin and Dejong [1977] State:
"... It is dangerous to compare the monopolistic and perfect
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competition equilibria. Cost and demand conditions may be 
radically different. The monopolist might use indivisible 
equipment which would assure him very low production costs. 
His output may be short of that obtained where price equals 
marginal cost, but such an output might still be higher than 
under perfect competition. The competitive firms would be too
small to utilize the large scale indivisible equipment....
the welfare of individuals depend on a much broader range of 
performance than that taken into account by the perfect 
competition model. For example, a perfectly competitive market 
will probably not undertake sufficient investment in Research 
and Development because of high risks involved" (p.4).
It has also been stated by Nixon, Lee and Kil,R. atric*
[1984] that where changes in concentration have a greater
chance of influencing the rate of technical progress and
innovation in an industry or increasing the capacity of
manufacturing products then one should be more optimistic
about changes in welfare over the long term, and may not
<v
dwell on the usual micro economic implications of a 
concentrated structure. While reviewing the literature it was 
found that such a phenomenon was revealed in a number of less 
developed countries, where especially the foreign owned 
enterprises by exploiting the technical and marketing benefits 
in large scale manufacturing sector were earning a higher rate 
of return than their local counterparts who fail to exploit 
such opportunities.
More recently Schumpeter's theory on technical change,
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industrial structure and development have been tested. 
According to which it is advocated that non-price competition 
like expenditure on product differentiation, skill and 
research and development play a more important role in 
industrial structure and development rather than the 
traditional price competition. If this is true then in most 
less developed countries the current strategies of public 
policy will have to be changed substantially. N.S. Siddhartan 
[1984] lends support to the above hypothesis; he finds that 
industries with fast technical change earned high profits 
because they produced differentiated products and spent more 
on research and development.
Even if we accept that high profit rates and high con 
centration are found together there are two major
controversies one relating to interpretation and the other to 
statistics. Many of those who first tested for the
Structure-Performance hypothesis interpreted the positive 
relationship as an evidence of monopoly power. More recently 
others suggest that such results are consistent with
competition. It is quite possible that some firms earn above
normal profits and have a large market share because of either 
technological reasons or they may possess some other 
capabilities which their rivals do not have. In that case 
above average profit is a reward of superior performance 
rather than monopoly returns. So the problem is that even if 
we can decide that there is a relationship between 
concentration and profitability it does not really tell us
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whether it is a result of competition and efficiency or 
monopoly power. For an effective economic policy it is 
important to distinguish one situation from the other, 
otherwise policy may do more harm than good. However it may 
not be easy to draw a line between the two situations, (see 
discussion in chapter-7). In view of the above problems it is 
suggested that it would be useful to use other indicators of 
performance than just using profits as a performance criterion 
and to focus on the long-term direct impact of concentration 
on the development process. For example Holterman [1974] 
suggests the use of labour and capital productivity as 
indicators of performance. And Banerji [1981] associated 
performance with the industries, ability to raise employment, 
wages and exports. One other advantage of using these other 
indicators of performance is that the data is easily available 
and is fairly reliable, whereas profit data available are 
tenuous; the errors in the accounting data are not random 
which introduce a systematic bias into the reported values of 
the rate of return.
Then there are problems of a statistical nature; if we 
examine the statistical work starting with Bain, on the one 
hand there have been a series of such studies which suggest 
that there is a positive relation between concentration and 
profits, while on the other hand there are some studies that 
have shown that there is a loose relationship Bain [1951], 
Stigler [1963]. Then we have another set of results Brozen 
[1971] , showing that if we take different time periods and not
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just one point of time, this positive relationship between 
concentration and profits that others have found tends to 
disappear. Results based on data for one point of time could 
be picking more of the disequilbrium effect rather than the 
actual concentration profitability relation. There is a 
possibility that the positive relationship found in the U.S
is typical for certain phases of the business cycle.2/.(s^
2. Various studies differ in all sorts of ways from each other.
Studies differ in their sample size, the range of industries 
covered, the degree of disaggregation of the data, the time 
period (some are 1 year some are 2 or 3 years) . The number 
and kind of other independent variables included such as risk 
and disequilibrium etc.
The question is to what extent any particular industry and 
its results are highly specific to that sample and period. In 
other words to what extent in these studies one is drawing 
from a random population for testing the hypothesis. In this 
regard a few points are made to show what the snags are and 
how they tend to confuse the debate in the discussion of the 
question.
a).The earliest study was done by Bain [1951], he takes
a sample of 42 industries for the year 193 6-40 and calculates 
profit for the top largest firms in each of the 4 2 ii^ustries 
and correlates profit and concentration, the correlation 
coefficient is found as 0.28, which is not large but not 
minute either. Dividing the sample between high and low 
concentration he found that where CR was above 0.70 profit on 
average was 11.8 and where CR was below 0.70 profit was 7.5. 
Brozen [1970] set out to replicate the study with more upto 
date data. Using the same approach, with a bigger sample he 
found that for the period 1953-57 (Postwar Span) profit was
11. 7‘/.and 10. 6/,which suggest that there was no difference 
between concentrated and unconcentrated industries. He 
conjectured that Bain's answer was accidental and he had hit 
upon a period when industries were in dis-equilibrium in 
adjusting the capacity to demand and also in the structure of 
the industry itself. And some industries were undergoing 
changes towards a more concentrated form in which the leading 
firms being larger were already enjoying economies of scale 
which made them earn high rate of return on capital which 
influenced the profitability figure in concentrated 
industries.
This explanation is not as conclusive, because it would than 
be very odd that Brozen had hit upon^a period where all 
industries were more or less in equilbrium. With respect to
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Thus the Structure-Performance paradigm on which most of 
the empirical work is based raise serious questions and hence 
the inferences drawn are not reliable. Some recent work by 
Clark and Davies [1982] has suggested that the problem is 
not so simple and straight forward as is understood in most 
of the empirical studies. To them the chain of causation that 
structure influences performance is not one way. The issue is 
that both profitability and concentration are determined 
simultaneously. Then in that case the previous results of 
ordinary least squares are invalid and one would derive quite 
different policy inferences.
Apart from the above problems there are difficulties 
which are only relevant to the less developed countries. 
Statistically testing the model for industrially less 
developed countries may need to be modified and extended to
capacity and the structure of the industry. Nevertheless what 
Bain's study shows is that a lot does depend on not only how 
one set up the problem but also on the period of the sample 
chosen.
b). The same sort of problem relates to a later set of work by 
Schwartzman [1959]. He took industries which are con­
centrated in Canada and less concentrated in the U.S and he 
compared the profitability of the same period between the 
Nothern and the Southern borders. On the basis of his sample 
he found prices were about 8.3% higher in Canada (after 
allowing for other cost differences).
Afterwards Jean. [1975] replicate the study with a better 
sample, less subject to criticism. She did the same exercise 
for three different years 1958,1963 and 1967. In . each case 
she found no significant difference between Canada*) profits 
and U.S profits for industries which were more concentrated 
above the border. She proved that the author of the earlier 
study had happened to stumble on the sample and the time 
period in which there was disequilibrium.
c).See Foot Note 9 Chapter 5.
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allow for the country specific circumstances and problems. We 
do not wish to comment on such problems here; we will however 
bring them to notice while reviewing the literature about 
less developed countries and particularly in the case of 
Pakistan.
All the above criticisms of the Structure Performance 
paradigm do not in any case imply we are minimizing the 
importance of the Structure-Performance model. Undoubtedly it 
provides a useful starting point. Nevertheless, the 
conclusion of this section is that unlike the traditional 
approach the structure of industry needs to be examined both 
in a static sense and overtime. And the concept of performance 
can not be restricted to the profit earnings of an enterprise. 
The traditional concept of optimality is narrow, it needs to 
be understood in a broader perspective, as a set of targets, 
taking into account the influence various groups like trade 
unions, consumers, government regulatory policies have and of 
course country specific problems.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE:
This section is divided into two parts. Part one contains 
empirical evidence on the measurement of concentration at 
industry level, determinants of the levels and changes in 
concentration over time. The second part will review studies 
testing the structure-performance hypothesis.
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Concentration at Industry Level:
The prime task here is to review the studies explaining the 
patterns of concentration at the industry level in less 
developed countries. But for purpose of comparison we will 
also turn briefly to the attempts made at explaining the 
patterns of concentration in developed countries.
The majority of the studies on industrial structure try to 
answer questions like:
1. Whether there is an increasing or decreasing trend in the 
share of the few largest firms in the production and 
employment of the manufacturing sector at the industry level.
2. What the relationship is between the level of concentration 
and the market size.
3. Whether the ranking of average size of establishments in 
individual industries is similar across countries.
4. What are the determinants of concentration in manufacturing 
industry.
We will review empirical evidence providing answers to 
the above questions one by one. Our own results regarding 
these questions are reported in chapters four and five.
1. An important issue in the analysis of industry structure 
is whether there is a tendency for the production of 
individual products to become increasingly concentrated in 
the hands of a few large firms. As far as studies about trends 
and changes in concentration in advanced countries are 
concerned the literature is abundant and quite clear. In case
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of less developed countries empirical evidence in the first 
place is inadequate and that too is difficult to compare 
because of different measures of concentration used; we will
therefore report the main findings of some of the studies
. Un­available to us . For example , m A case of Pakistan four
studies measured aggregate and individual industry
concentration . First, Papanek [1967] reports that 7 largest
families owned one fifth of the industrial assets and 15
largest families controlled three fourth of the shares in
banks and insurance companies . Second, Haq [1968] believes
that 20 to 22 largest families controlled 66 percent of total
assets of Pakistan manufacturing industry ,70 to 8 0 percent of
insurance and banking assets . Third, White [1974 ] suggests
that out of 197 nonfinancial companies listed on Karachi stock
exchange 43 families controlled 97 of these companies in other
words they owned 53 percent of the total assets of companies
listed . A slightly disaggregated picture shows that the top
4, 10, 20, 3 0 and 43 families controlled 20, 35.5, 46, 51 and
53.1 percent of all assets respectively. Finally comparing
these percentages with those of 1962 he finds that the
percentage share of the top 2 0 groups declined slightly but
the percentage share of all the 43 groups remained relatively
the same. Lately, Shirwani [1976] compared levels of two-firm
concentration ratio (CR2 ) in Pakistan for four years
(1968,1969,1970,1973) over a period of seven years. His
results show a slightly rising trend in eleven a declining
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tendency in twelve and no trend in three industries,3/ . He also
found that the ranking of industries remained fairly stable
over the period for which concentration ratios are calculated.
The main problem with all these studies is that they
are restricted to the earlier period of development and the
time span covered is too short to reveal any conclusive
results. Furthermore the choice of concentration measures is
arbitrary and based on difficult data like assets and capacity 
*of firms. Most studies as we will see below take CR4 or CR5 
as a reasonable concentration ratio measured as percentage 
share of the top 4 or 5 firms in manufacturing value added , 
employment or sales . In a study on India Gosh [1975] 
calculated changes in four and eight firm concentration 
ratios over a span of 20 years (1948, 1953, 1958, 1963 and
1968) . He reports that in the majority of the industries the 
level of concentration was persistently high over the period. 
However changes in CR4 showed a declining pattern over the two
ifs- , , ,
decades;Aconcentration ratio decreased m  18 industries and 
increased in only 4 industries. It is noteworthy that the 
decline in concentration ratios was highest in the
fastest growing industries like engineering, chemical, paper,
3. The industries experiencing rising trend were leather
footwear, fertilizer, cement, tins and cans, woolen textiles, 
leather tanning, paints, glass products, communications, acids, 
alkalies, silk, cotton textiles and jute textiles and the ones 
declining were tea, cigarettes, oil refinery,paper, machinery, 
beverages, electric motors, vanaspati, sugar, and iron and 
steel. And no trend was reported in case of alcholic 
beverages, industrial gases, matches etc. He however did not 
mention the reason for this rising trend.
T e c & ' m . c e t C  p. *
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cement, glass and rubber etc. And the industries experiencing
. c . . ,r> ,an increase in conentration ratios were .the traditional sectorft *
like jute and cotton textiles^ and the drugs industry, which of 
course does not belong to the traditional sector. But it is 
understandable that the drugs industry has an increasing 
pattern of concentration because the nature of the industry is 
highly innovative and requires increased size of research and 
development expenditure to improve the quality of the product, 
which overtime will squeeze out small firms. Furthermore the 
pattern of changes in concentration ratios was not uniform 
overtime.Most of the industries experienced a decline in 
concentration ratios during 1953-63 when the economy was 
experiencing maximum growth, before and after this period 
concentration ratios hardly changed. He further compares the 
two ratios; CR4 and CR8 , and finds that the same trend of 
high concentration prevailed during the two decades for both 
the measures. Nam.W.H.[1975] calculated the magnitude of 
changes in overall concentration between 1966 and 1969, in 
Korea. He estimated the weighted average aggregate 
concentration index. Using the output in each industry as 
weights. The results reveal a persistent increase in the 
trend in concentration of Korean industrial sector, which he 
states could be the result of changes either in concentration 
within industries or in the relative importance of different 
industries like cement and fertilizer and import substitute 
and export industries favoured by government policies.
As far as developed countries are concerned there is
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enough evidence suggesting that on average the level of 
concentration in U.K and U.S has significantly increased over 
the past few decades. For example in U.K the general rise in 
the trend was confirmed by the estimates of Evely and Little
[1960], Armstrong and Silberston [1965], Hannah and Kay [1977] 
and Hart and Clark [1980] . The estimates of Scherer [1980] for 
Tk'U.S show the same. However comparing the trends of consumer 
and producer goods industries separately, Caves and Porter 
[1980] found that concentration increases in the case of 
consumer goods industries and is declining in the producers 
goods industries.
Most authors considered economies of scale, barriers to 
entry and mergers as important factors responsible for rising 
concentration. However, if we rank industries according to 
concentration and compare the rankings across countries, and 
if&same industries are ranked as more concentrated then 
technological factors may be responsible for /Klhigh
concentration.
2. Some of the studies have tested the second hypothesis that 
the levels of concentration are higher in industrially less 
developed countries than in developed countries particularly 
U.S. provided that the size of the market is small. Bain 
[1966], Merhave [1969], White [1974] and Lall [1979] found 
evidence in support of the above hypothesis. This hypothesis 
is based on the belief that because less developed countries 
have smaller domestic markets therefore one or fewer optimum 
size enterprises are required to satisfy domestic demand,
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whereas for a big country like U.S many optimum size
enterprises are required to fulfill the domestic demand 
(Merhav [19 69]. Furthermore the optimum size enterprises are 
approximately similar across all countries, and finally, the 
relevant market faced by an enterprise of maximum efficient 
size is the domestic demand, implying implicity or explicitly 
that the openness of the economy is not significant.
This line of thinking has been criticized and as 
discussed earlier, there is ample evidence about trends in 
concentration levels contrary to what is suggested by the 
belief that less developed countries are more concentrated 
than the developed countries. The reason why over time large 
fimrs have taken over a growing proportion of activity in 
advanced countries is that for technological reasons minimum 
efficient size has grown immensly without the market having 
grown correspondingly. Technological change has replaced 
labour and resulted in capital intensive methods of 
production which often (though not always) increases minimum 
efficient size . Mass production reduces prices and some small 
firms will be squeezed out. So other things remaining the 
same, concentration increases if minimum efficient size grows 
faster than the expansion of the market. On the contrary, in 
practice, the plant size tends to be smaller in less developed 
countries, Banerji [1978], because firstly, they use older 
technologies with lower minimum efficient size; even if the 
situation is otherwise, i.e technological change is taking 
place the size of the market is also growing which leaves
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little scope for the large firms to take over a growing 
proportion of activity.4/. Secondly, the informal sector in 
less developed countries, which is unaccounted for in all 
studies, mainly uses local technology because of differences 
in relative factor prices and administrative reasons. The 
minimum efficient size of such enterprises would be small 
compared to the minimum efficient size of an enterprise in 
advanced countries; and many such enterprises could be 
accommodated easily contrary to the belief that one or few 
optimum size enterprises are sufficient to meet the domestic 
demands of a less developed country. Finally, the majority of 
the studies do not take account of the fact that most
fftt.
industries i n A U.S are regional and not national. In that case 
the average concentration ratio is grossly underestimated and 
if this phenomenon is taken into account the results of the 
above studies may be reversed. In an international comparison 
of concentration ratios, Proyer [1972] found evidence in 
support of the above consideration. The weighted average 
concentration ratios were roughly similar for U.S, France, 
W. Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands and the U.K. From these 
results two conclusions can be drawn; first, the similarity 
of pattern in ranking industries by concentration across 
countries undermines the role of chance events that might be 
held responsible if ranking was dissimilar across countries.
4. See Table [3.9] for comparison of minimum optimum scale of 
some of Pakistan's industries with the international standards 
and it is found, minimum optimum scale in Pakistan is smaller 
than in the developed countries.
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But on the other hand the similarity is not so complete, so 
that there is some scope for chance events influencing 
concentration levels. Secondly, that the degree of 
concentration is related to the size of the market and not 
the level of development, is not all that unexpected, but it 
is difficult to know the relevant market.
With such results in hand one is confused with the 
studies asserting beliefs otherwise Haq[1968] White[1974]: 
that the establishment and firm level concentration are higher 
in less developed countries, and at the same time expecting 
that the pressure of oligopolitic market structure will reduce 
with the expansion of the manufacturing sector and the level 
of development. There is no evidence to confirm that the 
concentration level will decline with the level of 
development, nor can we guarantee such a relationship to hold 
with the passage of time, because as we examine below, the 
studies dealing with the third hypothesis listed at the 
begining, it is found that the ranking of industries according 
to average plant size also reveals a similar pattern across 
both the developed and less developed countries. Again this is 
suggesting that the level of economic development is not 
central to the analysis of industrial structure.
3. Some evidence regarding the third hypothesis of whether 
the ranking of average size of establishments in individual 
industries is similar across countries is provided by three 
studies. Tietal [1965] and Banerji [1978] found that in 
general the ranking of industries according to the average
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size of establishment is somewhat similar among the developed 
and less developed countries. However some differences existed 
between the two studies, as Banerji [1978] found that in 
industries like tobacco, basic metals, chemicals and paper 
products the average size of establishments was larger in most 
countries: Whereas Tietal [1965] found that the high ranking 
industries in his study were petroleum products and 
beverages. Both the studies observed that textile and clothing 
industries had the lowest rank in terms of the average size 
of establishment. In another study of international comparison 
of concentration ratios, Proyer [1972] ranked the 
manufacturing industries of twelve nations according to their 
weighted average concentration and the pattern of average 
rankings of these weighted average concentration ratios 
emerged to be more or less similar in all twelve nations. 
Proyer [1972] like Banerji [1978] had found that concentration 
in all the nations (developed and semi-developed) is highest 
among the industries in the tobacco, transport equipment, 
machinery, petroleum and coal products, and lowest in the 
furniture, lumber products, clothing, leather, textiles and 
beverages. Implying that the same kind of industries 
experience a concentrated structure, it is then clear that 
forces making for«/)Oligopolistic structure in a particular 
industry are similar in all countries irrespective of the 
country's economic position or degree of free market 
competition.
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4. Determinants of the Level of Concentration:
Most of the empirical work is carried out with the a priori 
assumption that concentration is an important part of the 
structure of industry; therefore concentration and its effects 
need to be examined carefully. It is perfectly reasonable to 
follow the above procedure but a question missed out by most 
of the studies is why concentration exists in the first place. 
Instead of focusing on what is happening at an instant it is 
important to examine the behaviour of various firms overtime 
which may provide some information about the existence of 
concentration in certain industries. A shortcoming of most of 
the studies is that they restrict their analysis to the 
explanation of the levels of concentration at a point of time, 
using cross-section data for a year. Only a few studies 
attempt to carry their analysis further to examine what 
determines the changes in concentration. We will first review 
studies explaining the levels of concentration and secondly 
those analysing changes in concentration.
Table (2.1 and 2.2) give a few details about some of the 
studies investigating the determinants of concentration in the 
developed and less developed countries. Most of the studies 
explain inter-industry variations in the levels of 
concentration by means of regression analysis, where the 
simple concentration ratio has been used as the dependent 
variable and the explanatory variables suggested are minimum 
efficient size of plant, market size, barrers to entry andA
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growth rate of industry. However in less developed countries 
empirical evidence about the determinants of market structure 
is inadequate; only a few attempts have been made and those 
too show no uniformity of results.
We will examine the results according to some of the 
variables commonly used. Almost all the studies in Table 2.1 
and 2.2 suggest the importance of the plant economies of scale 
as a determinant of concentration. It is quite possible that 
technological differences across industries determine their 
concentration levels, as for certain industries, to lower 
costs per unit, technological changes are necessary.
Empirical studies relied on three measures of plant scale 
economies: i) The mid-point plant size Weiss (1963). ii) The 
average plant size Commanor and Wilson [1967] iii) The 
minimum efficient plant Lyons measure [1980]. The first is a 
hypothetical plant size such that "half of the output of an 
industry comes from plants larger than its mid point plant and 
half from the smaller plants" (p 73). The justification for 
using this measure is that the observed size distribution of 
plants will be close to the minimum efficient size of plant, 
and so some measure of central tendency like the median will 
provide an approximate measure of the minimum efficient 
size.He justifies the use of this proxy by suggesting that the
mid point " ..... is unlikely to be sub optimal." (p 73). All
the researchers, Weiss [1963], Strickland and Weiss [1976], 
Hart and Clarke[1980] using this measure of plant scale 
economies got similar results and same as those who used the
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Table 2.1: Determinants of The 
Concentration
Levels 
in U.K
of
and
Industry
U.S.
Author MES AS PF INS ICR ASR IG
z
R
Saving 1961 i * + i * + 0.55
Commanor & 
Wilson 1967 i * + i * + 0.81
Pashigian
1969
i * + i * - 0.74
Greer 1971 i * + i + i * + i- 0.91
Guth 1971 
Sawyer 1971
i
i
* + 
■k + i * +
i * + i -(1958) 
+(1963)
0.71
0.72
Porter 1974 i * + i * + i- 0.85
Strickland 
& Weissl976 i * + i * + 0.49
Lyons 19 80 i * + i * + 0.47
Hart & 
Clarke 1980 i * + i * + i * - 0.85
Notes: 1. i denotes a variable included in the analysis.
2. * denotes significance level at 5% level.
Whereas: MES= Plant scale economies. AS= Average firm size.
PF = Plants per firm. INS= Industry size 
ICR= Initial capital requirement. ASR= Advertising 
sales ratio. IG= Industry Growth.
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Table 2.2: Determinants of The Levels of Industry
Concentration for Less Developed Countries.
Author MES 
& Countrv
AS INS ICR IG K/L ASR NF I/S D Ri
Nam 1975 i * + i + i * + i + l.M 0.85
Korea. +
2.X
+
3 . S
*+
Charles i * + i - i + i -
00•01-H
Philippines
1977
Gan & i + i + i * + 0. 25
Tham.
Malaysia.
1977
Sandesara.i * + i * - 0.46
India.
1979
Notes: 1. i denotes a variable oncluded in the analysis.
2. * denotes significance lavel at 5% level.
Whereas: MES= plant scale economies. AS= average size.
INS= industry size.ICR= absolute capital requirement.
IG= industry growth. K/L= capital labour ratio. 
ASR= advertising sales ratio. NF= number of firms. 
I/S= import sales ratio. D= dummy.
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Commanor and Wilson measure [1967] of optimal scale, that is 
the mean size of plant. They suggest the use of "the average 
plant size amongst the largest plants accounting for 50% of 
industry output.” (p 428). This proxy is larger than the mid­
point and the rationale for its use is the same as above and 
it is close to the direct physical measures or engineering 
estimate, of minimum efficient size Greer [1971] and Guth 
[1971] Porter [1974] Nam [1975] Lindsey [1977] and Gan Tham 
[1977] all used the Commanor and Wilson measure of MES and 
except for the latter they found that it performed equally 
well in their equations.
However these results need to be treated with caution 
because the above two minimum efficient size measures are not 
strictly justified in terms of a theoretical approach; they 
are indirect measures of the direct measures of optimal plant
Unfortunately it is shown by Davies [1980] that both the 
above mentioned proxies do not satisfy the above conditions; 
they tend to overstate the minimum efficient size derived 
from the direct methods. He casts doubt on the common use of 
proxies and shows that if they are related to concentration 
itself, this renders the use of the proxies very doubtful.
To overcome the above problems Lyons [198 0] suggested a
third measure, according to which 11..... a firm utilizing two
plants will be producing at least MESP output, . . . . ” (p20) .so he 
estimates the expected number of plants set up by a firm of a 
given size.He uses this estimate to generate the estimates for
size, engineering
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MEP. This method requires simple Census of production data. 
This measure of minimum efficient size is closely related to 
the direct measure of minimum efficient size, the survivor 
technique used by Stigler [1958]. Besides the above measures 
of minimum efficient size some researchers like Haldi and 
Whitecombe [19 67] and Pratton [1965] have used the 
engineering estimates while Johnston [1960] used the 
statistical cost data. Others like, Stigler [1958], Saving 
[1961] Sheperd [1967], Rees [1973]. have used the survivor 
method. Unlike the proxies used for minimum efficient size, 
all these methods are direct measures of MES, but the results 
based on these measures are also not free from errors, either 
because of data limitations or because of the weakness of the 
measure itself.
Another variable, number of plants/firm ratio, is used to 
capture the effect of multi-plant economies of scale, Saving
[1961], Sawyer [1971] and Hart and Clarke [1980] incorporate 
this variable in their studies and find it to be significant. 
However there are problems with this proxy measure of 
multi-plants economies of scale. A firm may not be operating 
with multi-plant in order to gain economies of scale, it 
could be doing so to spread the plant specific risks. Another 
problem is that the proxy may be def initionally related to the 
dependent variables through a simple identity.
It has also been hypothesized that the size of the 
industry will influence the concentration ratio inversely. 
Pashigian [1969], Sandesara [1979] and Hart and Clarke [1980]
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lend support to the hypothesis, however Charles.W [1977] 
found a negative but non-significant relationship between 
concentration and industry size.
Other determinants of the levels of concentration 
suggested by some of the studies are some measures of 
barriers to entry; for example absolute capital requirement 
and product differentation. The higher the capital required 
for MES plant size, other things remaining the same, the less 
likely is entry and therefore the higher is concentration 
level. The theoretical link between the dependent and 
independent variable is loose and the evidence found is that 
the regression coefficient has positive sign [usuallly
insignificant] and the results are not uniform. It is 
interesting to note that Nam.W.H. [1975] and Gan & Tham 
[1977] do not lend support to the commonly believed hypothesis 
that absolute capital requirement is a stronger barrier to 
entry in less deveoped countries than the developed countries. 
It may be that capital is a barrier but not an absolute 
barrier (or binding constraint) to entry. Or it may be that 
non-significant results are a reflection of poor accounting 
practices in less developed countries regarding the 
measurement of capital.
The rational for incorporating product differentiation as 
an independent variable in most studies is that the more the 
products are differentiated the lower is the cross elasticity 
of demand between rival products; hence it makes entry 
difficult. How it is proxied is by taking the ratio of
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advertising expenditure to sales denoted as advertising 
intensity. Although it has a positive coefficient in the 
regression equations of most studies, (not all) it is argued 
that it is not a good proxy because we are trying to get a 
measure which picks up the relevant aspects of product 
differentiation which is reasonably consistent across 
industries. So industries with high advertising/sales ratio 
have more product differentiation barriers to entry than 
industries with low advertising/sales ratio. Why one would not 
expect consistency in the results is because i) In some 
industries one would expect a much higher level of 
advertising because of the nature of innovation in the 
industry. If the rate of innovation in a drug company is high 
it has to advertise more than a drug company with slow 
innovation. So such advertisments have something to do with 
the product and not with barriers to entry ii) part of the 
advertising expenditure in some industries is distilling 
relevant information to consumers this would in fact increase 
cross elasticity of demand. One expects the information 
component may be bigger in one industry than in others, and as 
long as the ratio varies from one industry to another one 
could get inconsistency in results, iii) A more serious 
problem discussed by Martin [1979] is that of simultaneity of 
the relationship, some studies hypothesise that 
advertising/sales explains concentration, but it may be that 
concentration is a cause of advertising intensity so that we 
get a wrong specification of the model. For example an
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industry is relatively unconcentrated becomes more 
concentrated and in the long-run price competition becomes 
neutral. To maintain its dominant position it may lead to 
more non-price competition which includes more advertising so 
the advertising/sales ratio rise Siddharten [1984].
To sum up on advertising intensity: not only is it
difficult to relate it to concentration but there are 
problems of measurement as well.
In spite of the shortcomings of much of the statistical 
analysis it is realized that the optimum plant size is an 
important variable in explaining inter-industry differences in 
concentration. However it is also realized that the 
explanatory power of plant scale economies is modest.
Studies about less developed countries are few and they 
are incomplete. In most of the models tested, one important 
variable relevant to the situation in less developed 
countries is government policies on matters of monopolies, 
import controls, protection, nationalization and investment 
sanctioning license which can influence concentration levels, 
is ignored. For example, White [1974] argues that to maintain 
and establish market power significant barriers to entry are 
required. Economies of scale may be a relevant barrier to 
entry but it does not explain all the industrial 
concentration. More important barriers to entry in less 
developed countries are government policies which create 
scarcity of resources by stringent licencing policies regarding 
the import of inputs. However he did not support his argument
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by statistically testing the strength of the two barriers to 
entry in affecting concentration.5/.
Determinants of change in concentration:
In the case of advanced economies several attempts have been 
made to carry the research about determinants of concentration 
one step further by explaining changes in industrial 
concentration using time series data in a multiple regression 
analysis. Both the dependent and independent variables are 
measured in terms of proportionate changes. However hardly any 
effort is made in less developed countries to explain the 
changes in industrial concentration. Tables (2.3 and 2.4) 
provide a summary of the studies undertaken by various 
authors for developed and less developed countries 
separately.
Most of the studies hypothesise.that besides the initial 
level of concentration the variables which determine the 
levels of concentration, changes in those variables, must be 
able to explain some of the changes in concentration. We will 
review the literature about proportionate changes in
5. He simply tested the relationship between dominant families 
(A) in 1968 and foreign exchange licensing (FFL). His result, 
as below indicate a strong relationship between family 
dominance and
A = 75.17 + 1.95 FEL R = 0.43
(3.80) (5.62)
the receipt of foreign exchange licenses. What White found, is 
true for that period, as discussed earlier, licenses were 
distributed in a way to increase concentration.
concentration according to the findings of the studies by 
discussing the variables included in the regression analysis 
by most of the studies.
As a whole most studies suggest that the level of initial 
concentration seems to be highly correlated with the changes 
in concentration. The hypothesis tested is that the higher 
the initial level of concentration the smaller is the likely 
change in concentration. Besides the economic justification 
of the use of initial level of concentration, it is expected 
that the high correlation may be observed for statistical 
reasons because the limiting values of concentration are zero 
and one. So if an industry is highly concentrated one would 
expect the changes in concentration in that industry to be 
small and vice-versa. Most of the studies in Table (2.3) 
found the initial level of concentration as highly 
significant in their regression equations.
A second important variable included in most of the 
studies is the industy's growth. It is hypothesized that 
concentration changes are going to be less in case of faster 
growing industries than in the industries with a slow growth 
process. One would expect that the industry growth will have 
a negative influence on changes in concentration. Empirical 
evidence is not so clear because quite a few studies such as 
Sheperd [1966] and Gratten and Kemp [1977] show that industry 
growth and changes in concentration are positively related.
Few studies used changes in the optimal plant size to 
explain changes in concentration. Except for one study Caves
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Table 2.3: Determinants of Changes in Concentration
in Developed Countries.
Author IG DMES PD ASR ICR INS DNF R2
Evely & i * - i * + NC
Little.
Nelson i * - 11
Weiss i * + i * + "
Sheperd i * - i * - i * — "
Sheperd i + "
Sawyerer i * - i * + i * - 0.3 2
Sheperd i i * - 0.10
Ducheneaui + i - 0.48
Muller & i * — i * 4- i * - i - i * - 0 . 3 6
Hamm
Aaronovi- i * - 0.12
tch & Sawyer
Gratton i -  i - i * - 0.34
& Kamp.
Wright i -  i * + i * - i - 0.44
Muller i - i * + i * + i * ” i -  0.36
& Hamm
Hart & i * - i * + i + i * - 0.40
Clarke
Caves & i - i + i * - 0 . 1 5
Porter
Notes: l. i denotes a variable included in the analysis.
2. * denotes significance at the 5% level.
Whereas: IG= industry growth. DMES= change in optimal 
plant size. PD= product differentiation. ASR= 
advertising sales ratio. ICR= initial level of 
concentration. INS« industry size.DNF= changes in 
number of firms. NC= not calculated.
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Table 2.4: Determinants of Changes in Industry Concentration
for Less Developed Countries.
z.
Researcher ICR IG DNF R
& Country____________________________________________________
Ghosh.A 1975 i * - 0.37
India.
i * - i * - 0.26
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and Porter [1980], the studies found that changes in the 
technical economies at the plant level was an important 
variable. However it has to be appreciated that the measurement 
of changes in the optimal plant size variable are measured for 
a short period of 8- 10 years. Therefore the regression
results are unable to pick up fully the effect of a change in 
the minimum efficient size of the plant which would have been 
revealed if changes were based on a longer period.
Other determinants of changes in concentration used by 
some of the studies are product differentiation,
advertising-sales ratio and changes in the number of firms. 
All the studies uniformly lend support to the hypothesis that 
product differentiation has a positive effect and changes in 
the number of firms has a negative influence on the changes in 
concentration. Results on advertising-sales ratio varied 
across studies. Only Muller and Hamm [198 0] found a 
significant positive effect of advertising-sales ratio on the 
changes in concentration.
With the exception of one study Gosh [1975] , 
statistical evidence about the changes in concentration in 
less-developed countries is not available. His results are 
mentioned in Table (2.4) and it is interesting to see that his 
study revealed a similar pattern of results as showed by 
studies mentioned in Table (2.3).
From the results of studies in Table (2.3 and 2.4) we 
learn that industry growth and the initial level of 
concentration appear to be the most important variables
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determining the changes in concentration. However the overall
explanatory power of the variables has been low as indicated
by the R s compared to the results in Table (2.1 and 2.2).
The unexplained variation is large which indicates that other
forces are more powerful than the static determinants of
%
concentration. Furthermore poor R s also means that the 
changes in the independent variables are not accuratly 
measured; to have more reliable evidence about changes in 
variables it would be better to take changes over a longer 
period of time.
STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE:
While reviewing the results of some of the studies exploring 
relationship between concentration and profitability we will 
briefly mention the evidence reported in Table 2.5 about U.S 
the U.K and E.E.C but we do not wish to engage in any 
discussion about their results. However in the case of less 
developed countries we will discuss their results fully. Our 
discussion will focus on the three well known studies of 
Pakistan, White [1974], Shirwani[1976] and Amjad [1977], 
measuring concentration levels and its effects on profit. 
Results of studies on other less developed countries will also 
be brought to light while comparing their findings with the 
evidence found in the case of Pakistan.
The pioneering work on Structure-Performance models was 
done by Bain [1951] for U.S data. As explained earlier he
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Table 2.5: Levels of Profitability Concentration and Other
Variables. Regression Results for Developed 
Countries.
Author CR 
&Countrv.
K/O IG MES ASR M/S X EPR D ACR R&D it
Commonari - 
&Wilson
i + i + i*+ i*+ .47
Blake & i+* 
Helmberger 
U.S 1971
i- i+* i+ i+ .47
Sheperd i + 
U.K.1972
i-* i*+ . 11
Holterm i + 
an U.K.1973
i*+i*+ i + i*+ .45
Khalilz i + 
adeh. U.K. 
1974
Strickl i*+ 
and & Weiss 
1976
Hart& i + 
Morgan .
U.K 1977 i*+
i*+ i + 
i - i - 
i*+ i +
i*+
i +
i - 
i -
i*+
i*+
i*+ i + 
i +
i*+ .54
. 65
. 43 
.09
David. i - i*+ i + 
Australia 198 0
i*+ i*- .36
Notes: 1. i denotes a variable is included in the 
analysis.
2. * denotes significance level at 5% level.
Whereas: CR= concentration ratio. K/0= capital output 
ratio.JG: = growth of industry. MES= size of 
enterprise or plant.AS#- advertising sales ratio. 
M/S= import sales ratio. X = exports. D= dummy for 
producer & consumer goods.EPR- effective 
protective rates. ACR= absolute capital 
requirement. R&D= research and development.
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finds that profit rate and concentration are significantly 
related but in a discontinous manner, i.e the top few firms 
holding market share greater than 70% showed positive 
evidence for the concentration profit hypothesis. Whereas in 
the case of top few firms contributing less than 70% of market 
share the relationship did not exist. On the other hand 
Stigler [19 63] took a sample of 99 industries for various 
dates between 1938-1957. He divided his sample into three 
classes. Industries with concentration ratio above 60%, below 
50%, and lower than 2 0%. He found that the difference between 
average rate of return in concentrated and unconcentrated 
industries was significant at 5% for 1951, 1954 and at 2% for 
1955-57. Averaging the rates of return on a longer period 
(1947-54), Stigler did not find any significant difference of 
averages.
Given the results of the above two studies one cannot 
safely rely on any one as such, after all, as noted earlier, 
Bain used data covering a phase of business cycle 193 6-1940, 
which were years of the late depression, while Stigler 
covered periods characterized by inflation or price controls. 
Furthermore a simple average on which they based their 
analysis may be an important single statistic but the problem 
is that such straight forward application of the 
Structure-Performance model may obscure important information 
required for policy purposes. This problem was overcome by the 
subsequent studies by relying on the multiple regression 
analysis. Results of these studies varied across the developed
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and less developed countries.
For the U.K a few studies were carried out but the
results showed scepticism about the structure performance
paradigm. Hart and Morgan [1977] and Hart and Clarke [198 0]
found that in a simple regression the explanatory power of
concentration was negligible and in a multiple regression
model concentration-profit relation was weak.
Shirazi-Khalilzadeh [1974] and Holterman [1974] found similar
results.The concentration profit relation was not significant 
. fK*.
and the importance ofAconcentration ratio was further reduced 
in a multiple regression analysis. However Cowling and
Waterson [1974] suggest the use of H index, defined as the sum
1IV- fhu
ofAsquare ofAindividual firm's share in industry output, which 
they found had a significant explanatory power.Table [2.8].
Comparing the studies of U.S and U.K it is concluded 
that the concentration-profit hypothesis is not supported by 
the U.K data of manufacturing industries. This could be due to 
several reasons; our aim is not to go into the details.
For the EEC countries the results of only three studies
are reviewed to get some idea about the importance of 
structural variables in explaining the performance of the 
manufacturing industries. Horowitz [1971] tested for a four 
equation model analysing the effect of concentration on 
industry wages, sales and Investment for a group of countries 
including Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxemburg. He found that concentration is an extremely 
important variable in influencing economic activity. Wages,
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sales and investment were all significantly related to 
concentration. In other words his results were compatible 
with the hypothesis that increased concentration leads to 
increased profits, but he concluded that compatibility and 
causality are two different things, i.e. which way the 
causation runs is not determined. Another interesting exercise 
was done by Ph: lips. L [1971] for Belgium, Italy and France. 
He finds that for Italy a positive profit concentration 
relationship exists, but is not strong, except that in the 
recession years the relationship is revealed more clearly. 
This positive relationship appears to be common for 
industries that are highly concentrated and technologically 
advanced. For Belgium no significant results could be 
obtained. Such also was the case for France.
Results of a third study by Jenny and Weber [1976] are 
equally interesting. For a sample of 44 French manufacturing 
industries they explored the relationship between performance 
and concentration, barriers to entry, exports, growth of 
industry, product differentation and economies of scale.TWe^ 
found that the explanatory power of the structural variables 
especially concentration's strongly limited.
Results of the above three studies cause suspicion about 
the Structure-Performance theory; it is unable to explain 
several important features of the industrial pattern 
characterising the European community.
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Less Developed Countries:
Table(2.6) gives a list of the studies reviewed, the variables 
and their significance in explaining profitability in the 
manufacturing industries of the various less developed 
countries. Before we start discussing the results it is 
important to mention the inadequacies of these studies in the 
first place. Firstly, most of the studies have used 
cross-section data for one year or takena°average of the 
concentration and profits variables for three or four years. 
Results based on one year data can only reveal a short 
run relationship which has no relevance to the structure 
performance paradigm which lays stress on the importance of 
structure of market affecting profit. To smooth out the 
short-run fluctuations some studies have used average rates 
of return and concentration over a period of three-four 
years; but this is a dangerous exercise because nothing is 
gained by averaging figures; if anything information is lost 
by doing so. When averages are used one should be careful to 
stay within the same phase of the bus. iness cycle, Ph..lips 
L. [1971]. Measures based on single year data can at best give 
information about the level of concentration and profits, 
which is far from explaining the long term effects of 
concentration on profits. Ideally one would like to explore 
the effect of proportionate change in concentration on 
proportionate change in profits. Secondly, an important avenue 
of research which could have provided in depth evidence about
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Table 2.6: Level of Profitability Concentration and other
Variables Regression Results for Less Developed 
Countries.
Authors CR CR 
Country.
K/0 MES K/L X EPR CU PP oc D OWS R
Charles.W i*+ 
Philppines 
1970
i - . 26
House.W. i*+ 
Kenya 1972
i*+ i*_ .48
SawhneyS i*+ i*
Sawhney
India 1973
-i + i*+ .59
Nam. W H. i*+ 
Korea 1975
NC
Gan.W.B. i + 
Mala-1977 
ysia.1978 i +
i*+
i*+
i*- i*- i*+ i*+ i*+ i*+ .84 
.55
Apte.P .& i + 
Vadiyanat- 
han. 1982.
l + i + i*~ i*— . 67
India
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the structure-performance model is ignored. Other aspects of 
performance e.g. wages, productivity of labour and capital 
could provide complementary information about the structure 
performance link especially when we know the variable 
measuring profit is not reliable due to data problems. To 
double check the results it is useful to rely on other 
measures of performance, Thirdly, the majority of the studies 
relied on the linear regression equations, hardly any exercise 
of simultaneous equations was carried out; this could be 
because it has only recently been suggested that the line of 
causation between concentration and profitability is 
undetermined. As mentioned earlier on it is quite possible 
that both are simultaneously determined. Lastly model 
specification was to a large extent constrained by the 
availability of data.
Studies exploring structure-performance relationships in 
the less developed countries are not many. But most of the 
work done up till now is a priori theory based on the
Structure-Performance link.
In case of Pakistan White [1974], Shirwani [1976] and 
Amjad [1977] test the hypothesis that highly concentrated 
industries have a high rate of return. The models of the 
three studies are stated below. Their result will be
discussed according to the variables used:
The models tested were:
1. Amjad: PC = a + bCR + cK/O + dP + eM + fCU
2. Shirwani: PI = a + bCR + cDQ + dDc + eD^+ fCU + gCU
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3. White 
where:
Pc:
CR:
K/O:
P:
M:
CU:
PI:
Do:
Dc : 
DM:
II:
S
II = a + bS + cLCM + dLIM
Price cost margin as a measure of profit. 
Concentration ratio taken as the share of top 
firms of total sales or output of the 
industry.
Capital-output ratio was calculated by 
dividing the book value of fixed assets by the 
value of production.
The level of protection as calculated by Lewis 
and Guisinger [1971].
Competing imports i.e. imports as a percentage 
of total domestic supply.
Capacity utilisation, data used in CSO Survey 
(1965)
Profit before tax as a percentage of paid up 
capital.
Domination of foreign firms (a dummy 
variable).
Domination of government regulated fimrs (A 
dummy variable).
The level of imports; is the value of the 
imported goods as a percentage of the total 
value of domestically produced and imported 
goods.
Profit before tax 
The structural variable
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LCM: A variable indicating the relative stringency
of licenses for competing imports 
LIM: A variable indicating the relative strigency
A
of licenses for imported inputs.
Amjad, selected a period of four years 1967-70 and 
Shirwani focused on the periods 1966-68, 1969-70 and 1972-73 
to test their models for 25 and 27 manufacturing industries 
respectively, (accounting for approximately 8 0% of the value 
added of the manufacturing sector). Both the studies based 
their exercise on almost the same time period which makes it 
a less interesting analysis for purpose of comparison. They 
report regression results for each year and also for average 
concentration and profits of the four years, for alternative 
model specifications. In contrast to these two studies White, 
used cross-section data for 1964-65 for 17 industries.
All the studies found a positive relationship between 
concentration ratio and profits. The significance of 
concentration in influencing profits varies from study to 
study and year to year. Compared to Amjad [1977] and Shirwani
[1976], White [1974] found a relatively weaker relationship.
Their over all conclusion is that concentration and
profitability are related, hence the usual micro economic
3 . . .implications of monopolitic competition follows. However 
empirical findings of others have been different e.g Gan Thara
[1977], Apte and Vaidyanathan [1982] and Kemal [1978] did not 
find a marked relationship between profits and concentration
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Table 2.7:Levels of Profitability Concentration and Other 
Variables Regression Results for Pakistan.
Author CR K/O M/D PP CU CU D
2-
R
White.L i * + i + i + i * 4- 0.42
1971. (Dl)
Shirwani. 1. i * + 0.44
1976.
2. i * + i * - 0.56
(D2)
i * +
(D3)
3 . i * + i * - i + i - 0.60
Amjad 1. i * + i + 0.57
1977.
2. i * + i i * - 0.55
3. i * + i i * + 0.57
CR: Concentration Ratio K/O: Capital Output ratio
M/D: Imports as a percentage of domestic sales.
PP: Share of public sector in industry.
CU: Capacity Utilization. Dl: Dummy for domestic price 
above CIF price. D2: Dummy for growth of firms.
D3: Dummy for foreign firms.
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and it is hard for them to reconcile such findings with 
theory.
Some of the studies explored the possibility of a 
discontinous relationship existing between concentration and 
performance, e.g. House [1973] found that beyond a certain 
degree of concentration level the profit concentration 
relation gets stronger. However there are studies that report 
contradictory results, e.g for India, Sawhney and Sawhney
[1973] and Katrak [1980] found that profits in fact fall at a 
very high level of concentration, this could be a reflection 
of implementations of the anti-monopoly legislation and 
policies. In general most studies found the relationship was 
continuous.
These studies also took account of the openess of their
Co
economies by including a foreign trade varible in the
A
regression analysis. This was done in three ways. One way 
also adopted in other less developed countries was to include 
a variable measuring the level of imports or exports. Second 
the level of imports taken in combination with the level of 
concentration in the domestic industry i.e concentration x 
Dummy variable for competing imports. And a third way is to 
use effective protection as a measure of foreign trade 
restrictions. Amjad and Shirwani, unexpectedly did not find a 
strong impact of competing imports. But House [1973] found 
that the concentration profit link gets stronger when the 
foreign trade variable is included in their regression of 
concentration on profits. Amjad and White have also used
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effective protection as a measure of foreign trade 
restriction, although it is an indirect way of accounting for 
foreign trade restrictions. White argued that effective 
protection given to the domestic industry through high 
tariffs, bonus vouchers and license stringency would all 
influence concentration and hence profits of the monopolist. 
The central factor to his analysis is that if imported goods 
were freely allowed to enter at zero or low rates of duty, 
these imports would have been an important constraint on the 
power of domestic producers to exploit their monopoly power. 
If the monopolist tried to raise their prices above CIF import 
prices plus tariffs one would have seen imported products 
coming in till prices fell again. Amjad's results were not 
significant and the sign was unexpectedly negative. He 
provides two reasons for it: i) Measures of protection may be 
highly inaccurate ii) Industries might be enjoying protection 
but by having high cost, low capacity utilization and 
inefficient labour etc., profits may be pulled down. On the 
other hand Kemal [1978] and Packard [1969] obtained results in 
favour of the argument, White [1974] and Gan Tham [1977] found 
a positive but a less significant relationship between profits 
and effective protection. However, the reader may be warned 
that the estimates of effective protection are generally very 
rough; they tend to vary a great deal from year to year; that 
they are purely static measures providing a snap shot view of 
the economy at a moment in time etc. If that is so then one 
would wonder whether these measures of protection can tell us
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anything meaningful at all.
Amjad like most other researchers attempted to capture 
the influence of barriers to entry on profits. The majority 
of the studies measure the barriers to entry variable by 
using the capital output ratio except for Gan Tham who uses 
both capital/output and MES as a barrier to entry (BTE) ; his 
results supported the hypothesis that BTE influence profits. 
Amjad like Lindsey [197 0] got a perverse negative sign with 
an insignificant coefficient. It could be that measures of 
BTE are just proxies which can at best give approximate 
results or that concentration itself is correlated with the 
measures of MES or capital/output ratio due to which the 
independent effect of these variables cannot be identified.
Another variable common to a number of studies is a 
measure of capacity utilization. In the case of Pakistan, all 
the three studies had tested the hypothesis that profits and 
capacity utilization are positively related. With high 
capacity utilization the costs per unit would fall. However 
there are problems of interpretation because of the ambiguity 
in the hypothesis e.g. if we have a straight forward case 
where seller concentration is high, firms may earn high rates 
of return by under utilising their productive capacity. On the 
other hand what is more typical of less developed countries is 
that even if seller concentration is high and there is excess 
demand which is likely to lead to an increase in capacity 
utilisation, the profit margins may not increase because of 
the price control policy adopted by the
106
government. In that case capacity utilization will have no 
significant effect on profits.
Results of the three studies about Pakistan do not show 
a significant influence of capacity utilization on profits. 
Amjad is satisfied with the mere positive sign of the 
regression coefficient, better than what Islam [19 67] gets, a 
negative sign. In fact Islam's results are more interesting 
and reasonable than Amjad's. The justification provided by 
Islam is that with a larger output firms tend to set a lower 
profit margin. Since a lower profit margin on a larger output 
may still lead to larger absolute profits, depending 
presumablly on the price elasticity of demand. However his 
regression coefficient was small. Two studies Nam [1975] and 
Sawhney and Sawhney [1973] show evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that in a concentrated structure, under utilization 
of capacity will enable firms to earn monopoly profit.
Some 5fndCe,$ have also enquired about the effect of 
types of firms within an industry on the levels of profits, 
Shirwani [1976], Gan Tham [1977] and Apte [1982]. Shirwani 
found that profit levels were higher in those industries 
where a foreign firm is a leading producer, and Apte [1982] 
showed lower profits for a large government regulated firm 
than the level of concentration in those industries would 
other wise suggest. These results lend support to our central 
argument that the structure of the industry may not be the 
sole determinant of performance. As Shirwani mentions, foreign 
firms, could be earning higher profit margins because they may
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be better organised, have more technical know-how compared to 
their local rivals and even commercially efficient, but 
Shirwani causes confusion in his conclusions by suggesting that 
high concentration leads to high profits. Another possibility 
is that the foreign firms may be operating in more capital 
intensive faster growing industries, but Gan Tham [1977] found 
that the foreign enterprise earned higher profit margins in 
the consumer goods industries but not in the producers goods 
industries of Malaysia. The findings of Apte [1982] do not 
imply that government enterprises are not earning higher 
profits because they are inefficient. In fact the commercial 
motive may not be the target set by such firms, as pointed out 
at the beginning, they may be pursuing other goals.
Almost all the studies convey the same message that a 
concentrated structure leads to above normal profits; 
therefore they infer that the welfare implications of a 
concentrated structure of market can be far reaching despite 
the fact that the explanatory power of their models frequently 
account for less than 50 percent of the variance in price 
cost margins. However these writers need to recognize the 
fact that in most less developed countries a high proportion 
of manufacturing production takes place in the small scale 
informal sector, and because of data deficiencies the role of 
this sector is not taken into account; hence there is an 
upward bias in the results. Secondly the public sector owns 
a fairly large proportion of enterprises in the manufacturing 
sector in most less developed countries whose motives are far
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from those of private entrepreneurs and the 
Structure— Performance paradigm may need to be modified to 
take this factor into account. Finally, even if large firms 
hold a large proportion of market share, their dominance may 
be of little importance in the presence of low price 
elasticity of demand (which is omitted from all models 
because of data limitations) , government regulatory policies, 
smuggling and dumping of foreign goods.
Summary:
Reviewing studies related to ^ structure-performance 
paradigm, in developed and less developed countries it is 
noticed that most studies attempt to answer four basic 
questions like i) whether aggregate concentration has in 
manufacturing industry increased over time? ii) What the 
relationship is between the level of concentration and market 
size? iii) what is the pattern of ranks when individual 
industries ranking is compared across countries? iv) what 
determines concentration and what are its effects on 
profitability?
No firm conclusions, about the structure and performance 
in the manufacturing industry, can be drawn from the results 
reported by the studies reviewed because of several problems 
related to the data, measurement error, errors in the model 
and estimation techniques.
Nevertheless, it is observed that in less developed 
countries the trends in concentration vary from country to 
country depending mostly on government policies & country
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specific circumstances, while as in developed countries 
concentration has increased mainly because of technological 
reasons, however, the level of concentration may not depend on 
the level of economic development as almost the same 
industries are ranked as highly concentrated in both developed 
and less developed countries, implying that similar forces are 
at work in forming oligopoly and monopolistic structure in 
manufacturing industry.
Most studies examining the influence of explanatory 
variables on concentration, at a point of time, suggest that 
economies of scale, industry size, absolute capital 
requirement, product differentiation etc are the determinants 
of concentration. Very few writers have tested the 
relationship between changes in concentration and changes in 
the right hand side variables. They found that seldom are the 
same variables explaining levels of concentration important 
in influencing changes in concentration. Thus suggesting that 
by restricting the analysis to levels one may draw incorrect 
inferences. In the second section we reviewed studies 
examining the Structure-Performance link. Again no firm 
conclusions can be derived from the results reported by the 
studies reviewed, because of ambiguity in the 
efficiency/monopoly hypothesis, market disequilibrium, type of 
ownership and size, simultaneous equation bias, and errors in 
data about profits. Hence it is suggested that other measures 
may also be taken as indicators of performance. 
Furthermore the traditional approach of profit maximization
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Table 2.8: Some Regression Results of Proportionate Changes 
in Profitability on Proportionate Changes in 
Concentration.
Author_____________DCR______ DH______ DNOE_____ DTU DG R
Cowling & 1. i * + 0.06
Waterson.
U.K. 1976. 2. i * + 0.04
3. i * + i * + i + 0.09
4. i * + i + i + 0 . 0 6
Hart & 1. i + 0.01
Morgan.
U.K. 1977. 2. i + i 0.03
Ill
\>Z/
may not alwaysAvery useful . when the firms have to
operate under tight government regulatory policies.
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CHAPTER III
CONCENTRATION AND LARGE ESTABLISHMENTS 
IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
In Pakistan no studies about the structure of industry
were undertaken prior to 1965. Writers began to measure the
extent of concentration enjoyed by powerful oligopoly and
monopoly groups in Pakistan when concentration of wealth and
thX'
ownership became a major political issue in late sixties, but
none of the studies measured changes in concentration/
structure of industry except Shirwani [1976] and that too is 
. . .
limited in nature.Afrjain findings of the authors have already 
been presented in chapter 2.
Before we deal with the determinants of industrial 
structure, in the next chapter, it is . important to
examine the evolution of the structure of manufacturing 
industry by tracing the pattern of changes overtime in some of 
the basic aspects of industrial structure like /^(a) ) 
distribution of firm size and type of ownership trends in
I/'
aggregate concentration in manufacturing industry (c)j the 
level of concentration in individual industries and d^)) the 
average size of establishment and plant size in Pakistan in 
relation to International Standards of average plant size. 
Like this, information gathered about the key aspects of 
industries structure will enable us to provide some
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explanation about the determinants of industrial 
concentration/structure and thereupon performance of the 
manufacturing industry in the subsequent chapters.
Distribution of Firms Size And Type of Ownership:
It is important to have some idea about the pattern of 
distribution of firm size and the type of ownership, in 
particular the relative importance of the private and public 
owned enterprises in Pakistan manufacturing industry. Such 
information is necessary because the structure, conduct and 
behaviour of different enterprises besides other factors also 
depend on the size structure and type of ownership.
Annex 3.A illustrates the inter-temporal changes in the 
size structure of manufacturing industry as a whole. The 
distribution of value added among the ten size groups for 
various points of time is presented, and it is observed that 
the size structure of manufacturing establishment tend to be 
skewed towards the large size classes.1/.
Table 3.1 also ■ the size structure by comparing
the distribution of size in the three size groups measured in
1. Ishikawa [1979] observes that the size structure of
manufacturing establishments in Japan have continuously skewed 
towards the small and medium size establishments and even 
though overtime the size structure has changed still the 
smaller size establishments prevail. Comparing the Japanese 
size structure with selected countries he finds that 
unlike Japan, the size structure of not only the U.S.A but 
even of India, Pakistan and the Phillipines are skewed towards 
the large size classes.
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terms of number of workers.2/. The table also provides a 
comparison of the percentage share of the three size groups in 
manufacturing value added.3/.4/. (For details see Annex 3.A) 
At the beginning 87.25 percent of firms had 100 or fewer 
workers, this percentage declined to 83.5 in 1970 and remained 
almost the same in 1984. Whereas the percentage of firms with 
more than 100 but less than 1000 workers increased from 10.33 
to 14.70 percent in 1970 and since then has increased only 
fractionally. In contrast about 3 percent of firms employ 1000 
or more workers and this percentage has also changed only 
fractionally since 1970. It then means that after 1970 the 
pattern of distribution of employment by the three size 
groups remained the same. Similarly comparison of percentage 
share of the three size groups in manufacturing value added 
manifest that, the share of the small size group continued to 
decline from 25.40 to 12.94 percent between 1959-84, that of
2. The manufacturing establishments are grouped into three size 
groups, the small, medium and large size which may be defined 
in terms of the number of workers as a less than 100 size, a 
100-1000 size and a more than 1000 size, respectively.
3. As mentioned in the first chapter, the Census of Manufacturing 
Industries does not include establishments that employ less 
than 10 workers (the informal sector). Therefore our 
estimates of the small size group are only partial and biased 
to that extent.
4. The Census of Manufacturing Industries also provide a second 
measure of size in terms of ownership of fixed assts. This 
classification scheme of fixed assets is not comparable 
between years because they donot take into account inflation 
and there upon represent only the book value of assets 
purchased over a number of years rather than a consistent 
extimate of capital stock (Annex 3.A).
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Table 3.1: size Distributionof Manufacturing Establishments
and Value Added (1959-840.
Size
(Employment)
Establishments
(percent)
Value Added
(percent)
1959 1970 1975 1978 1984 1959 1970 1975 1978 1984
0-99 87.3 83.5 82.3 83.2 82.7 25.4 15. 6 13 . 0 13.3 12.9
100-999 10.3 14.2 14.5 14.2 14.7 32.4 39. 9 45.8 51.9 44.8
1000 & 3.3 
above
N (22)
2.3 3.2 2.5 2.6 43. 
(86) (108) (94)(100)
4 40. 6 39.4 32.2 H  .2
N = number of establishments in the largest size group.
Source : Calculated from the Census of Manufacturing
Industry(1959-84), Statistics Division, Federal 
Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, 
Karachi,Islamabad.
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the medium size has persistently increased except for a 
slight decline towards the end.5/. And the large size 
establishments recorded approximately the same percentage 
share in value added throughout except for a decline in 
1970's.
Table 3.2 summarized some evidence : on the relative 
importance of the public and private sectors in Pakistan 
manufacturing industry. It suggests that the role of the 
public sector in manufacturing industries has increased 
substantially since 1970's, for example public sector 
investment increased from 12 percent in 1969/70 to 8 0 percent 
in 1977/78 and 54 percent in 1984.It is engaged mainly in the 
basic industries like edible oil, petrochemicals, fertilizer, 
pesticides, petroleum refining, non-me- tallic mineral 
products,cement, iron and steel, engines, motor vehicles, and 
ship building etc. In contrast the private sector involvement 
in the manufacturing industry had reached its peak in 1960's 
and started declining in 1970's and increased only marginally 
in the 1980's. For example private sector investment reached 
its highest level of 87 percent in 19 69-70 and has now
Similar trends were reported by A.Ghosh [1975] for 
Indian Manufacturing Industries. He suggests that the role of 
the medium size firms has become more important in majority 
of Indian industries. Since the four and eight firm 
concentration ratios calculated for 2 2 industries tend to 
decline in most of the industries, obviously the share of the 
smaller firms must have been declining even more. Thus it was 
the middle size firms that grew in size relative to the large 
and small size enterprises, and have caused changes in the 
structure of Indian industry during 1948-68.
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Table 3.2 : Large Scale Manufacturing investment (LSM)
1963-64 to 1982-83 (Rs.million 1959-60 prices).
Investment
in Lj&M Percentages
Private
(PRI)
Public
(PUI)
Total
(TI)
VA
(LSM)
PRI
VA
PUI
VA
TI
VA
1963-64 864.4 29 . 5 893 .9 2,233 38.7 1. 32 40.0
1964-65 966. 7 108.3 1075.0 2,523 38.3 4.29 42 . 6
1965-66 866.5 110.1 976.6 2,796 31.0 3.93 34.9
1966-67 714. 2 89 .8 804 . 0 2,982 24.0 3.0 27.0
1967-68 730.5 97.4 827 .9 3 , 209 22 . 8 3 . 0 25.8
1968-69 646. 0 59.6 705. 6 3,548 18.2 1. 67 19.9
1969-70 827. 4 121. 3 948 . 7 4, 042 20.5 3.0 23.5
1970-71 779.4 43 .7 823 . 1 4, 090 19. 1 1. 06 20.1
1971-72 630.9 60.2 691.1 3,813 16.5 1.57 18 .1
1972-73 426. 9 61.5 488.4 4,265 10.0 1.44 11. 5
1973-74 307.5 165.5 473 . 0 4,585 6.7 3 . 6 10. 3
1974-75 287.3 306.4 593.7 4,509 6 . 4 6.79 13 .2
1975-76 354.3 855.2 1,209.5 4,486 7.9 19.06 27.0
1976-77 381. 2 1,120.9 1,502.1 4, 385 8.7 25.6 34 . 3
1977-78 337.6 1,393.7 1,731.3 4,823 7.0 28.9 35.9
1978-79 357.5 1,352.0 1,709.5 5,006 7.1 27.0 34.1
1979-80 432 .8 1,097.9 1,530.7 5,575 7.8 19.16 27.5
1980-81 515.8 753 .8 1,269.1 6,188 8.3 12 .18 20.5
1981-82 553 . 2 717.5 1,270.7 7,036 7.9 10.19 18.1
1982-83 582 . 3 684. 0 1,266.3 7, 646 7.6 8.94 16. 6
Source : Estimated by I.B.R.D., Federal Bureau ofStatistics, 
Statistics Division, Government of Pakistan as 
reported in I.B.R.D (1984).
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reached 45 percent in 1984.6/.
From the above information we understand that there exist 
small/medium/large size enterprises privately (singly/jointly) 
or publicly owned. Such enterprises may record different
structure conduct and therefore performance. For example,
M -  , . . .
firstf(Ssize of an enterprise will influence its structure and
technique of production. These will in turn determine to a 
large extent the cost per unit of output, prices, 
profitability, productivity and wages. Second, type of 
ownership besides influencing the structure of an industry 
also determines its performance. The public owned enterprises 
are mostly concentrated but pursue objectives, different than 
the private owned enterprises, other than maximization of 
profits. Thus the relevance of size structure of manufacturing 
establishents and type of ownership to our analysis in the 
subsequent chapters cannot be ignored.
Aggregate Concentration In Pakistan Manufacturing Industry;
We have already gained a bird's eye view about the importance 
of the three size groups from Table 4.1. However, the 
percentage share of the largest size group in manufacturing 
value added can also be interpreted in terms of overall 
concentration trends over 25 years period 1959-84. In other
6. The relative importance of the foreign sector in Pakistan 
manufacturing industry can be guaged from its share in 
investment in the sector which was 7 percent in 1968 White 
[1974].
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words these percentages enable us to gauge the importance of 
the largest size class enterprises in the manufacturing 
sector and the extent of market power-concentration exercised 
by them.
At the begining the largest size group comprised 22 
establishments in manufacturing industry controlled about 43.4 
percent of its output^ and employed 47 percent of the labour 
force. The biggest of these was textiles followed by food 
which had net assets of Rs.4 0,8955 and Rs.93,93 3 and employed 
99,9 03 and 14,608 workers respectively. The share of
output and employment held by the large size enterprises now 
100 in 1984 is 42.19 and 43 percent. In 1984 on top of the 
list of large enterprises are establishments belonging to iron 
and steel, textiles, chemicals and food industries which 
owned net assets of Rs.94,11263 (iron and steel) Rs.8779040 
(textiles) Rs.6903796 (chemicals) Rs.521580 (food) and employ 
34086, 197252, 51575 and 61214 workers respectively.7/. One
7. As noted earlier the classification scheme according
to ownership of fixed assets is not comparable between years. 
However White [1974] shows that during 1960's only 43 leading 
families controlled 53.1, percent of total assets of 
non-financial companies listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange. 
Of the private Pakistani controlled firms, these families 
controlled three quarters of assets, and within the 
large scale manufacturing sector, the largest forty three 
families controlled 38 percent of value added. Moreover of 
the nine commercial banks which controlled 90 percent of the 
total assets of private commercial banks, seven were owned by 
these leading families.
A large share of the assets of the insurance companies was 
also concentrated in a few hands. There were forty seven 
Pakistani insurance companies and fourteen were controlled 
by the monopolists and their share came to over 50 percent of 
the entire assets of the insurance sector Amjad [1984],
Keeping in view the concentration of capital assets with 
large firms, all private commercial banks and insurance
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question that we may ask ourselves is has the percentage 
share of the large enterprises remained almost the same?. From 
the percentage shares mentioned in Table 4.1, and it is 
observed that the large size enterprises did not experience 
smooth growth in their market power in 1970's. So far as the 
number of establishments in the large size group between 
1958-84, is concerned it has increased four fold. 
Correspondingly growth in value added in this size group did 
not follow the same pattern. However, it may be noted that 
since 197 0 the number of large establishments remained more or 
less the same and so is the percentage share in value added 
in 197 0 and now in 1984 but the job opportunities provided by 
the large size has declined. These findings indicate there 
are opposite forces at work, which on balance are maintaining 
approximately the aggregate level of concentration in 
manufacturing industries at the same level. Some may not take 
a serious note of it due to the fact that the increase in the 
level of aggregate concentration is marginally higher than 
what it was in 1970.. Others will be disappointed that the 
level of aggregate concentration has not decreased over the 
twenty six years covered by the analysis. Despite the presence 
of factors reducing concentration there exist forces that have- 
at least maintained the level of concentration constant.
f\ Similar picture emerges when we summarize the data in 
Table 3.3 in terms of the four firm concentration ratio 
derived from the data contained in Table 3.4. For 1970, of the
companies were nationalized in early 1970's.
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3 3 sectors 7 sectors carried more than 80 percent of 
production in their respective areas of production and 
employed more than 60 percent of the labour force, this number 
declines to 6 in 1978 and increaseSto 9, mainly because of the 
opening of four sepeyrate sectors petroleum refining, petroleum 
products shipbuilding and motor cycles, by 1984. Indicating 
that concentration has remained on average the same between 
1970 and 1984.
Individually these ratios show the same tendency, 
increase in the market power of some with decline or same 
market share in case of others overjtime. Table 3.4 reports 
concentration in manufacturing enterprises in individual 
sectors, measured as the percentage share of the top four 
firms in value added for 1970, 1978 and 1984. It suggests
that tea, alkalies, petroleum refining, rubber, pottery, 
non-ferrous industries, ship building, motor cycles and 
photographic goods industries are ranked as the highly 
concentrated industries followed by tobacco, Leather foot 
wear, paper, tyres, fertilizer and iron and steel. Out of a 
total of thirty seven sectors, eighteen sectors witnessed a 
decline in concentration ratio.£ And in 9 industrial sectors 
market power on average remained the same from 1970 to 1984. 
Whereas in 10 sectors concentration has increased overtime.
Table 3.5 summarizes the changes in concentration which
8. It may be noted that despite the decline in
concentration,some of these industries are still highly 
concentrated.
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Table 3.3 : Frequency Distribution of the Four Firm 
Concentration Ratio in Manufacturing.
Number of Industries
Concentration
Ratio
1970 %E 1978 %E 1984 %E
< 40 10 76 12 76 13 65
40 - 60 10 10 8 11 8 14
60 - 80 6 6 9 6 7 14
80 > 7 3.5 6 2 9 5
N 33 35 37
E :Employment.
Derived from Table 3 .4
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Table 3.4 : Pakistan Four Firm Concentration in Manufacturing 
Industries (1970,1978,1984).
Concentration Ratio 
1970 1978 1984
Sectors CR4 CR4 CR4 CR4 CR4 CR4
VA E VA E VA E
Food 32 13 13 10 7 10
Tea 100 100 100 100 100 100
Beverages 54 50 24 35 13 24
Tobacco 54 27 48 25 61 59
Textile 13 14 10 13 8 19
Wearing Apparel 64 46 50 46 23 39
Leather Tanning 44 30 42 41 59 35
Leather Footwear 76 75 73 66 71 67
Ginning 3 8 2 9 1 8
Wood Products 41 48 42 39 39 46
Furniture 43 42 27 33 40 39
Paper 95 66 92 87 75 75
Printing & 
Publishing
35 22 49 45 49 47
Drugs 60 27 25 28 21 25
Chemicals 44 47 25 31 31 29
Alkalies 100 100 80 80 90 83
Fertilizers 100 100 66 65 66 63
Other Chemicals 10 17 11 15 28 23
Petroleum Refining - 100 100 100 100 100
Petroleum Products - - 70 67 64 63
Rubber 63 54 71 69 86 79
Tyres 80 73 83 56 66 61
Plastic 73 55 71 56 54 39
Pottery 95 87 98 85 82 86
Glass 75 51 52 39 49 44
Cement 58 55 48 49 54 30
Iron & Steel 51 34 30 52 61 55
Non-Ferous Metal 93 81 68 69 88 84
Fabricated Metal 22 13 26 19 26 23
Machinery 21 12 51 47 37 46
Electric Machines 23 23 18 31 20 31
Transport 31 50 65 52 49 55
Ship Building - - - - 100 100
Motor Cycles - - - - 100 100
Science Equipment 39 42 31 43 42 50
Plitographic Goods 86 83 86 82 100 100
Sports 51 50 69 57 29 40
Notes :1). Typically CR4(VA) > CR4(E).
2). Decrease in CR4(VA) = 18 sectors i.e, food, 
beverages, textile, wearing apparel, leather 
footwear, ginning, paper, drugs, chemicals, 
alkalies, fertilizers,petroleum products, 
tyres,plastic, pottery, glass, non-ferous 
metal, sports.
3). Increase in CR4(VA) = 10 sectors i.e, tobacco, 
leather tanning, printing and publishing, other 
chemicals, rubber, iron and steel, fabricated
metal, machinery, transport, photographic 
goods.
4). Constant CR4(VA) or marginal changes = 9 i.e, 
tea, wood products ,furniture, petroleum 
refining, cement, electric machines, ship 
building, motor cycles, science instruments.
Source : Calculated from Census of Manufacturing Industries 
1970 - 84).Federal Bureau ofStatistics, Statistics 
Division,Government ofPakistan, Islamabad.
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Table 3.5 : Changes in Concentration
Changes 
1970 - 78 1970 - 84
D C I D C I
Number 17 10 8 18 9 10
% Decline &
Increase
About 5% - - -
5% - 10% - 6
10% and above 1 7 - 8  12 - 10
Notes : D = Decline, C — Constant, I = increase. 
Source : Derived from Table 3.4.
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enable us to give a definite answer for the four firm 
concentration ratio. Here it is clearly shown that the market 
structure remained the same after 1970. The number of 
increases has increased only marginally from 8 (in 1970-78) to
10 in 1970-84. Another noteable fact is that the change that
<• . . .  
occured, both decline and increase m  concentration was always
very high, exceeding 10 percent in most cases.
It is of interest to enquire whether these concentrated 
industries are relatively more capital intensive or employ 
more labour, have higher labour and capital productivity and 
their wage bill is greater than the small size establishments 
in the same industries. Table 3.6 summarizes the comparison of 
capital/ labour ratio, value added per unit of labour and 
capital and wages per head, between the top four large size 
and small size establishments in particular industries, which 
are reported in Annex 3.B. Out of 2 6 industrial sectors the 
largest size establishments of 8 sectors have capital/labour 
ratios lower than small size establishment. Whereas in case 
of 10 areas the large size establishments had lower value 
added per unit of capital and only 2 sectors recorded lower 
wages than the small units _. Similarly in case of 6
sectors, the large size establishments employ less than 40 
percent of the workers in their respective industries. Invest 
of the 2 0 sectors the top 4 firms employ more than 50 percent 
of employees in their respective industries.
Thus the main conclusion drawn is that most concentrated 
industries are capital intensive, and were at the same time
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Table 3.6 : Summary comparison of Selected Ratios of 2 6
Concentrated Industries (1984).
K/L V/L V/K W/L E
( Number of :Industries)
L 8 8 10 2 6
H 22 18 16 24 20
Total 26 26 26 26 26
Notes : L = Lower than small size establishments.
H = Higher than small size establishments. 
Source : Derived from Annex 3.B.
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employing more than half of the work force in their respective 
industries. However, it is noted that most of these large 
establishment although they were able to have higher labour 
productivity, were not able to utilize capital more 
efficiently. (The issue is further dealt with in chapter V 
and VI as well).
From the above information it is noted that the sectors 
showing high concentration are mostly those which are i) 
capital intensive and possibly dependent on imported 
technology and raw material, ii) import substitutes, iii) 
encountered with a disequilibrium in the markets for their 
products, where supply is deficient. Part of the reason for 
this is the large amount of capital required for the 
installation of additional establishments in these industries, 
iv) a mix of consumer, intermediate and capital goods, v) 
Owned by the public sector and where the private sector is not 
allowed to invest.
Besides our findings, it has been reported that 
concentration ratios are very high in Pakistan and may exceed 
in some cases by a significant margin the level of 
concentration found in developed countries. Merhave [19 69] and 
White [1974]. However, this does not imply that the size of 
plant or enterprise is the same in both developed and less 
developed countries. In practice the size of plant in less 
developed countries is smaller than in advanced countries. 
Banerji [1978]. And even among the less developed countries 
the level of concentration will vary with the size of their
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domestic markets. Mueller [1978]. Some evidence on these 
questions is brought together in Table 3.7 to 3.10. Table 3.7 
reports concentration in manufacturing enterprises as the 
number of establishments controlling over 4 0 percent of output 
in a selected list of industries and countries. Only Columbia 
and El-Salvador appear to have more highly concentrated 
industrial structures than Pakistan. Similarly, data contained 
in Table 4.8 about the concentration levels in Pakistan and 
United States illustrate that the general level of 
concentration is higher in Pakistan than in United States.
Tietal [1975] and Banerji [1978] in their studies show 
considerable similarity in the pattern of distribution of 
plant size by sector in different industries across a sample 
of developing and advanced countries (including Pakistan). In 
a similar exercise Table 3.9 shows the ranking of 
manufacturing industries according to two measures of size (i) 
average value added per establishment (ii) average number of 
workers per establishment for a sample of 2 0 industries. And 
our own results are in line with those of Tietal, the rank 
ordering according to average value added per firm shows 
petroleum on top followed by fertilizer, cement, tobbacco, 
food, beverages, paper, drugs, iron and steel, transport and 
rubber. At the end of the list are leather, matches, soap, 
printing, furniture etc. Ranking according to mean number of 
workers show first again petroleum followed by cement, 
fertilizer, tobacco, paper, textile, transport equipment, iron 
and steel, rubber, drugs, beverages and food. While at the
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Table 3.7 ; Number of Establishments Accounting for Over 4 0 
Percent Of Output, by Industries, Selected 
Countries.
Countries
Industry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Food 426 253 1215 144 58 40 37 72 34
1970-
11
■84
44
Textile 373 :1191 407 44 2 30 35 - 15 27 51
Paper 105 90 213 3 2 7 6 - 16 3 3
Printing 161 175 498 7 4 10 10 46 22 5 5
Apparel 326 1257 2658 111 21 52 25 45 385 4 10
Wood 146 511 966 50 2 14 42 117 37 5 7
Furniture 561 606 768 12 10 42 - 51 60 5 7
Leather 13 121 457 4 7 4 33 - 7 9 6
Rubber 23 21 59 6 2 - 5 8 5 5 5
Chemicals 163 103 248 40 6 29 - 18 14 9 13
Petroleum 9 7 67 2 - - 15 - - - 3
Non-Metallic95 634 415 28 3 6 15 23 13 6* 4*
Basic Metall53 155 194 7 1 - 4 - 5 4 6
Metalproduct3 00 312 799 37 3 17 34 39 29 21 21
Machinery 170 550 501 50 2 6 34 57 6 20 4
Electric 168 88 239 7 _ 5 19 _ 10 18 18
Machines
Transport 85 80 134 19 4 30 6 14 6 9 4
Notes : 1 Germany. 2. U. K. 3. U.S. 4. Colombia . 5. El.
Salvador. 6. Ireland. 7. Israel. 8. Malayasia. 9. 
Pillipines. 10. Pakistan.
Source: All countries except Pakistan from Merhave. M, 
Technological Dependence, Monopoly and Growth 
(Oxford: Pergamon 19 69 ).
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Table 3.8 : Comparison of Concentration Ratios in Pakistan and 
United States (selected industries 1967 - 68).
Four Firm Concentration Ratios
Industry Pakistan United States
Fertilizer 100 33
Sulphuric Acid 100 54
Paper 100 26
Nylon Yarn 100 91
Cigarettes 92 81
Cement 86 2 8
Jute Textiles 37 70
Cotton Textile 25 3 0
Dyeing, Bleaching 10 42
and Finishing
Source : White (1974).
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bottom of the list are matches, printing, leather, soap and 
furniture.
Results reported by Tietal [1975] and Banerji [1978] and 
those reported in Table 3.8 indicate that the same kind of 
industries experience a concentrated structure i.e forces 
working for an oligopolistc structure in a particular 
industry are similar in all countries both developed and less 
developed. These forces can be technical economies of scale 
but the leading producers, realizing that entry is difficult,
f
through their entry deterging practices will work for an 
oligopolistic structure as well. However these results do not 
indicate that minimum efficient size isAsame m  all countries. 
Table 3.10 compares the minimum efficient size of a few 
sectors with International Standards of minimum efficient 
size. And it is found that plant sizes in Pakistan are much 
smaller relative to the International Standards of minimum 
efficient size. Such a comparison suggests that the existence 
of economies of scale may not necessarily mean economies with 
small market will have^few large firms. Many small well below 
optimum size plants may be operating in such economies due to 
several other considerations like political and social. This 
does not mean we are ruling out the possibility that a number 
of factors prevailing in developing countries may influence 
average size of plant. For example import substitution 
policies favour large scale industries, distortion of factor 
prices by allowing cheap capital imports etc. As a result the 
average size of plants in less developed countries may be
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Table 3.9 : Rankings of Selected 
by Average Size
Industries 
of Firm
Average Size (VA/N) Average Size
Industry Rank Rank
Petroleum 1 1
Fertilizer 2 3
Cement 3 2
Tobacco 4 4
Food 5 12
Beverage 6 11
Paper 7 5
Pharmaceuticals 8 10
Iron and Steel 9 8
Transport 10 7
Rubber 11 9
Paints 12 13
Textiles 13 6
Leather 14 17
Plastic 15 16
Matches 16 14
Soap 16 19
Printing 18 15
Metal Products 19 18
Furniture 20 20
Source : Calculated from Census of Manufacturing 
Industries(1984-85), Federal Bureau of Statistics, 
Statistics Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
1 3 A
Table 3.10 : Pakistan and International Standards
of Average Size of 5 Selected Industries.
Industry
Average size 
in Pakistan
Average size Interna­
tional Standards
Cement 450,000 tpy 900,000 tpy
Cotton Spinning 12,500 spindles —
Polyester staple 40. tons/day 120a
" filament 11. tons/day 80b
Automotives 200,000 7 million d
(cars and LCV) 300,000
Vegetable Ghee 9,500 - 20,000 3 0,000 and above
Source : Pakistan Industrial Regulatory Policy Report Vol. II 
(Draft Confidential January 6, 1988 ).
a. In case of individual countries it is 111 for Korea, 181 
Taiwan, 97 Thailand, 115 Malysia, 5 9 pKilCppines and 159 
Japan. A
b. Average size for Korea is 64, 132 for Taiwan, 20 for 
Thailand, 65 Philippines and 113 Japan.
c. Total Output of LCV was only 12,392 units in 1984-85.
d.It is estimated that in 1970 the World production of 
automotives of/all types, was around 22 million, in 
Western Europe it was round about 10 million, U.S.A alone 
produced 7 million and Japan over 3 million. These 
estimates are made by the Motor Industry of Great Britain 
1971 (society of Motor Manufactures and Traders Ltd, as 
reported in Me.Gee (1973).
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large and comparable to that of developed countries.
Given a few facts about some of the aspects of industrial 
structure in Pakistan, it is of interest to identify the 
factors causing first increase and then keeping constant the 
£c5ncer)TYo.t/d) n  of large enterprises in particular (see 
chapterlV). Our general remarks are that market power 
originates with the conscious policies, adopted by the then 
government, regarding the structure of industry. Later, the 
changing market and political enviornment exercised some 
influence on the structure of industry and concentration 
levels.
In short, although this chapter is incomplete in many 
respects, still a fair picture emerges from the data contained 
in various tables. We may conclude first, that monopoly in 
the sense of a single seller is virtually non-existent but 
the structure of manufacturing industry is quite concentrated 
which suggests that part of the industrial structure is 
categorised as oligopolistic. But the question is, has the 
structure been always oligopolistic?. Is there an observable 
trend towards increasing or decreasing concentration?. It is 
observed that growth in c-oncanXroLttorj of large enterprises has 
been interrupted. During the sixties concentration of large 
enterprises output was undoubtedly high; which remained 
constant or declined in some and increased in other sectors in 
seventies and again in eighties. Although opposite forces are 
at work, on balance concentration has remained constant
after 1970. Individually not all industries experienced the
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same trend in their c.one.&nZ'rah^ n'• Factors repsonsible for 
difference in trends regarding &oric&?<Zra.hc>n may vary from case 
to case. Ranking of industries according to average size of 
plant . that the pattern of distribution in Pakistan is
f^same as in other countries. This suggests that similar forces 
are at work in creating an oligopolistic structure in 
different countries. However this doe^lnot imply the plant 
size is^same in similar industries across countries. In 
Pakistan minimum optimum size of plants are substantially 
below the international standards of minimum efficient size.
Limitations of our approach in this chapter are, first, 
these concentration ratios obscure the changes in rank order 
of top enterprises over frW, such changes are an indication of 
dynamic competition. Second, the importance of the forces in 
determining the structure of industry cannot be gauged from 
the modest approach adopted in this chapter. More rigorous 
analysis is undertaken in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER-IV 
DETERMINANTS OF CONCENTRATION
The purpose of this chapter is to equire what determines the
A
structure of manufacturing industry. In particular our aim is 
to find what determines  ^ . concentration and change
in concentration overtime. Such an enquiry is the first of its 
kind /ov* of Pakistan. The merit of our investigations is
that from an economic policy and planning point of view it is 
useful to know of importance of certain variables
in influencing the structure of industry at a point of time 
and whether their importance changes overtime. The demerit of 
our enquiry is that it is limited in nature to the extent 
that it is based on OLS estimates which provide only average 
relationships; thus our results may not be relevant for 
particular industries. Also because of the non- availability 
of data we are unable to assess the importance of some 
qualitative factors like government regulating policies, 
private and public sector investment decisions, luck and 
uncertainity etc.
The above mentioned problem is approached in two ways. 
First, we adopt the traditional approach which is static in 
nature and explain only the levels of concentration. For this
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exercise we have cho .sen three points of time 1^970/, 1978. and
^ 19 84*1 employing Census of Manufacturing Data. Like this we are 
able to detect simultaneously not only the relative importance 
of the explanatory variables at a pa.rticuiui' time but also the 
changing importance of these variables in influencing the 
levels of concentration at different . times with the
change inAeconomic and political scene After
having obtained our results for levels of concentration, in 
our ^ second approach which relates to the dynamic aspect of our 
analysis, we probe a little further by explaining changes in 
concentration, that is what factors reinforce concentration or 
how concentration could persist. We then compare our results 
with those of the first approach. Such a comparison enables us 
to assess whether the variables explaining the levels of 
concentration are also relevant in explaining the changes in 
concentration. Since, it is possible that the relative 
importance of certain variables may grow stronger or weaker 
over fcf'/n<2, or some new variable may appear to be more important 
in influencing concentration. If so, we may get concentration 
not because of monopoly but because of other reasons. Thus 
public policy needs to be different and inferences drawn on 
the basis of the first approach may not remain valid any 
more.
Although relevant economic theory is weak, it is 
generally hypothesized by most writers that inter industry 
variation in concentration can be explained by factors like 
scale economies, barriers to entry (mainly capital
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requirement) and size of industry. Like all others we also
hypothesize that the same variables exert considerable
influence on the structure of industry. So we will take the
same three variables and examine their relative importance in 
explaining the level of concentration. In addition to these 
variables we plan to include industry growth for all the
three years and pattern of ownership and product 
differentation for 1978 and 1984 only. The addition of the 
last two variables is made to assess the influence of 
government ownership and product differentiation which 
gradually increased, on the concentration of manufacturing 
industry.
While explaining changes in concentration one of the 
constraints is that only comparable industries can be included 
in the sample to assess the importance of variables overtime,* 
This is so because as economies grow new products are 
introduced through new activities and old products gradually 
disappear. Such industries will then record a different 
concentration behaviour compared to stable industries where 
comparison overtime is relatively easy. Thus due to all such 
reasons we could include only 3 3 comparable sectors of 
production. Before reporting the results of our enquiry, all 
the variables included in our models are explained briefly, as 
to how they are measured and what is the direction of their 
hypothesized relationship with the dependent variables. 
Dependent Variable:
Concentration Ratio (CR4): denoted by CR4 is our dependent
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variable for the first approach and is measured as the 
percentage share of the top four enterprises in value added 
in their respective industries.
Static Determinants of Concentration:
Economies Of Scale (EOS) : Economies of scale was Bain’s 
[1956] leading candidate in expl^ning the level of 
concentration in an industry i.e one condition that could 
lead to concentrated market structure is the existence of 
substantial scale economies, permitting relatively large 
producers to manufacture and market their products at lower 
average cost per unit than the small producers. Although 
there exist product specific, plant specific and multiplant 
economies of scale, we will mainly take into consideration the 
average size of plant making up the top 50 percent of the 
industry in terms of size.1/* it is all plants of a bigger
1. One of the proxies used for the measurement of minimum efficent 
size is mid point or median plant size which is defined as 
that plant size such that all large size plants added 
together account for 50 percent of the industry size. For 
example:
Size of Plant 
measured by 
(Number of 
employees)
Number of 
employees
Cumulative 
number of 
employers
600 + 3200
2700
3600
2600
800
100
13000
3200
5900
9500
12100
12900
13000
500-599
400-499
300-399
200-299
199
From the given data we find the plants that account for
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size when added together which determine the average or median 
plant size which in turn determines the structure of industry. 
More precisely the optimum size of a plant together with the 
size of the industry determines the optimum number of firms 
which in turn determines concentration. Pashigian [1968].
So the hypothesis is that industries in which either 
technological considerations favour large plants or technology 
is imported from advanced economies will tend to have higher 
enterprise concentration than those where small plants prevail 
or local technology is employed. It is also possible that for 
several reasons enterprises may prefer to work with more than 
one below optimum size plants. In that case one needs to take 
into account the economies of multiplant operation which 
implies higher concentraion and market power, but the 
non-availability of data about the number of plants per 
establishment restrict us to single plant operations.
The data available to us are at various size groups and 
we will base our measure of economies of scale on these data. 
The variable is derived by estimating the median size of 
plants accounting for 50 percent of industry size.
Size of Industry (INS): It is hypothesized that other things
ite*beingAsame, the larger the absolute size of an industry the 
lower its entry barriers, Bain [1956]. The simple logic is
13000.05 = 6500 classes 600+ and 500-599 account for only 
5900, so we go below 500, to account for another 600 
employees (6500-5900). 600 is 1/6 of 3600, therefore we go 
below 1/6 into the 400-499 class. Thus the proxy for MES is 
500-16.6 = 483.3.
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that if the size of a firm is determined by the optimum plant 
size of an industry, then the share of the top four firms in 
the industry output depends on the optimum plant size relative 
to the industry size. Therefore,^smaller the industry size 
there will exist fewtf optimum size plants hence concentration 
will be high. Our measure of industry size is total 
employment.
Absolute Capital Requirement (K/L): Much of the literature 
gives the impression that certain industries must necessanly 
be concentrated because the fixed cost to build plants of 
minimum efficient size are high relative to the size of the 
market.Bain [1956] Gan Tham [1977].
Or in case of less developed countries foreign exchange 
required for the import of machinery and other inputs may be
o n ljc o
large and available toAfew influential entrepreneur s. White 
[1974]. Therefore absolute capital requirement can act as a 
barrier to entry if the ability to raise funds for entry in a 
particular market is limited. This is especially so in less 
developed countries where capital markets are relatively 
imperfect, and the ability of new small firms to obtain 
adequate finance may be limited or government may adopt 
foreign exchange discriminatory policies favouring large or 
specific enterprises at the cost of small enterprises or 
government may ration foreign exchange depending upon the 
priorities of the government.
So a positive relationship is expected between the level 
of concentration and the absolute capital required. The ratio
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of book value of fixed assets to labour for each industry is
taken as a measure of absolute capital required,'lhtCapital
labour ratio will also pick up the influence of import
substitution industries, often capital intensive in nature,
1U
on the levels of concentration. And since^capital labour ratio 
is an indirect measure of import substituion we will therefore 
not examine the relative importance of import substituion 
policy in determining the levels of concentration by 
including it as an additional dummy variable in our models. 
Industry Growth (IG): Industries that are growing slowly or 
are declining are likely to create a displacement problem for 
the new entrants. On the contrary, when an industry is 
growing rapidly, new firms face a less difficult problem of 
entry. We therefore expect this variable to change its sign 
over time depending upon the pattern of growth in the 
manufacturing industry, which was fastest in the earlier 
period, slowest after 1970 and again gained some momentum in 
1980's. Proportioniate change in value added between 1965-70, 
1970-78 and 1970-84 was used to measure industry growth for 
1970, 1978 and 1984 respectively.
Effective Protection (EPR): It is widely believed that
concentration depends on the extent of the market, the wider 
or more open a market the more is competition and lower is 
the concentration. In contrast the narrower orA heavily 
protected a market the higher is the concentration level in a 
country. In less developed countries import substitution 
industries are often heavily protected and they are unable to
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compete in the international markets. Thus a few large units 
of production are enough to meet the domestic demand. This 
leads to a concentrated market structure. So we would expect 
a positive association between effective protection and 
concentration. Effective protective rates are taken from two 
different studies. For 1970 the rates were taken from Lewis 
and Guisinger [1968] and for 1978 the rates used are taken 
from Naqvi, Kemal and Heston, [1983]
Ownership pattern (PP): It is generally believed that
concentration will be high in those areas of production where 
government participation is large and private sector is not 
allowed to enter against those activities where the private 
sector is free to invest and produce. In contrast to this
belief others may argue that government intervention is not 
the cause of concentration, if government intervention means 
more investment to increase the number of firms then
concentration level will be reduced in those areas of
production. However, it is quite likely that government
intervention results in either failure to reduce concentration 
or possibly increase in concentration if, first government 
investment is of a limited nature i.e the increase in number 
of firms is slow and potential entrants from the private 
sector are not allowed to enter which otherwise may have led 
to decline in concentration levels. Second, the threat of 
nationalization, as in the case of Pakistan, acts as a deterent 
to entry by large investors both local and foreign even in 
areas of production where there are no restrictions on private
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investment. Thus, with the presence of opposing forces it is 
not clear what is the direction of association between 
concentration and government ownership and whether on balance 
the effect of government ownership on concentration is 
negligible or significant. Therefore careful explanation of 
results is required. A dummy variable is used to measure the 
pattern of ownership with one for public ownership and a zero 
otherwise.
Product Differentiation (PD): Quite often it is suggested
that at least in the same industries and especially in certain 
consumer goods industries there are significant economies of 
scale in many aspects of product differentiation and sales 
promotion. And its implication is that the advantage of size 
can lead to market concentration exceeding what is required to 
realize all production and distribution economies. Empirical 
studies have observed that concentration changes have followed 
quite a different pattern in consumer as compared to producer 
goods industries. Average concentration rose significantly in 
the former and fell in the later. Furthermore concentration 
ratios rose more rapidly in consumer goods industries with 
product differentiation and relatively intense advertising. 
These results suggest there is something special about 
industries inclined towards advertising. It could be 
promotional economies of scale that gave larger consumer goods 
sellers a cost advantage over their small rivals and 
especially over new entrants. In particular advertising is the 
most important basis of large firms' advantages Bain [1956].
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Large firms are able to attain the maximum level of response 
from consumers at a lower advertising cost per unit sale than 
the small size firms. This may originate with physical 
diffficulties and barriers in the rapid enhancement of sales 
or consumers neutrality and slowness in shifting their demand. 
Thus given such an advantage it will have a feed back effect 
on concentration.
Advertising sales ratio is the usual proxy used to 
measure advertising intensity. This proxy is hypothesized to 
have a positive coefficient. However as discussed earlier not 
only is it difficult to relate advertising intensity to 
concentration but there are problems of measurement as well 
which means the proxy will measure the relationship between 
concentration and product differentiation loosely.2/.
2. The positive relationship between concentration and product 
differentiation is correct but it is not the whole story. 
Through successful product differentiation small firms maybe 
able to cut out for themselves a small but profitable share 
in some special areas of production. There,, sales may be 
limited which does not allow them to realize the benefits of 
large scale, but the price consumers are ready to pay for 
differentiated products may be large enough to offset the 
cost disadvantage arising from small scale of production and 
sales promotion. Thus the direction of association between 
concentration and product differentiation may not be posi­
tive in all cases, it may vary from case to case.
Another aspect of product differentiation is that rival 
sellers may produce poor quality and sub standard 
differeniated goods to shift the demand in favour of their 
products by charging low prices.
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Determinants of Changes in concentration 
The Second Approach:
Change in Concentration: Our dependent variable of the
second approach is measured as the absolute and proportional 
change in concentration between 1984 and 1970 defined as,
i) Absolute Change: DCR4 = CR4 - CR4
1984 1970
ii) Proportionate Change: dCR = logCR4 - logCR4
1984 1970
Similarly our right hand side variables explaining change in 
concentration are measured as first differences and 
proportionate differences in economies of scale, industry 
size and capital labour ratio between 1970-84. Another 
important variable explaning changes in concentration is 
initial concentration (CR4 1970), it is expected to have 
negative association with change in concentration.The higher 
the initial level of concentration the smaller is the change 
in concentration. Besides these variables, industry growth, 
ownership patterns and product differentiation have also been 
added as our additional explanatory variables.
LEVELS OF CONCENTRATION AND REGRESSION RESULTS:
We started our tests with the ordinary least squares by
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specifying the relationship between selected variables for the 
three points of time as such:
4.1. CR4 = a + bEOS + cINS + dK/L + elG + fEPR
1970
4.2. CR4 = a + bEOS + cINS + dK/L + elG + fEPR + gPP
1978
4.3. CR4 = a + bEOS + cINS + dK/L + elG + fPP + gPD
1984
Linear, Log linear and Semi-log linear regression results of 
equations 4.1 to 4.3 are r^&corckcL in Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3.
Since the results using different measures for concentration
were similar, we, therefore, report in this and the next 
chapter only the regression results where concentration is 
measured by value added.
Table 4.1 reports three sets of regression results, 
for(equation 4.1) 1970. Equations 1-5, 6-10 and 11-15 contain 
regression results for linear, log linear and semi log linear 
regressions respectively. All the variables included in our 
regression equations have the right signs but economies of 
scale and industry size are the only two principal variables 
which exert strong influence on the structure of industry in 
all the three forms of our regression equations. But both 
these variables have very small regression coefficients in 
the linear form of the regression results. The independent 
relationship between economies of scale and concentration, 
reported in equations 1,6 and 11 although insignificant grows 
stronger when industry size is included in our regression 
equations in equations 2,7 and 12. Addition of capital labour 
ratio does not change the results it remains an insignificant
14 9
Table 4.1 : Determinants of Inter Industry Differances in
Concentration Levels Between 2 9 Manufacturing
Sectors 1970
Equations
Linear
1.
2 .
3 .
4 .
5.
Variables 
Constant EOS INS
48.45
48.78
50.38
51.18
48 . 08
K/L
0.0009 
(1.08)
0.005 -0.002 
(1.30) (2.11)
0.006 -0.002 
(1.35) (2.10)
0.006 -0.002 
(1.27) (2.00)
IG
0.22
(0.55)
0.38
(0.18)
EPR R
0. 03
0. 15
0. 16
0. 16
0.006 -0.002 0.23 -0.39 0.02 0.18
(1.26) (2.06) (0.41) (0.02)(0.08)
Log Linear 
6.
7.
8 .
9.
10.
3.16 0.09 0.12
(1.76)
5.46 0.25 -0.39 0.48
(2.70) (4.78)
5.48 0.25 -0.39 0.01 0.48
(2.61) (4.70) (0.07)
5.39 0.27 -0.41 0.02 -0.28 0.49
(2.73) (4.85) (0.12) (0.62)
5.47 0.27 -0.41 0.02 -0.28 0.0006 0.49
(2.73) (4.85) (0.12) (0.62)(1.18)
Semi Log Linear
11. 33.30
12 .
13 .
119.00
118.60
2 .59 
(1.68)
8.57 -14.78
(3.14) (5.96)
8.43 -14.71 1.02
(2.96) (5.85) (0.24)
0.12
0.59
0.59
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14.
15.
113.9 9.61 -15.13 4.49 -18.73 0.61
(3.27) (6.06) (0.90) (1.33)
117.75 9.67 -15.72 2.92 -15.40 0.02 0.66
(3.45) (6.54) (0.60) (1.16) (1.84)
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variable in all the three sets of regression results. 
Industry growth shows negative but modest influence on the 
structure of industry. Finally effective protection manifest 
positive association with concentration. However, both 
industry growth and effective protection appear to be 
associated with concentration only in the semi-log linear 
regression results. The t ratios and overall goodness of fit 
improves impressively in the log-linear and semi log linear 
regression results. It is note worthy that the joint 
explanatory power of economies of scale and industry size 
alone is 0.59 (equation 12) which is remarkably high.
Table 4.2 reports regression results for 1978. As before 
linear, log linear and semi log linear specification of 
equation 4.2 were taken. Equations 1-6 report linear 
regression results, all the explanatory variables have the 
right sign and except for industry growth^rest of the 
variables show modest association with concentration in terms 
of t-ratios. However, the regression coefficient of economies 
of scale and industry size, in particular, is very small . 
The over all goodness of fit is also limited to 0.42. 
Equations 7-11 and 12-16 record log-linear and semi-log linear 
regression results and it is noted that these results show 
considerable improvement over the linear form of the 
regressions. This is evident from the improvement in both the 
t-ratios and regression coefficients in case of economies of 
scale and industry size in equations 6,7 and 12 and 13. 
Capital labour ratio remain as an unimportant variable.
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Table 4.2 : Determinants of Inter Industry Differences in
Concentration Levels Between 30 Manufacturing
Sectors 1978
Equations Constant
Linear
1. 41.45
44.99
36.12
36.22
34.10
34.88
EOS
Variables 
INS K/L 16 EPR
0. 005 
(1.30)
0.005 -0.0002 
(1.32) (1.93)
0.005 -0.0002 
(1.59) (1.93)
0.005 -0.0002 
(1.48) (1.84)
0.004 -0.0002 
(1.23) (2.08)
PP
0.24
(7.29)
0.13 -4.88 
(0.46)(0.41)
0.16 -3.90 0.03
(0.58) (0.34) (1.30)
06
17
31
31
36
0.006 -0.0001 0.31 -0.32 0.03-16.39.42
(1.76) (1.45) (1.07)(0.03)(1.53)(1.54)
Log Linear
7. 1.73 0.30 .16
(2.31)
8 . 4.52 0.43 -0.43 .56
(4.34) (4.96)
9. 4.30 0.42 -0.43 0.09 .57
(4.25) (4.95) (0.70)
10. 4.40 0.41 -0.41 0.004 -0.13 .59
(4.13) (4.70) (0.03) (1.10)
11 4.72 0.40 -0.96 0.02 -0.14 0.001 .66
(4.33) (5.48) (0.16) (1.16)(2.77)
12. 4.45 0.42 -0.45 0.04 -0.14 0.001-0.11 .66
(4.05) (4.55) (0.25) (1.17) (2 . 21) (0.38 )
Semi Log
13. 5.23 8.19
(1.94)
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14.
15.
16.
17 .
18 .
80.66 12.18 -13.08 .49
(3.59) (4.41)
65.83 11.92 -13.37 6.04 .52
(3.57) (4.58)(1.42)
71.59 11.29 -12.48 1.20 -7.72 .58
(3.52) (4.42) (0.25) (1.88)
83.98 10.90 -14.46 1.88 -7.85 0.04 .69
(3.84) (5.57) (0.44) (2.16) (2.82)
60.97 12.27 -12.88 3.28 -8.23 0.04 -9.58 .70
(3.99) (4.58) (0.74) (2.27) (2.89) (1.12)
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Table 4.3 : Determinants of Inter Industry Differences in
Concentration Levels Between 31 Manufacturing
Sectors 1984
Variables
Equations Constant EOS INS K/L 16 PP PD R
Log Linear
1. 40.45 0.004 .04
(1.06)
2. 44.27 0.004 -0.0003 .21
(1.34) (2.44)
3. 45.31 0.004 -0.0003 0.04 .22
(1.26) (2.44) (0.48)
4. 47.86 0.005 -0.0003 0.04 -0.11 .23
(1.33) (2.43) (0.60)(0.54)
5. 47.62 0.006 -0.0003 0.01 -0.03 -7.0 .26
(1.57) (2.16) (0.20)(0.15)(0.95)
6. 50.47 0.005 -0.0003 0.01 -0.03 -6.0 -0.53 .28
(1.35) (2.18) (0.21) (0.15) (0.79) (0.79)
Semi Log
7. 61.80 2.68 .02
(1.83)
8 . 77.51 1.41 -2.92 .06
(0.41) (1.04)
9. 77.92 1.42 -2.91 0.11 .06
(0.40) (0.99) (0.03)
10. 78.12 1.81 -3.29 1.35 -0.02 .08
(0.49) (1.08) (0.33) (0.74)
11. 78.12 1.81 -3.29 1.35 -0.02 .08
(0.49) (1.08) (0.33) (0.71)
12. 81.77 1.83 -2.90 0.42 -0.02 -5.07 .09
(0.49) (0.94) (0.09) (0.62)(0.70)
83 . 59 2.41 -2.40 0.37 -0.02 -4.60 -0.63.13
(0.69) (0.75) (0.08) (0.67) (0.63) (0.86)
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Industry growth and effective protection also improve their
significance in the log-linear and semi-log linear regression
results. Ownership pattern show weak negative association
2.
with concentration. The over all goodness of fit, R , has
also improved to 0.66 and 0.70 in equations 11 and 16.
Finally, Table 4.3 only log-linear and semi-log
linear regression results for 1984 (equation 4.3). (Linear
regression results are not reported for their poor explanatory
power). These results suggest that not only the importance of
economies of scale declines and its relationship with
concentration deteriorates, it also changes its sign from
positive to negative. And except for industry size all other
variables also record a decline in their significance level.
Industry size manifest a consistent and typically negative
association with concentration, capital labour ratio, Industry
growth and ownership pattern exert least influence on
concentration. Addition of product differentiation does not
2
improve the results. Obviously this also shows in the R , 
altogether the explanatory power of right hand side variables 
is limited to 0.28 and 0.13 percent in the log-linear and 
semi-log linear regression, which clearly indicate that many 
other forces are at work which our model cannot explain. TnA 
short, all the three regression forms confirm that economies 
of scale and industry size consistently appear as an 
important determinant of the inter-industry level of 
concentration. However economies of scale has lost its 
significance in influncing concentration ratios over the
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years. By 1984 its relationship with concentration had reduced 
to insignificance. Capital labour ratio does not perform well 
in all of the regressions. Industry growth shows modest 
influence on concentration, and the association between 
effective protection and concentration is strongest in 1978. 
Ownership pattern and product differentiation do not appear to 
be important variables. Generally our results are satisfactory 
but they are unable to provide any conclusive answers, many 
other forces are at work which our models particularly 
equation 3 cannot explain. This is hardly surprising, it is 
quite possible that omitted variables like changing political 
and economic enviornment which are difficult to measure are 
more important in determining the structure of industry 
overtime. Most authors argue that weak
association between concentration and its determinants is due 
to the existence of multicollinearity among our explanatory 
variables, particularly economies of scale, industry size and 
capital labour ratio. If any one of these variables has large 
values the others also have a tendency to take up high values. 
And when all such variables are included in a regression 
equation it is often noted by researchers that one of the 
variable manifest sweeping importance over the others in its 
significance and explanatory power; while the rest appear to 
be statistically insignificant.3/. Whatever the demerit of our
3. Nothing much can be done about any possible existence of
multicollinearity in the data. Only by obtaining precisely 
measured longer sample can one avoid the difficulties aris 
ing out of collinear explanatory variable. However the 
correlation matrix for our data dqfnot indicate the existence
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results, when we compare these results with those of the 
studies for less developed countries mentioned in Table 2.2 we 
note that our results are similar to these studies.
Given the results of the first approach one question 
posed at the beginning was, how seriously should one
take results obtained for a point of time ?. Ar&- - the 
inferences drawn on t h e ^ o f  such results reliable and
TTvL'y e. fort* the policies suggested? To be sure that the 
answers we provide to the questions put forth at the begining 
are correct we follows simple procedure by arguing that if 
certain variables explain/donot explain the level of 
concentration in an industry at a point of time then do these 
variables remain important/unimportant determinants of the 
structure of manufacturing industry overtime as well. The 
procedure is based on our second approach where our regression 
equations take first the form of absolute differences.
4.4.DCR4 - a + bDEOS + cDINS + dDK/L + eCR4 + fIG + gPD + hPP
1970
Our regression estimates for absolute differences are given 
in Table 4.4. Economies of scale show significant positive 
reltionship with concentration. Industry size exerts negative 
influence on concentration only modestly. But the regression 
coefficient of both economies of scale and industry size is 
close to zero and their explanatory power is limited. Addition 
of capital labour ratio in column 3 does not improve the
of strong multicollinearity among the explanatory variables.
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Table 4.4 : Absolute Changes in Concentration and its 
Determinants ( 2 9 Sectors 1970 - 84 ).
Variables
Equations
Constant 6.12 4.57 7.11 2.46 16.28 16.52 17.96
DEOS 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004
(1.87) (2.29) (2.31) (2.14) (2.39) (2.17) (2.15)
DINS -.0006 -.0009 -.0008 -.0006 -.0006 -.0006
(1.39) (1.54) (1.53) (1.14) (1.13) (1.03)
DK/L 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.71) (0.71) (0.97) (0.99) (0.19)
CR1970 -0.19 -0.21 -0.19 -0.19
(1.50) (1.67) (1.56) (1.26)
IG -14.5 -12.42 -13.0
(1.39) (1.26) (1.26)
PD -0.82 -2.0
(1.98)(1.82)
PP -2.0
(0.29)
2
R 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.26 0.32 0.42 0.42
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result and it manifest a weak positive relationship with
concentration. Initial concentration and industry growth have
the expected negative sign and explain changes in
concentration in a limited manner. Product differentiation
manifests negative and fairly significant relationship with
changes in concentration. The last variable, ownership
pattern, in column 7 has a negative sign but its explanatory
power is poor. Altogether the explanatory power of the right
z
hand side variables expressed by R is as high as 0.42
The final regression equation with proportionate 
differences takes the following form:
4.5.dCR4 = a + bdEOS + cdlNS + ddK/L + eCR4 + fIG + gPD + hPP
1970
The regression estimates given in Table 4.5 manifest that in 
comparison to other variables economies of scale and industry 
size are important variables in explaining changes in 
concentration. Comparing the estimates of proportionate 
changes with those of absolute changes, the significance of 
the variables measuring changes in economies of scale and 
industry size improved and the resulting increase in the
explanatory power increase to 0.3 4 in column 2. Addition of
the remaning five explanatory variables to the regression
equations increase the explanatory power of the right
handside variable to 0.45 only. Capital/ labour ratio
consistently remains unimportant, initial concentration has
lost its importance and changed its sign from negative to
positive. Industry growth and product differentiation show
weak association with concentration and ownership pattern
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Table 4.5 : Proportionate Changes in Concentration and its 
Determinants (29 sectors 1970 - 84).
Variables Equations
Constant 
d EOS
d INS
d K/L
CR1970
IG
PD
PP
Z
R
0.20 0.12 0.11 0.23 0.54 0.56 0.45
0.90 0.21 0.21 0. 22 0.22 0.21 0.23
(1.39) (3.00) (2.84) (2.80) (2.82) (2.75) (2.87)
-0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0. 66 -0. 63 -0. 67
(3.28) (2.96) (2.90) (2.91) (2.80) (2.92)
0.001 0. 007 0.09 0.08 0.10
(0.01) (0.05) (0.59) (0.53) (0.67)
0.04 0. 05 0. 07 0. 07
(0.28) (0.44) (0.63) (0.57)
-0. 44 -0.43 -0.47
(1.09) (1.11) (1.18)
-0.02 -0. 02
(1.47) (1.22)
-0. 18
(0.89)
06 . 34 . 34 .34 .34 .37 .45
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appears to have negative but insignificant influence on 
concentration.
Comparing the results of changes in concentration and its 
determinants with those obtained for the determinants of the 
levels of concentration at three different points of time, it 
is noted that both the approaches suggest that economies of 
scale and industry size are the two main variables that 
explain the inter industry variation in concentration, 
however, their importance has been limited overtime. Thus it 
is clear that the importance of our explanatory variables 
change over time and therefore inferences drawn on the 
basis of results obtained at a point of time may not 
necessarily be valid for all times.
Now that the results of the two approaches regarding the 
determinants of concentration are at hand, at this stage we 
can gain some insight about the structure of industry by 
discussing the determinants of structure according to two 
broad phases of development (1955-70 aand 1970-84) and relate 
our results to the regulatory policies adopted in these two 
periods. First, between 1955-70 there were several 
factors (as already discussed in chapter 1) which combined to 
lead to a concentrated structure of industry and produce 
results reported in Table 4.1. One important factor which 
most earlier writers seem to undermine is the importance of 
Pakistan's dependence on imported technology. Where 
significant economies of scale exist there would tend to exist 
a fundamental difference between the scales of output given
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by the imported technology and the initially small size of 
the market in the importing country so that 'the available 
technology puts a floor under the size of almost any plant
that 1------ represents a significant shift from the
traditional to modern technology of production1. (Merhave 
1968, p.68). Moreover the adoption of foreign techniques which 
are suited to the larger scales of production in the countries 
of origin play an important role in determining the 
competitive structure in the importing country. Imported 
technology therefore makes easy the establishment of dominant 
market positions. Thus the important point is that the 
establishment of dominant market position in large sectors of 
manufacturing industry in a country like Pakistan is an 
outcome of its dependence on imported technology. Market power 
thus has structural and ultimately, technological origins. 
Reinforcing the effects of technology is the role played by 
other barriers to entry, two of which were of special 
importance: i) the regulatory policies particulary regarding 
licensing decisions and the allocation of foreign exchange, 
and ii) the large absolute volume of capital required to set 
up a plant of minimum efficient size. In the use of the 
concessions and privileges contained in the regulatory 
policies, the power and influence exercised by the top big 
families was instrumental in shaping the structure of 
industry. White [1974] estimates, for example, that between 
19 60 and 1965, these families because of their complete hold 
over the licensing system, managed to claim for themselves 51
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percent of the total licenses issued by the government for the 
import of plant and equipment. Winston [1970] showed that the 
larger firms were equally influential in obtaining favourable 
treatment in the allocation of licenses for industrial raw 
material; furthermore by being able to purchase inputs at over 
valued exchange rate and selling their outputs in protected 
domestic markets and areas where they again managed to take 
most of the other privileges and incentives given by the 
government, the larger firms were able to generate about 40 
percent extra value added out of the system of effective 
protection, Lewis and Guisinger [1968]. Finally not only did 
these families own a major share of banking assets, they also 
exerted strong influence on the pattern of allocation of 
foreign credit and on the Pakistan Industrial Credit and 
Investment Corporation (PICIC); an institution through which 
the major part of external assistance to the private sector 
was distributed. Seven of the thirteen Pakistanis on the Board 
of Directors were members of the top big families, and 65 
percent of the permissions for new investment issued by PICIC 
during the period 1958 and 197 0 went to 37 monopoly groups, 
with 13 of the larger groups getting 70 percent of all 
sanctions, White [1974], Amjad [1977].
Nonetheless with the changing and unpredictable political 
and thereupon economic envrco.nment in the seventies and 
eighties government regulatory policies towards the structure 
of industry under went unexpected and drastic changes. 
Although once again government policies were largely
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instrumental in jointly shaping the structure and performance 
of the industrial sector, but this time in quite a different 
manner. For example, first,after nationalizations the private 
sector was not allowed to invest in large capital intensive 
projects, and their past reliance on imported technology and 
raw material was to be considerably minimized by limits set on 
investment sanctions. Investment sanction policy limited 
private sectors access to imported technology and other 
industrial inputs. The investment sanction policy was tight in 
seventies and was gradually relaxed in eighties. The ceiling 
was brought down to Rs.5 million in 1978 which has been 
raised to Rs.500 million in 1987 thus setting limits on the 
size, of new investment which was also restricted to a 
specified list of projects and particular locations. The 
purpose was to avoid market concentration by ensuring that the 
market is divided up among two or more (below minimum optimum 
size) entrants rather than a single large firm. Like this the 
role of imported technology in influencing industry 
concentration was expected to be reduced to a large extent.4/. 
To reinforce the impact of investment sanctions particularly 
on imported technology access to foreign exchange required for 
the import of machinery and other inputs was limited. Unlike
4. Although the impact of these policies donot show in the
results reported in Table 4.2, perhaps this is so because 
data for 1978 could not pick up the effect of policy changes. 
But the results mentioned in Table 4.3 for 1984 clearly 
indicate that through investment sanction and other policies 
the role of technology as a determinant of structure of 
industry is minimized considerably.
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the first phase of development tight control was exercised on 
foreign exchange which was made available in accordance with 
the sanctioning limits of a project.At the same time labour 
cost was increased which left no option for firms than to 
delay investment. Another not^able feature of seventies and 
eighties was that government policies were altered at random 
and short notice like changes in input/output prices, taxes 
etc; these changes caused unforseen financial problems and 
frightened away the entrepreneur s from new investment and 
participation in economic activity.
Furthermore to disintegrate and defeat monopoly power it 
was necessary and imperative to disjoin the link between the 
monopoly group and the financial market. This connection had 
feed back effects and was considered as vital for the 
maintainance of dominant market position. In this regard the 
role played by two policy decisions was decisive in many 
ways. First, the hard handed nationalization of banks and 
insurance companies without compensation, deprived the 
leading families of the whip hand through which they acted as 
masters of the capital market and consequently detered entry 
by potential entrants. Prior to nationalization some of these 
leading families were hit by the loss of assets in the former 
East Pakistan as well. Thus their financial power and 
confidence was weakened considerably. Second, devaluation of 
frt Rupee, abolition of multiple exchange rates and other 
governmentally conferred benefits and privileges were with 
drawn which raised the cost of production and exposed the
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dominant producers to pressures of competition. The extent to 
which these policies were successful in shaping the structure 
of industry can be gauged from the information reported in 
Table 3.2. The Table indicates that the private sector 
appears to have revised its investment decisions by postponing 
and reducing investment which reached the lowest level of 6.4 
percent of manufacturing value added in 1974-75 compared to 
20.5 percent in 1969-70 and 38.7 percent in 1963-64. And 
between 1974-75 , 1982- 83 it has increased only marginally to
7.6 percent. Obviously the private sector acted in this manner 
due to the fact that profits which are important for 
investment decisions were affected by policy changes (see 
chapter V ) .
Decline in investment imply the structure of industry 
presumably remain to be dominated by concentrated oligopolies 
at least in the private sector. In contrast to the private 
sector, during the same time, market structure in terms of 
the growth of some of the public owned capital intensive 
enterprises was changing consequent upon the growth of market 
size, Demand for goods produced by capital intensive 
industries expanded rapidly which led to increased public 
investment and thereupon modification in the dominant market 
position of some of the large capital intensive firms overtime 
Table 3.2 demonstrates the fact that public investment rose 
sharply from a low level of 1.44 percent of manufacturing 
value added to 28.9 percent between 1972-73 to 1977-78 and 
declined gradually to 8 percent of manufacturing value added
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by 1982-83 due to the noncommitment of the Military 
government to further investment./} wjajor part of public 
investment was made in the on going and some new sectors like 
vegtable oil, cement, fertilizers, manufacture of light 
engineering goods, petroleum refining and iron and steel 
where concentration as noted earlier in terms ofA number of 
establishments has declined.5/.
Finally what is more disturbing to note is that the joint 
investment of both the public and private sector has continued 
to decline after 1977-78. It was 35.9 percent of 
manufacturing value added in 1977-78 and has now declined to
16.6 percent in 1982-83. Such a state of affairs have a direct 
bearing on the structure of industry.
It may also be mentioned that the other side of the 
picture is that these policies (particularly investment 
sanctions) were in some cases ineffective in reducing 
concentration because the leading influential firms would 
pre^pL licenses and let the sanction lapse. For example Table
5. However, it is note worthy that concentration of these
industries in terms of their share in manufacturing value 
added has increased considerably mainly because of their high 
relative weight in manufacturing value added. Increase in 
demand for most of these goods is mainly attributable to the 
increase in rural income level, an important source of 
demand which was not taken note of in the earlier strategies 
of development.
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4.6 and Annex 4.1 show the value of issued investment 
sanctions in most groups of industry annually exceeded actual 
private investment in the manufacturing industry. It is also 
widely believed that only a fraction of the annual loans 
sanctioned (by government) are invested and a major share of 
the sanctioned funds is deposited in foreign banks. The 
recipients of the sanctions are often political supporters who 
demand such favours from the governments. It is difficult to 
substantiate this belief with statistical evidence because 
somehow the documents of the recipients show consistency in 
the amount invested and sanctioned. And the government lacks 
the ability of accountability because of its urgent: need for 
political support to remain in power. As a result investment 
is at its lowest level, entry of potential entrants is blocked 
and the private sector in general remain almost as 
concentrated as it was in 1960's.
Summary:
To summarize the chapter, our results manifest that among the 
determinants of concentration economies of scale and industry 
size are the strongest explanatory variables, but their 
explanatory power is limited and decline overtime. The 
importance of economies of scale as a barrier to entry and a 
determinant of market structure mainly stemmed from Pakistan's 
dependence on imported technology which at least led to the 
domination of the manufacturing sector by the top leading 
families.lt must also be noted that the link between 
concentration and barriers to entry was not one way, barriers
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Table 4.6 : Sanctioned investment Projects
(Values in billion Rupees).
1977-78 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86
Number of n.a 419 386 431
Projects
Value of 
Projects:
(in currentRs 4.5 19.7 11.2 17.9
(in constant 3.8 10.3 5.7 9.0
1975/76 Rs)
Realized 1.0 5.8 n.a
Investment
(in current Rupees).
n. a
Source : Annex 4.1
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to entry created concentration and economic power which in
turn gave birth to political power to facilitate the
maintenance of these barriers through the capital market,
licensing and trade policies. Whether economies of scale as a
barrier to entry would have been of less importance if a)
labour intensive technology was adopted instead of imported
technology is difficult to answer.^In sectors like cement,
fertilizers, iron and steel and petroleum refining perhaps it
would not have made much of cl difference to the scale of
production but in consumer goods industries like vegetable
ghee and sugar etc; labour intensive technology may have led
to lower efficient scale of production), b) access to imported
technology was open to all entrepreneurs rather than the top
few families, ^in that case economies of scale may not have
e
acted as a barrier to entry, created deliberately by government 
policy , and consequently an important determinant of the 
structure of industry), However, as noted,economies of scale 
cannot explain all of the industry concentration found in 
Pakistan, so we have to look at other barriers to entry to 
explain concentration in Pakistani manufacturing industry.
cv
Other variables included in our regression equtions were 
capital/labour ratio, ownership patten, effective protection 
and product differentiation etc; but they showed somewhat 
frail relationshipswith concentration.lt is difficult to draw 
simple generalizations about the factors responsible for 
shaping the structure of industry from our model. However one 
thing seems quite clear, the forces influencing concentration
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change over time. A fair amount depends upon the changing
envif £? nment in the country through changes in government
policies which are aimed at reduction in concentration, and
the reaction of the entreprenurial class to such changes.For
example, the regulatory policies of the 1970's and 1980's,
namely nationalizations, investment sanctions, devaluation,
tight control on fore.i gn exchange and withdrawal of concessions
etc; were designed to minimize the role of imported technology
and break the crucial link between the monopoly and economic
power. In practice these policies led to undesirable
consequences in the form of decline in the private sector
participation in investment in the new projects. In contrast
to what the regulatory policies had aimed at such a phenomenon
supported the dominance of a few large firms at least in the
private sector. Even in the public sector concentration could
1Kil
have declined further than experienced inAseventies
and eighties if the private sector was allowed to invest in 
the areas of production dominated by the public sector, or at 
least the public sector alone had commited itself to further 
investment.
It is important to point out that it is not only the policies 
of the various regimes which were important in shaping the 
struture of industries, the inconsistencies in policies had a 
more lasting and damaging impact on the structure of industry. 
In actual fact public policy changed inconsistently over the 
three regimes which provoked entrepreneurs to revise and 
postpone their investment descions.Although the later
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government realized its mistakes it could never regain the
confidence of the private entrepreneurs.
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CHAPTER V
THE EFFECTS OF CONCENTRATION
The concern of this chapter is to assess the influence of 
structure/concentration on profitability. Besides 
concentration we will also examine the influence of some 
other variables on profits. Our enquiry will be incomplete to 
the extent that we are unable to assess the influence of 
other important factors like price elasticity of demand, some 
of the government regulatory policies, distribution methods, 
future expectations and risks etc on profits.1/* We cannot 
take them into account because of the non-availability of 
data. We are aware that the measure of 
performance/profitability is not free from error and bias 
therefore we will also assess the influence of concentration 
on other aspects of performance like the ability of 
concentrated industries in increasing productivity of labour
1. It is obvious that the structure-performance hypothesis
suffers from the omitted variable bais, an important variable 
omitted from all the studies reviewed in the previous chapter 
is the price elasticity of demand. Underlying this omission is 
the strong assumption that in case of cross section data the 
elasticity of demand is constant across industries. In our 
case due to price controls the problem is less severe. However 
we will deal with this problem in our exercise regarding 
changes in concentration influencing changes in performance. 
As it is fairly reasonable to assume that elasticity of demand 
remain constant overtime and not across industries at a point 
of time. Cowling and Waterson [1976]. (see Foot Note 3 
stating the theoretical model setting the relationship between 
structure and performance).
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and capital in this and the coming chapter. Finally, we also 
know that some researchers cast doubt on the inferences drawn 
on the basis of ordinary least squares estimates of 
Structure-Performance due to the simultaneous equation bias in 
the results. We deal with this problem by examining the 
changes in profitability and concentration r^ast shortcoming 
of our enquiry is that because of data deficiency we are 
unable to take account of the small scale informal sector 
where a high proportion of manufacturing production takes 
place, to that extent there is an upward bias in our results. 
The importance of such an enquiry is that the government 
policy towards the structure and performance of the 
manufacturing industry must not be first based on theoretical 
grounds but also on some empirical knowledge. The 
implementation of government policies would be greatly 
assisted if empirical work could predict to some extent the 
effects on industrial performance of the structural and 
behavioural changes that are brought to bear by government 
policies.
One approach that most studies ha</& adopted is to 
investigate the problem at the micro level and the question 
dealt with is whether there is a relationship between market 
structure and economic performance. Theory gives us a well 
known basic answer, a competitive economy leads to marginal 
cost pricing, whereas an imperfectly competitive market 
structure where a few large firms have the ability to 
collude, create barriers to entry and maximize their joint
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profits, charge price above marginal cost and display 
x-inefficiency.
An alternative approach is to examine a direct link 
between market structure and the overall performance of the 
economy. The question that draws attention here is how far 
the pricing policy ofa./few large firms contribute towards 
inflationary pressures. If such a link is true then 
government intervention may seem unavoidable and competition 
policy may be used to fight inflation, stabilize output and 
employment. However; in contrast to the above two theoretical 
views, the practical point of view also deserves attention. 
Whatever the merits of competition entrepreneurs favour large 
units in order to benefit from the economies of scale, 
government particularly in less developed countries aiming at 
rapid growth m  the manufacturing sector may support^few large 
private enterprises with the understanding that the 
re-investment of high profits earned by large units will 
accelerate growth.2/. Even labourers may prefer large units 
because of job security and stability of wages through trade
2. In the earlier days, for rapid economic development the
economic planners suggested the functional inequalities
hypothesis as a relevant development strategy. According to 
which government will have tocreate an economic atmosphere 
that favours the establishment of concentrated oligopolies. 
The idea behind this development strategy was that development 
will not take place unless investors are ensured of excess 
profits which when reinvested will accelerate growth and also 
become a means of self- financing growth process. The 
advocates of this hypothsis admitted that such a development 
strategy may result in economic and social inequalities, but 
for them it is a necessary price that the society will have to 
pay for the formation and development of an entrepreneurial 
class Haq [1966].
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unions. Such considertions, particularly in less developed 
countries may encourage a concentrated market structure. The 
main question dealt with in the present enquiry is whether at 
all there exists a relationship between market structure and 
economic performance. To answer this question our statistical 
analysis will be carried out in( two staged,, first, we will
examine relative importance of structural and policy variables 
influencing the absolute level of profitability in the large 
scale manufacturing sector.'Secondly, after having obtained 
our results on the absolute level of profitability we then 
proceed to use the model developed by Cowling and Waterson
[1976] to test the effect of proportionate changes in
concentration on increases in profits and see if the results 
obtained from the second test are consistent with those 
obtained from our first test measuring the effect at absolute 
level.3/. Like this our enquiry will be the first of its kind
3. Cowling and Waterson [1976] show that if firms are of unequal 
size i.e their marginal costs are different and all the firms 
maximize their profits, then equation 3 in Chapter 2 footnote
1 can be rewritten as,
dll: = P + Xf (X) dX - c(X) = 0 
dX* dX* 1 1
Summing over N firms, rearranging and making the assumption 
that MC =AVC they obtain the following equation,
II + F = - H (1+Q)
R E
Where the LHS of the equation is the ratio of profit plus 
fixed cost (II+F) to revenue (R). On the RHS is H,the 
Herfindahl index of concentration, E is the price elasticity 
of demand and£the conjectural variation term.
Finally assuming and E are constant, they take ratios of 
the LHS and RHS variable overtime for i industries and we 
have,
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by examining the effect of structure on performance from both 
static and more importantly dynamic perspective rather than 
relying on static cross section approach, commonly adopted in 
the past, and drawing weak inferences from it.
The relevant economic theory underpinning most empirical 
studies of the relationship between market structure and 
perforance is inadequate. To explain variations in performanceA
three sets of variables are emphasized market concentration,
entry barriers and demand growth. But industry in Pakistan
operate, s under a host of controls imposed by government. We
therefore wish to take into account the effect of some of
these policy induced variables like tariff protection,
nationalization, price controls etc on performance. We will
take up almost all these structural and policy variables and
Lexamine how far they can guide us m  explaning the
inter-industry levels of profitability. In our second exercise
we will drop most of the above mentioned variables and
restrict our analysis to the association between changes in
concentration and increases in profitability only. Finally we
will take a sub sample of industries where concentration has
increased between 1970-84 and test whether increase in
'TXe-
concentration has led to increase in profits, r.est of the 
chapter will be reserved for the exercise relating 
concentration with labour and capital productivity.
II/R m  = H m  where k = 1..... M
II/R (T-l) H (T-l)
industries.
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Variables And Their Measurement 
Performance Indicators:
For our dependent variable we will use three indicators of 
performance measured in the following manner.
1. Gross profit (PR): The usual measure of performance used 
in most of the studies is gross/net profits. The gross profit 
is ratio of profits to net output, measured as value added 
minus wages divided by net output for an industry.4/.
2. Labour productivity (VA/L): Our second measure of 
performance is measured as the ratio of value added to labour 
input.
3. Capital productivity (VA/K): Value added per unit of 
capital is our third measure of performance where capital 
includes both fixed assets and stocks.
Structural And Policy Variables:
The following are the explanatory variables used in our 
regression analysis. Since the measurement of some of these 
variables is already described in the previous chapter, we 
need not repeat the same here, only their hypothesized 
relationship with profits is stated below:
1. Concentration Ratio (CR^): The ratio is used as a proxy 
for monopoly power and it is expected to have a direct link 
with profitability.
2. Foreign Trade (M/D): Instead of adjusting the
The appropriate measure of profitability is the rate of return 
on capital, either assets or equity, but Census of 
Manufacturing Industries only provide the book value of fixed 
assets which renders the measure of the rate of return on 
capital difficult.
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concentration ratio for imports we account for competition 
from imports by adding an additional explanatory variable. It 
is measured as the ratio of imports to domestic sales. A high 
level of imports meanS that the sector is open to foreign 
competition and that the national monopolies or oligopolies 
are constrained to behave more competitively. In this case 
one should expect a negative impact on profitability.
3. Economies of scale/Average size of plant (EOS): As a 
measure of entry barrier it is expected to exercise a 
positive influence on gross profits, because entry barrier 
practices reduce potential competition.
4. Capital labour ratio (K/L): As a measure of capital 
intensity it is expected to be positively related with 
profits.
5. Effective protection (EPR): It is hypothesized that
protection granted to domestic producers against foreign 
competition tends to reduce the pressures of
competition and enables the large
establishments to continue earning above normal profits.
6. Ownership pattern: Not only during 1970's a number of
industries were closed to the private sector, large state-
owned enterprises also dominated some other sectors open to 
the private sector. These enterprises as a matter of policy 
would not exploit their market power, thus their
profitability would tend to be lower. A dummy variable is 
used with a value of 1 for the industries where state
participation is dominant and zero otherwise.
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7. Price Control (Pc) : To account for the impact of price 
controls on profits a dummy variable is created with a value 
of one for industries whose output was subject to price 
controls and zero for industries free from price controls. 
We expect such price controls to depress profitability.5/.
8. Product Differentiation (PD): Most empirical studies 
suggest that in many consumer goods industries product 
differentiation raise? the height of entry barriers and 
influences the nature of competition among the established 
enterprises. Such entry barriers enable these producers to set 
prices above costs without inducing entry Bain [1956], 
Scheerer [198 0] etc.
The four variables used in our second test of 
concentration and profitability are absolute and
proportionate changes in concentration and profitability,
DPR = PR - PR
1984 1970
DCR = CRf* - CR^
1984 1970
5. Under the Price Control and Prevention of Profiteering Act 
of 1972 the government is authorised to exercise direct 
controls to keep prices under check by : a) fixing maximum 
prices of products which from time to time are declared
"essential" and included in the schedule of the act. In
1984-85 the schedule included 66 commodities, b) establishment 
of a price consultation mechanism where by the producers and 
importers of essential commodities are required to consult 
the concerned authorities 3 0 days in advance if they wish to 
increase the prices of their products. Although the government 
can fix the prices of any of the products mentioned in the 
listf prices of four products are fixed by the Federal
Government. These four products are vegetable ghee and oil, 
fertilisers, Tractor and mechanically propelled vehicles. 
Only one product^pepper, is subject to price consultation. The
price trends are however, kept under watch and are not
allowed to exceed fair limits.
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dPR = log PR - log PR
1984 1970
dCR = log CR^ - log CR^
1984 1970
where DPR is absolute change in profitability and DCR is the 
absolute change in concentration between 1984 and 1970. 
Similarly dPR and dCR measure the proportionate change in 
profitability and concentration, again between 1984 and 1970.
Regression Results on The Levels 
Of Concentration And Profitability 
(1970, 1978 and 1984)
Most studies for their qualitative investigations rely on 
regression analysis to test the impact of concentration on 
performance, but there are some who show scepticism towards 
quantitative studies which assume a direct link between market 
structure and performance, they suggest that inferences drawn 
on the basis of case studies are more useful. As suggested 
earlier, we will deal with this problem by examining the
association between proportionate changes in concentration
and increase in profitability in the later part of the 
chapter. However the data we have restricts our analysis to 
linear, log-linear and semi-log linear regression.
A number of linear, log-linear and semi-log linear 
regression were performed for the year 1970, 1978 and 1984. 
The specification of our models is given as such:
5.1. PR = a + bCR^+ cM/D + dEOS + eK/L + fETR
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5.2. PR = a + bCR + cM/D + dEOS + eK/L + fETR + gPP + hPC
5.3. PR = a + bCR +cM/D + dEOS + eK/L + fPP + gPC + hPD
Contrary to what Amjad [1977] Shirwani [197 6] and Kemal
[1978] found our results of equation in Table 5.1 show a 
fairly significant influence of concentration on 
profitability, but the explanatory power of concentration is 
very limited. Not just that, the relationship between 
concentration and profitability weakens overtime as is 
indicated by equations 1 in Table 5.2 and 5.3. This 
undoubtedly _ that other variables are important and
need to be included in our model. We add more variables and 
take different combination of variables in order to detect 
their independent influence on inter-industry variation in 
profitability.6/.
The independent influence of foreign competition from 
imports was measured by including M/D as an independent 
variable in equation 2 and it is noticed that M/D doesnot 
explain the inter industry variation in profits and its 
regression coefficient is not different fr&nx. zero. The 
negative sign of the coefficient is as expected. The non 
significant regression coefficient of M/D and the weak
6. It is often said that one of the limitations of concentration 
ratios is that it fails to take into account inequalities in 
size within the top four firms and the rest of the firms in 
the industry. In order to account for such inequalities in 
firm sizes it is suggested that additional variables may be 
included in the regression equation to pick up that aspect of 
the influence of CR on profits which the measure itself cannot 
pick up. Generally, Gini index is supposed to measure the 
inequality effect, in our case non availability of data does 
not permit us to conduct such an enquiry.
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Table 5.1: Regression Results of Levels of Profitability on 
Concentration and Other Variables (2 9 Sectors) H7o
Variables
Equations
Linear
1.
constant
18.06
CR
0.21
(1.98)
M/D EOS K/L EPR
4.
R
. 13
2 . 76.86 0.21
(1.86)
-0. 05 
(0.41)
. 13
3 . 75.76 0.21
(1.88)
-0.04
(0.36)
0. 001 
(0.63)
. 14
4. 75.38 0.23 
(2.17)
-0. 02 
(0.20)
0.007 0.38 
(0.32)(1.78)
.24
5. 75. 54 0.23 
(2.05)
-0. 02 
(0.18)
0.005 0.38 -0.006 
(0.25) (1.76) (0.48)
.25
Log Linear 
6. 4.59 0.11
(1.75)
. 10
7. 4.59 0.11
(1.70)
-0.001
(0.06)
.10
8. 4.32 0.12 
(1.88)
-0.001 
(0.07)
0.04
(1.25)
. 16
9. 4.18 0.13
(2.05)
-0.001
(0.70)
0.04 0.13 
(0.77)(2.06)
. 28
10. 4.18 0.12 
(1.97)
-0.001 
(0.69)
0.04 0.14 -0.0009 
(0.75)(2.06) (0.40)
.29
Semi Log
11. 90.78 6.29
(1.69)
.09
12 . 88 .9 6.11 
(1.61)
-0.06
(0.50)
. 10
13 . 75.1 6.73
(1.76)
-0.06 2.57 
(0.52)(1.13)
. 15
14. 66.16 6.88
(1.95)
-0.04 1.34 8.52 
(0.33)(0.66)(2.27)
.30
15. 65. 61 6.89
(1.90)
-0.04 1.43 8.80 -1.50 
(0.33)(0.62)(2.00) (0.30)
.30
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Table 5.2 : Regression Results of Levels of Profitability on
Concentration and other Variables 30 Sectors 1978
Equations Constant CR H/D
Variables 
EOS K/L EPR PP PC
Linear
1 .
5.
6 .
7.
73 .08
72.01
72 .17
72.51
72.41
73 .85
67 .49
Log Linear
8. 4.44
9. 4.42
10
11 .
12 .
13.
4.44
4.17
4.17
4.11
0.06 
(0.63)
0.06 -0.04 
(0.61) (0.46)
0.03 -0.07 0.001
(0.36) (0.69) (0.83)
0.16 -0.02 0.0002 0.17
(1.45)(0.15) (0.12) (2.83)
0.17 -0.02 0.0003 0.18 0.004
(1.45)(0.18) (0.15) (2.35) (0.28)
0.21 -0.01 0.0002 0.20 0.006 -6.0 
(1.64) (0.15) (0.09) (2.48) (0.47) (0.84)
R
01
02
05
23
23
25
0.11 -0.60 0.0002 0.21 0.005-8.5-17.4.48
( 0.98) (0.56) (0.12) (2.95) (0.42) (1.38) (3.08)
0. 06 
(1.23)
0.05 -0.00008 
(1.21) (0.56)
0.05 -0.00009 0.004 
(1.02) (0.55) (0.09)
0.06 -0.00002 0.002 0.09
(1.26) (0.17) (0.04)(2.06)
0.06 -0.00002 0.002 0.09 0.00001
(1.27) (0.13) (0.18)(2.05)(0.39)
05
06
06
20
20
0.07 -0.00005 0.009 0.10 0.00001 -0.06 .40
(1.35) (0.32) (0.18)(2.06)(0.49) (0.51)
14. 4.09 0.03 -0.00004 0.009 0.09 0.00001-0.07-.23.40 
(0.72) (0.25) (0.22)(1.99)(0.42)(0.69)(2.59)
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Semi Log
15. 83 .88 3.84
(1.18)
16. 82.78 3 .84 -0. 04
(1.16) (0.43)
17. 89.75 2.85 -0. 07
(0.77) (0.62)
18. 70. 07 3 .53 -0. 02
(1.02) (0.22)
19. 70.07 3.52 -0.02
(0.99) (0.22)
20. 65.50 4.37 -0.05
(1.15) (0.46)
21. 64 . 35 1.87 -0.05
(0.52) (0.07)
1. 75 
(0.59)
1.55 7.0 
(0.57)(2.26)
1.55 7.0 0.003 
(0.56)(2.20)(0.03)
0.58 7.0 0.001 -5.11 
(0.18) (2.27) (0.01) (0.66)
1.77 6.95 0.001 -5.9-14.
(0.61)(2.21)(0.01) (0.84)(2
.05
.05
. 06
.23
.23
.24
.40
46)
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relationship between profitability and M/D could be because of 
the tariff and non tariff protection given to the domestic 
industry against competition from imports. To know the 
influence of tariff protection we add in equation 5 of Table
5.1 and 5.2 a variable ETR representing effective protection. 
The regression coefficient is not different f-rom zero and the 
t ratio is not high.
Besides concentration, the second structural variable, 
economies of scale, represented by EOS is included in equation 
3, but it is not significant at all. It is possible that its 
effect is captured by concentration and capital labour ratio 
which is our final structural variable. It is noted that when 
capital-labour ratio K/L is included in equation 4 R2 improves 
considerably and the t ratios are significant. However for 
1984 the regression coefficient in all the three forms of 
regression equations is close to zero. In Table 5.3 an 
additional entry barrier variable product differentiation was 
introduced in equation 7 and it does not manifest any 
influence on profitability. The regression coefficient is 
negative and the t ratio is low.
Among the policy variables price control, PC, and 
ownership pattern, PP, appear to have strong influence on 
profitability. Represented by a dummy variable both PC and PP 
have negative influence on profits and the t ratios are 
significantly high.7/.
7. Another variable, capacity utilization was included in the 
regression equations. It did not appear to be an important 
variable. Therefore we dropped it from our model.
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From Table 5.1 to 5.3 and 5.4 to 5.5 we are able to show the 
complexity of the relationship between profitability and 
concentration.8/. Clearly concentration has the expected sign 
and some association as well, and all the variable together 
could at best explain only 48 percent of variation in 
profitability (Table 5.2 equation 7 ), which suggest that the 
residual or unexplained variation is large. However the 
explanatory power of our regression equations is almost the 
same as that of the studies mentioned in Table 2.4, whereas 
results about profit-concentration relationship for less
8. In comparison to the results based on CM1 data we are in a 
position to report results of similar regression equations 
using establishment level 1975-76 data. In Table 5.4 and 5.5 
the results of linear and log linear regressions are 
reported. Equation 1 in both the Tables show weak positive 
influence of concentration on profits. The t ratio is not 
significantz and the explanatory power of concentration is 
very low, R is 0.07 and 0.03. Besides concentration eight 
more variables were included the regression equations to 
detect their influence on inter-industry variation in 
profits. Except for the variable measuring foreign trade and 
barriers to entry rest of the explanatory variables have the 
expected signs; but most of these variables didnot show 
strong association with profitability. Only capital labour 
ratio,K/L, manifest significant positive association with 
profits. And the addition of K/L in the regression equation 
further reduce the significance of concentration as an 
explanatory variable.
Among the policy variables price controls, PC appear to have 
some influence on profits. Although effective protection, 
EPR, does not show strong positive influence on profits, but 
it has the right sign and the t ratio of 1.0. Comparing the 
results of Table 5.4 and 5.5 with those of Table 5.1 - 5.3 we 
note consistency in our results, particularly in terms of the 
significance of concentration and capital labour ratio as the 
explanatory variables in the regression equations. In all the 
equations concentration has limited positive influence on 
profits and capital labour ratio dominates concentration in 
its significance. The explanatory power of our equations on 
average has remained the same around 35 percent.
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Table 5.3 : Regression Results of Levels of Profitability on 
Concentration and other Variables 30 Sectors 1984
Variables
Equations Constant CR M/D EOS K/L PP PC PD RZ 
Linear
1. 80. 74 0.17
(1.80)
0.10
2 . 79.14 0. 17 
(1.68)
-0. 01 
(0.12)
0.10
3. 79.67 0.17 
(1.65)
-0.008
(0.07)
0.0003 
(0.10)
0.10
4. 75.97 0.15 
(1.57)
-0.038 
(0.36)
0.0006 0.01 
(0.36)(2.25)
0.26
5. 73 .70 0.12 
(1.25)
-0. 02 
(0.21)
0.0003 0.01 -4.74 
(0.19) (2.25) (1.60)
0.30
6. 73 . 89 0.13 
(1.25)
-0.01
(0.15)
0.0006 0.01 -6.30 -0.92 
(0.27) (2.10) (0.87) (0.265)
0.30
7. 74. 18 0.13 -0.02 0 
(1.23) (0.22) (0
.0007 0.01-6. 
.30)(2.04)(0.
45 -0.93-0.0050.30 
86)(0.25)(0.21)
Log
8.
Linear
4.09 0. 04 
(1.00)
0.03
9. 4.06 0. 04 
(1.07)
-0.001 
(0.48)
0. 04
10. 4.12 0. 04 
(1.05)
-0.001 
(0.52)
0. 009 
(0.24)
0. 04
11. 4.41 0.01
(1.30)
-0.001 
(0.42)
0.01 0.03 
(0.32)(0.18)
0. 06
12. 4.76 0.07
(1.37)
-0.001
(0.82)
0.012 0.05 
(0.38)(1.29)
-0.27 
(3.44)
0.37
13. 4.40 0. 08 
(1.62)
-0.002 
(0.99)
0.02 0.01 
(0.70)(0.38)
-0.05 -0.15 
(0.40)(1.95)
0.46
189
14. 4.36 0.08 -0.002 0.03 0.01 -0.05-0.150.003 0
(1.59) (1.07)(0.77)(0.35)(0.39)(1.92)(0.43)
semi Log
15. 80.69 2.20 0
(1.16)
16. 79.68 2.12 -0.03 0
(1.06) (0.31)
17. 78.67 2.12 -0.02 0.26 0
(1.04) (0.25)(0.14)
18. 56.32 0.05 -0.04 0.53 2.80 0
(1.02) (0.39) (0.28) (1.10)
19. 56.30 3.41 -0.05 0.54 2.02 -9.63 0
(1.16) (0 47)(0.31)(0.87) (2.32)
20. 52.30 3.84 -0.06 2.32 3.86 -0.32 -7.13 0
(1.35) (0.59) (1.16)(1.52)(0.04)(1.67)
.43
.04 
. 04 
. 05 
. 09 
.26 
.34
21. 51.92 3.80 -0.07 2.37 3.87 -0.33 -14.7 0.03 0.34
(1.32) (0.57) (1.12) (1.49) (0.04) (1.63) (0.08)
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Table 5.4 : Linear Regression Results of Level of
Profitability on Concentration and Other Variables 
(26 industries)1976.
CR4 M/D EOS K/L PC CU PP EPR NOE R
0.55
(1.41)
0.07
0.55
(1.46)
0. 06 
(0.51)
0. 08
0. 81 
(1.56)
0.06
(0.47)
-0.44
(0.74)
0. 10
0. 43 
(0.74)
0. 06 
(0.47)
-0.16
(0.26)
0.44
(1.39)
0.18
0.29
(0.49)
0. 05 
(0.46)
-0.18
(0.31)
0.71
(1.92)
-33.5
(1.35)
0.25
0.21
(0.41)
0. 03 
(0.27)
-0.30
(0.48)
0.65
(1.74)
-28.74
(1.14)
0. 03 
(0.77)
0.28
0. 02 
(0.17)
-0. 27 
(0.52)
0. 61 
(1.71)
-27.4
(1.06)
0. 04 
(0.98
0. 05 
(1.00)
-0.06 0.30 
(0.17)
0.31
(0.52)
0. 03 
(0.23)
-0.47
(0.71)
0.53
(1.28)
-24.2
(0.87)
0. 03 
(0.94)
-1. 98 
(0.08)
0.05 0.31 
(0.99)
t - ratios are in parenthesis.
Source : Published and unpublished CMI data 1975-76.
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Table 5.5: Log Linear Regression Results of Level of 
Profitability on Concentration and Other 
Variables(26 Industries)1976.
CR M/D EOS K/L PC CU PP EPR NOE R*
0.29
(1.0)
0.31 0.001 
(1.0)(0.70)
0.10 0.001 0.11 
(0.2) (0.70) (0.50)
-0.17 0.001 0.12 0.48
(0.35) (0.87) (0.60) (2.30)
-0.15 0.001 0.08 0.62 -0.41
(0.31) (0.92) (0.40) (2.55) (1.10)
-0.30 0.001 0.13 0.63 -0.34
(0.59) (0.80) (0.63) (2.58) (0.90)
0.001 0.13 0.63 -0.34
(0.94) (0.78) (2.52) (0.88)
-0.30 0.002 0.13 0.64 -0.28
(0.55) (0.89) (0.56) (2.38) (0.66)
. 03
. 05
. 06
. 25
.36
-0.08 .32
(0.86)
0.04 0.00003 -0.26 .35
(0.48) (0.04) (1.09)
0.09 -0.16 0.0001 .33
(0.85)(0.46)(0.12)
NOE: Number of Establishments.
t ratios are in parenthesis.
Source: Published and unpublished CMI data 1975-76.
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developed countries reported in Table 2.5 show relatively high 
R.z
However, if at all strong association between structure 
and performance is confirmed, it is not the end of the story, 
because from such results we are unable to tell whether the 
strong positive association between profits and concentration 
is so due to monopolistic practices or due to larger firms 
gaining more of the market by their superior efficiency as 
reflected in their high profitability.9/.
Discussion about our results, and the difference in 
results when compared with earlier studies about the 
performance of manufacturing sector will be presented at the 
end of the chapter.
Regression results about the levels of concentration and 
profitability guided us to the extent that market structure 
has limited influence on profitability. Scepticism towards 
the approach adopted in identifying the causal relationship 
and hence the inference drawn cannot let us be content with 
the results obtained so far. We need to explore a little more 
by examining the association of absolute and proportionate 
changes between concentration and profitability. The 
hypothesis testing the relationship between absolute and 
proportionate changes is based on the assumption that if the 
levels of concentration and profitability are related then by
9. Hart and Morgan [1977] suggest that the usual regression 
analysis undertaken to find the extent of association between 
concentration and profitability are mongrel type, 
reduced form equations, and its structural relationship cannot 
be identified.
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the same reason changes in concentration and profitability 
must also be related.
We base our model on the theoretical model explained by 
Cowling and Waterson [1976] showing a direct link between 
proportionate changes in profit margins and proportionate 
changes in concentration.10/.
It would be of interest to check the reliability of our 
results obtained in Table 5.1 to 5.3 by taking a sample of 3 3 
comparable sectors and run a simple regression relating 
absolute and proportionate changes in profitability and 
concentration.
Two simple regressions were performed by taking absolute 
and proportionate changes in profitability against absolute 
and proportionate changes in concentration. The regression 
results are as follows:
10. Cowling and Waterson [1976] tested the following 
relationship:
log/PR*. \ = log/ Ht \
(PRt [HeJ
The dependent variables, is profit margin measured as gross 
output minus raw material, wages and salaries all divided by 
gross output. For the market structure variable they used 
both Herfindal H index and concentration ratio, where size is 
ranked by employment. They tested their model for U.K in 
dustry and found significant relation between the two 
variables. However their analysis suffered from one drawback 
they failed to take into account the fact that in an analysis 
of proportionate changes the industries in the sample at two 
points of time must be comparable. Hence the inferences drawn 
and the results obtained are incorrect. The significant 
relationship found by them disappeared when Hart and Morgan
[1977] replicated the exercise by including only comparable 
industries in their sample and not the industries that had 
changed their bounceries and definitions changed in the census 
between 1963 and 1968.
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5.4 DPR = 0.03 + 0.09 DCR I&= 0.09
(1.25)
5.5 dPR = 3 .1 8 + 0.08 dCR R =0.02
(0.78)
We notice that DCR has some positive influence on DPR but
a.
its explanatory power is poor as indicated by R of 0.09. In
our regression of proportionate changes dCR shows no link
I .with dPR and R is close to zero.
From our results of the levels of concentration on profits 
and those of changes in concentration on changes in 
profitability we understand that the complexity of the 
relationship between structure and performance cannot be 
denied. And more so when our results about levels in Table
5.1 to 5.3 are compared with the earlier studies of Shirwani 
[1976] and Amjad [1977].
As a third test of our analysis a simple regression of 
profits against concentration is performed for 13 industries 
experiencing increase in concentration over time, with the 
understanding that increase in concentration must also lead to 
increase in profits. Regression results for three equations 
are mentioned in Table 5.6. Equation 5.6, based on 1984 data 
represent the relationship between concentration and 
profitability of industries where concentration has increased 
overtime. Whereas regression 5.7 and 5.8 estimate the 
association between absolute and proportionate increase in 
concentration and profitability. In all the three equations 
the regression coefficient does not have the expected sign
T l j u
and except for equation 5.6^rest of the two equations have
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Table 5.6 : Regression Results of Profitability and 
Concentration in Case of 13 Sectors with 
Increasing Concentration.
Increase Overtime (1984).
PR = 79 - 0.24 CR4 R = 0.18
(1.20)
Absolute Increase ( 1984-197 0).
2L
DPR = 5.92 - 0.32 DCR4 R = 0.03
(0.53)
Proportionate Increase (1984-1970)
0.23 
(1 .11)
dPR = 0.03 - dCR R = 0.02
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poor explanatory power.
Although our set of results exhibit declining association 
between profitability and concentration; it is widely believed 
that in the first phase of development large enterprises
earned above normal profits. An explanation for such a
phenomenon is that when market form is oligopolistic with high 
barriers to entry, a characteristic feature of these
concentrated oligopolies is that, in a given situation, the 
size of the market, the structure of the existing technology 
and the elasticity of demand for the whole industry will 
combine to explain the level of prices; while different 
barriers to entry will produce differences in the levels of 
costs between the firms in the industry. Given the level of 
costs and prices, it seems reasonable to suppose that it is 
the largest firms which, because of their market power, will 
be the price setters for the whole industry. And prices will, 
in turn, be set in a manner to yield a given mark up, over 
costs.
Combined with the power over prices, our discussion of 
market structure in Pakistan also suggests that it is 
generally the largest firms in the industry that have access 
to certain inputs like technology, licenses and foreign 
exchange, and that only large firms were in a position to 
realize the benefits of economies of scale. Under these
circumstances when these firms experience cost reductions due, 
for example, to exceptional improvements in productivity that 
are not accessible to all firms in an industry, there is no
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compulsion on them to reduce prices accordingly. The 
likelihood that this will happen is high where entry barriers 
are high, or where, there are barriers to spread cost 
reductions because access to new technologies is discontinous, 
that is the new technology is not made available to all 
producers. Prices are more likely to remain unresponsive to 
costs and to changing conditions of cost. In these 
circumstances, the discretionary power to set prices will lead 
to an increase in the share of profits.11/*
11. Although it is argued that in concentrated oligopolies,there 
will be a persistent tendency for costs to fall consequent to 
the introduction of new methods. This belief is not however, 
without controversy. Little [1970] for example, in discussing 
price cost tendencies in oligopolistic markets in developing 
countries argueSthat there is likely to be an important 
difference in the manner in which costs adjust in different 
market forms. It is argued that, while under competition the 
entry of new firms will tend to bring prices down to costs, 
in conditions where competition is amongst a few firms and 
prices are administered,
1 -------- domestic competition lowers profits m^T^ly by
raising costs, that is by creating competitive waste and 
correspondingly by diminishing the share of each in the
domestic market high profits secured by high protection
often lead to the competitive establishment of too many 
firms, sometimes each with too small a capacity for low cost 
operation and very often with too small a share of the market 
to fully utilize even this capacity. In other words high 
profits in manufacturing secured by import restrictions, 
whether or not they are curbed eliminated by domestic 
competition, encourage high costs of production and wasteful
use of capital------ '(ibid pp 98-99).
Despite the fact that the above argument is a common
  „ our own view differs in two respects. First, where
technological innovations are not accessible to all 
categories of firms, new entry is greatly detered and the 
question of the establishment of too many small firms with 
high costs of production and wasteful use of capital cannot 
be well taken. Second, since the main purpose of the large 
firms is to increase profits and establish dominant market 
position, in that case there is no reason why these firms 
face less severe pressures of cost reduction. Infact it is 
the different barriers to entry and discontinuity in access 
to scarce resources that bestow on these firms comparative
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A second line of thinking, not supported by our data,
possibly because}in the presence of heavy protection,profits
cannot be taken as a satisfactory measure of performance, is
that indeed these large firms continue to earn above normal
profits so long as they remain insulated from pressures of
competition Kemal [1978]. In other words market structure is
a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition to earn
above normal profits. It is the joint influence of
concentration and protection from competition that ensures high
profits. These large firms were certain that high profits
earned by them i^ Aoaid not create the risk of entry either by
s
foreign f irms/products or established producers in other 
markets. The entry of foreign firms/products will not take 
place even if the potential entrant is physically able to 
produce just as efficiently as those existing in the market, 
because the established firms may exert their considerable 
political influence on government to prevent such entry. By 
pointing to the surplus and unused capacity in the industry 
and by arguing that any further permission for investment in 
the same industry will lead to capital loss. Or that the free 
entry of foreign products will threaten growth of domestic 
firms. Similarly the existence of excess profits did not 
provoke the entry of firms established in other markets. This
cost advantage compared to their rival producers. And the 
fact that new firms may invade their market or the existing 
may expand, brings to forefront the need to reduce costs 
faster than the rival producers to maintain their dominant 
market position.
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was so because such producers were related, either directly or 
through the system of interlocking directorships, so that the 
behaviour of established producers in different markets was 
cooperative. Moreover an established producer in another 
market was reluctant to invade the market of other established 
firms for the fear that such an intrusion might have provoked 
similar reaction in the form of an attack on their market 
shares in their original markets.
For these reasons therefore one would expect that in the 
short run prices, being unresponsive to cost reductions and 
strong barriers to entry increased the share of profits of the 
large enterprises. But a rise in the share of profits was not 
a permanent phenomenon. The behaviour of the share of 
capitalist's income changed over time. This relates to those 
factors which we identified earlier, the changing political 
and market enviornment modified the dominant firms behaviour 
over time.
After 1971 concentration is as high as before but it is 
not surprising to note that what Amjad [1977], Shirwani 
[1976] and Kemal [1978] found, strong positive relationship 
between concentration and profits in the earlier period, did 
not hold in the seventies.12/. These earlier writers are
12. Earlier writers interpret high profits as the result of high 
concentration but for some unknown reason did not view their 
results in the light of the disequilibrium phenomenon. 
Undoubtedly concentration ratios exert strong influence on 
profits, but it is understood that at least in the earlier 
period of development concentrated market structure was 
greatly supplemented by a disequilibrium in the supply and 
demand conditions in market for manufactured goods.
It is well known that not just in the case of a concentrated
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commited to the belief that a concentrated structure of 
industry in Pakistan has led to high profits. Underlying this 
argument is the supposition that firms have similar goals i.e 
profit maximization and they adapt passively to the economic 
environment and change is taken as exogeneous to the system. 
Such a line of thinking minimizes the role of changing market 
envi'fa nment resulting from the emergence of several factors 
like greater government intervention in the form of 
nationalization, price control, tariff and non tariff 
barriers, labour legislation and emergence of stronger trade 
unions, uncertainty of oil prices, world recession, 
devaluation of Rupee and the resulting increase in capital 
and raw material prices, turbulence in the country, all may
market structure even in perfectly competitive industries 
profits may be higher simply because of excess demand 
conditions. If demand is high without supply catching up in 
the period under observation then profits will include short 
run quasi rents. So one needs to include in the regression 
equations a variable measuring disequilibrium which reflects 
departure from equilibrium. This variable can pull up or down 
industry profits in a manner quite unrelated to the degree of 
the level of concentration in an industry at a point of time. 
In a regression of disequilibrium (IG) on profits it is found 
that the variable has the right sign, however, the t ratio and 
R is not high.
PR = 62.8 + 0.12 IG R = 0.05
(1.27)
Moreover with the addition of other explanatory variables IG 
lose it importance. This may be so because of several reasons. 
Typically growth of sales or market is taken as a proxy 
measure of disequilibrium. The problem is how many years 
should one take as a measure of change in the size of the 
market. If a longer period is taken one would be overstating 
the degree of disequilibrium; the chances are adjustments 
period is short, two to three years. Liebowitz [1982]. In our 
case change in sales between 1964-1970 was taken as a measure 
of disequilibrium.
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. . 1press on firms m  different ways and influence firms
performance directly and indirectly, causing them to record 
different performance. Thus they ignored the fact that in 
changing economies the firms are actively trying to mould ter 
industrial enviornment overtime, the entrepreneurs select 
objectives according to the influence that various groups 
like government, trade unions and consumers have.
Thus some of the factors mentioned above may have led to 
the weak association between market structure and 
performance. Either by a) moulding the behaviour of the 
capitalists class to be less aggressive b) depriving the 
capitalist of their discretionary power to set prices and 
ensure a given mark up over costs or c) increase in the cost 
of production may have squeezed the profits and share of the 
capitalist group.
For example, first, since government intervention was 
greatest, private^owned large firms may have modified their 
behaviour. In recognition of the the threat of nationalization 
they may have chosen not to maximize profits, they might have 
adjusted their prices (where prices were not controlled) at 
a level just above the marginal cost, and preferred a quiet 
life so as not to invite government attention in the form of 
nationalizations. And most of the large nationalized 
enterprises which were previously operating with profit 
earning motives were now functioning on a non- commercial 
basis. This change of objective by the nationalized 
establishments may have also dampened the effect of
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concentration on profits. Moreover the productive apparatus 
inherited by the Board of Industrial Management (BIM), under 
which the nationalized enterprises were operating was 
economically inefficient and the scope for improving 
efficiency was limited. BIM was unable to close plants or 
reduce the work force, at the same time prices were reduced 
or held down despite inflation and workers and share holders 
were given their due share. Under these conditions it is 
unreasonable to expect the public sector to earn the same 
level of profits as before.
Table 5.7 gives the profit margins of BIM units by sector 
for three points of time. In 1975-76 the largest profits were 
earned by cement followed by automotives, petroleum, 
fertilizers and chemicals. As a whole, the profit margins 
appear to have been declining. Keavy engineering sector 
experienced consistent loss. The profit margin of the 
Automotive sector declined despite an increase, between 
1973-76, in import duties on motor vehicles (which ranged 
from 50% to 2 00%) , an increase in capacity utilization, and a 
more than doubling of the value of sales. The basic problem 
was the small scale of production or assembly which rendered 
the sector economically inefficient. In light engineering 
too there was s sharp decline in the profit margin which was 
attributed to increased costs of inputs and high inventory 
carrying charges.
Second, amidst inflationary pressures government 
intervention in the form of price control, which may have
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Table 5.7 : Profits and Prfit Margins of B I M Units*.
(Rs. million).
Sector
Automotive
a) Net profit before tax
b) Sales
c) Percentage of profit margin 
Cement
a) Net profit before tax
b) Sales
c) Percentage of profit margin 
Chemicals & Ceramics
a) Net profit before tax
b) Sales
c) Percentage of profit margin 
Light Engineering
a) Net profit before tax
b) Sales
c) Percentage of profit margin 
Heavy Engineering
a) Net profit before tax
b) Sales
c) Percentage of profit margin 
Fertilizers
a) Net profit before tax
b) Sales
c) Percentage of profit margin 
Petroleum
a) Net profit before tax
b) Sales
c) Percentage of profit margin 
PIDC
a) Net profit before tax
b) Sales
c) Percentage of profit margin
1973 1974 1975
48.4 91.8 34.5
848.8 2000.4 1942.0
5.7 4.6 1.8
40.7 96.5 78.4
489.1 701.9 724.8
8.3 13.7 10.8
31.0 15.4 33.3
349.2 344.0 411.5
9.0 4.5 8.1
30.3 57.4 10.5
450.8 735.1 766.4
7.0 7.8 1.4
-47.7 -40.5 -60.3
46.6 49.8 191.9
25.1 12.9 18.2
196.6 186.8 197.5
12.8 6.9 9.2
9.0 12.5 33.4
332.9 622.3 712.8
2.7 2.0 4.7
22.9 16.5 15.5
246.2 327.1 337.9
9.3 5.0 4.6
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Total BIM
a) Net profit before tax 159.8 262.5 217.7
b) Sales 2893.6 4967.4 5284.8
c) Percentage of profit margin 5.5 5.3 4.1
* : Profit after interest and depreciation but before tax.
Source : IBRD, Pakistan Development Issues Policies, Vol.l, 
Washington, 1978, p.115.
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blanketed the effect of concentration on profits, forced the 
large firms to act as price followers rather than price 
setters. Either the dominant state owned enterprises acted as 
price setters or the government controlled prices of goods 
produced by the private entrepreneurs through price control 
regulations. Thus depriving the oligopoly price leaders of 
their discretionary power over setting prices for their 
products such as to ensure a given profit margin over costs. 
In this connection it is important to mention that in the 
event of price controls and protection from imports profit 
cannot be taken as a good indicator of performance,
There is a third reason why the behaviour of the share of 
capitalist income may be expected to have changed overtime. 
This corresponds to the changing market environment which on 
the one hand forced the prices down despite the resistance 
exerted by large enterprises. On the other hand labour unions 
were getting stronger, labour laws were passed to protect 
workers (without ensuring increases in productivity) and 
shifted the balance of power between labourers and capitalists 
thus squeezing the share of profits by the general hardening 
of the market, and the increase in wage bill which 
consequently increased the cost of production.13/.
13. This view is supported by others, for example Sylos-Labini 
[1969] and Irfan [1979]. It is argued by the former that in 
oligopolistic industries, cost reduction may not necessairly 
be translated into higher profits if the initially higher 
rate of profits arising out of new technologies stimulates 
successful union demands for higher wages. For this reason 
there would be a tendency in the economy to tolerate a slowly 
rising level of costs so that the rate of return on capital 
will tend to be closer to the competitive level.
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Whereas previously structure-conduct worked to re-enforce high 
profits because the economic enviornment favoured them i.e the 
government collaborated with these monopolists/capitalists and 
labour unions were weak.
Table 5.8 and 5.9 gives a comparison of the real wages 
paid by the large scale manufacturing sector. Table 5.8 
clearly indicates the weakness of the trade unions and the 
unfavourable labour legislation which meant that there was 
little increase in real wages during the sixties. However in 
seventies the labour reforms brought a marked increase in 
wages. The wages of a typical worker in the industrial area of 
Karachi increased in 1973 from Rs.125 to Rs.235 in 1975-76 an 
increase of 88 percent in two years. Since consumer price 
rose by 65 percent real wages of the low paid workers 
increased substantially. The average wage of the worker given 
in Table 5.9 in real terms showed an increase in real wages 
between 1970-75. And Table 5.10 reports the findings of Ahmed 
and Irfan [1985] which suggests that the real wages of 
workers in the large manufacturing sector increased sharply 
after 1976.
Then unlike the 1960's as discussed in the preceeding 
chapters, the cost of production increased due to the 
increased price of raw material and imported capital as a 
result of world inflation and devaluation of Rupee. Also the 
increase in taxes, withdrawal of concessions and tightening of 
foreign exchange made foreign technology and imported raw
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Table 5.8 : Index of Real Wages of Large Scale Manufacturing
Sector { 1959-1969).
Year Index
1959-60 100. 0
1962-63 91.21
1963-64 92.94
1964-65 105.42
1965-66 109.30
1966-67 104.85
1967-68 105.78
1968-69 116.17
Source : Hamid. N , ’The Burden of Capitalist Growth- A 
study of Real Wages and Consumption in 
Pakistan,1 Pakistan Economic and Social 
Review, Vol. VII, No. 1, 1974.
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Table 5
Year
1969-70
1970-71
1971-72
1972-73
1973-74
1974-75
9: Real and Money Wages of Production Workers 
in Large Scale Manufacturing
(Rupees per worker per year)
Money
Rupees
Wages 
1959-60 =100
Real
Rupees
Wages
1959-60
1,930 177 1,351 124
2 , 094 192 1,384 127
2,389 219 1,504 138
2,914 267 1, 679 143
4,012 368 1,775 168
4,953 454 1,730 159
Source : Guisinger. S, Wages, Capital Rental Values and
Relative Factor Prices in Pakistan , World Bank Staff 
Working Paper No. 287, 1978.
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Table 5.10 : Real Wage Trends in Large scale Manufacturing
(1970-81)
(Percent per annum) 
1970-76 1976-81
1. Nominal wages
All workers 15.8 17.0
Production workers 17.3 16.6
Non Production workers 14.5 19.6
2. Real Wages
All workers 1.4 7.6
Production workers 2.6 6.5
Non Production workers 0.4 9.2
Source : Taken from Irfan and Meekal, Real Wages in 
Pakistan : Stucture and Trends, 1970-84, 
Pakistan Development Review Vol. XXIV, Nos 3 
and 4 (Autmn Winter 1985).
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material even more expensive.
In short, the government regulatory policies and the 
changing market and political environment pressed on 
capitalists in three important ways. First, the capitalist 
class prefered to live a non aggressive life and did not 
engage themselves in collusive and entry barrier practices to 
increase their profits. Second, prices were controlled by the 
State, and set by large nationalized enterprises. Third, cost 
of production increased due to increase in both labour and 
capital cost, along with increase in raw material prices and 
taxes etc. Thus the profit margin of the capitalist was 
squeezed considerably.
InA1980's although the swing was towards the old policies 
of sixties the pressures of political and economic
uncertainty continued to prevail. The structure of industry 
was more or less the same. Except for a few sectors, where 
government investment increased the number of firms^rest of 
the industries remained as concentrated as before. But a host 
of other factors combined to have opposing influence on the 
performance of large size establishments. Uptill 1984 
investment sanctions, tariff and non tariff barriers and 
price controls were still in operation. Large enterprises 
nationalised in 1970's remained under government control and 
acted as price setters for the goods produced. These 
restrictions led to two peculiar phenomena.
First, tariffs and non tariff barriers like import bans 
and restrictions made smuggling of goods in the country and
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other forms of illegal trade (dumping) a profitable 
enterprise. . juch . phenomenon tend to under cut monopoly
profits. Large volumes of banned goods apparently came 
through illegal channels, uncontrollable borders and customs. 
Due to smuggling, estimated to be over $ 1 billion annually, 
some industries are actually not protected to the extent that 
non-tariff barriers are meant to provide [National Taxation 
Return Committee Report 1978].14/. It may be noted that 
smuggled and duty free imports provide a great degree of 
price competition and shift demand in favour of the smuggled 
products which are mostly better in quality. (For example 
Chinese cycles which are smuggled have superior fit and 
finish and customers are willing to pay an extra Rs.600, 
almost double the domestic price). So the extent of downward 
price movement is limited by domestic cost structure which may 
exceed international production costs. The areas of production 
affected the most are consumer durables like light 
engineering, automotive and textile. However the threat of 
imports both legal and illegal has also worked in some cases 
to reniforce competitive pricing behaviour and improve 
quality despite high market concentration. For example in 
polyester yarn and fibre producers appear to be-have
competitively in marketing their products. Several yarn
14. It is very difficult to estimate the annual extent of
smuggling and the demand for these goods, however it is a 
widely held view in Pakistan that smuggling is substantial and 
shift in demand is large. These smuggled goods are sold in 
established markets along the border area where government 
intervention is least.
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producers have shown sensitivity to market trends by shifting 
their production towards finer counts than they anticipated 
when building their plants. Some are also considering adding 
machinery to produce twisted and flat yarn (which have higher 
value than texturized). The two fibre producers compete in 
each others markets rather then dividing up the market 
according to their respective locations in Karachi and 
Punjab.
Under such conditions it becomes very difficult to assert 
that market structure bears an important influence on the 
performance of manufacturing industry.
At the same time the second phenomenon of price controls 
led to hoarding and the emergence of black marketing in the 
local markets and smuggling of goods to the neighbouring 
countries. The price of the commodity under price control in 
the local black market and in the neighbouring countries 
tend, of course, to be substantially higher than the 
controlled prices. For exampleiKtprice of vegetable ghee is 
kept well below international prices and both ghee and edible 
oils are smuggled to the neighbouring countries where price 
levels are higher. Such practices have not only masked the 
effect of concentration on profits but have also enabled the 
local producers to earn excess profits. [World Bank Report, 
1988] .
In addition to the above two phenomenon there are other 
important aspects of price control and regulatory policies 
related to firm behaviour and performance. For example price
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control has reduced the extent of direct price competition, it 
has minimized the incentive for cost reductions and made 
firms unresponsive to world market conditions and improvement 
in quality. In fertilizer and cement firms did not compete 
through pricing. Similarly quality of ghee has deteriorated 
as firms have substituted inferior quality oil in inputs in 
response to rising input prices and regulated prices on 
output. With higher costs through higher prices capacity 
utilization and output growth has declined. Capacity 
utilizatioin fell from 117 percent in 1978-79 to 81 percent by 
1985-86. Furthermore, price control on products in highly 
oligopolistic industries such as cement and fertilizer may 
have eliminated collusive pricing behaviour, but it is not 
clear that government set prices were successful in 
eliminating monopoly profits in these industries.
During the same time a new trend of product 
differentiation emerged and its importance cannot be ignored 
in our discussion. Although, in the case of Pakistan, there 
is no empirical evidence available regarding the role played 
by advertising in influencing the structure of manufacturing 
industry and there upon the performance of the sector. Our 
results also do not give any indication of the impact of 
product differentiation on performance, however, other 
sources of information that some establishments
showed Cb tendency 1b non price competition by resorting to 
practices like product differentiation to generate monopoly 
profits. Such practices were most common in consumer goods
214
industries. In this regard Table 5.11 shows the advertising 
expenditure of a selected number of industries, with 
relatively high advertising expenditures, as an evidence of 
product differentiation in these areas of manufacturing 
industry. It is noted that advertising expenditure has 
increased manifold in all the sectors given in Table 5.11. 
Highest expenditures are incurred by textile, drugs, food, 
industrial chemicals, other chemicals, beverages, tobacco etc. 
And some producers in these sectors have earned some premium 
through product differentiation and reputation for quality. 
This indicates that product differentiation is a significant 
source of market power for an individual establishment and 
also for the industry to earn above normal profits and 
discourage entry. Bain [1956] and Commanor and Wilson [1974]. 
Furthermore, if the payoff from successful product 
differentiation is large, established producers will have a 
strong incentive to differentiate its product and engage in 
some advertising Muller and Rogers [1980].
Table 5.12 gives some further evidence about the 
advertising expenditure by various media in Pakistan. It 
manifest that television adver tisement has grown from about 
Rs.9.29 million in 1972 to Rs.347.238 million in 1989, 
followed by Radio. This suggests that among the various 
advertising media Television has an increasing impact on 
performance. It may be so because established producers opt 
for those advertising media which are most effective in 
forming consumer preference for their product. And since the
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Table 5.11 : Advertisement Expenditure of Selected 
Industries. (1970-84).
Advertising
Industry
Food
Dairy
Vegetable oil
Sugar
Tea
Beverage
Tobacco
Textile
Leather
Footwear
Drugs
Industrial Chemicals
Other Chemicals
Cement
Rubber
Plastic
Electrical Goods
Expenditure
1970
35,533
14,778 
5,157 
7,896 
2,195 
10,128 
36,203 
1, 669 
1,260 
27,359 
12,079 
12,163 
4,823 
1,097 
571 
2,572
(0001Rs.)
1984
20,4261 
9136 
61,948 
16,594 
49,707 
55,394 
42,513 
27,5635 
21,925 
3,341 
21,0183 
14,3288 
77,719
54,414 
12,039 
67,307
Source : Census of Manufacturing Industries 1970-71, 1984-85, 
Federal Bureau of Statistic, Statistics Division, 
Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
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Table 5.12 : Advertising Expenditure by Media in Pakistan
(1972-73 and 1988-89).
Medium Million of Rupees
1972 1988
1. Television. Rs. 9.29 Rs . 47 .23
2. Radio. Rs. 5.28 Rs. 59. 62
Total Rs. 14.57 Rs. 406.85
Source : 1) . Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV) Ltd. Facts 
and Figures 1988-89. The Central Sales Office 
PTV, Karachi.
2) . Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation, Central Sales 
Office Headquaters, Book keeping section, 
Islamabad.
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network of television has been extended to most parts of the 
country, large enterprises find it easier to create product 
differentiation, introduce new products and build an image for 
its product in the most powerful manner (reaching large number 
of potential buyers at minimum cost) through Television and 
Radio.
Finally, it would not be out of place to mention the 
importance of some non-economic practices, the extent of which 
cannot be so easily gauged, that are actively pursued for the 
revival of above normal profits. For example it is a common 
practice of the entrepreneurial class to either collaborate 
with some government officials and avoid payment of taxes and 
substantial amount of electricity and gas bills. Or they may 
just underreport their output and use of power by false entry 
in the registers and keeping down the meter readings. Many 
other similar under hand practices take place to ease the 
pressures of competition and increase profit margins. Such 
tactics are an easy way of increasing profit margins, 
practised by establishments irrespective of their size. Of 
course, if such practices are detected the actual cost of 
production in most cases can be substantially high.
In contrast, the smaller firms, as well as the more 
labour intensive, competitive industries found themselves in 
a constant state of crisis in the earlier phase of 
development. The very fact that new technologies were not 
accessible to them meant that these industries were faced with 
the constant threat of an erosion of markets available to
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them. The higher wages paid by the larger establishments meant 
that the smaller firms must follow if they were to retain 
their work force; and they must do so despite the fewer 
opportunities for productivity advance open to them. These 
firms had limited access to import licenses and frequently 
purchased their foreign equipment through import agents who 
charged high prices and even when the smaller firms purchased 
locally manufactured equipment, tariffs o#1 the imported inputs 
used in their production increased their cost. When combined 
with the fact that they also lacked access to institutional 
sources of credit and were therefore forced to borrow in the 
informal market at interest rates which were substantially 
above those paid by the larger firms, small scale 
establishments were placed at a considerable disadvantage 
with capital costs twice as high as that paid by their large 
scale competitors. Guisinger [1978]. No doubt, the small 
received some relief from the overall expansion in demand and 
markets and, during the import liberalization period from the 
availability of equipment and raw materials and credit that 
might have accrued to them. They might have used this 
opportunity to speed up productivity gains and thereby offset 
the pressure of higher costs sufficient to maintain a constant 
share of profits in output; or else they may settle for a 
lower margin of profits and gradually disappear from the 
market altogether. Then in 1970's and 1980's these small 
establishments were exempt from labour and taxation laws, 
which meant the pressures of higher costs were released to
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some extent. Moreover price controls guaranteed some margin of 
profits. However large scale labour intensive industries 
mostly remained in crisis as labour costs increased while 
increase in productivity could not be gurantfed as technology
A  ^
was out dated and investment sanctions had tightened control 
over import of equipments.
In short, from our estimates of inter-temporal changes in 
performance of the manufacturing sector, we are able to make 
the following conclusions: first, ordinary least square
estimates provide only average estimates about the 
association between market structure and performance. Thus 
inferences drawn on the basis of average estimates may not be 
correct for specific industries. Furthermore inferences drawn 
from the results obtained for a point of time may be 
misleading for other time periods. The importance of the 
structural variable may be greatly undermined by other factors 
that emerge overtime. For example, in the initial phase of 
development concentrated oligopolies were able to enhance 
their profit margins by influencing both the price level and 
cost of production relative to their rival producers. However, 
in the later period the structure remains concentrated but the 
changing market envi'To nment to a large extent limited the 
power of the oligopolists to set prices and keep the cost of 
production lower than other competitors in the market. This 
led to the growth of certain phenomena which had opposing 
effects on profits. Thus structure is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition to ensure a high rate of return on
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capital.
Factor Productivity And Concentration:
In the first part of this chapter profitability is taken as 
a measure of performance of the manufacturing industries and 
the evidence suggest that profits of concentrated firms are 
small. As discussed above several factors may be responsible 
for the weak association between concentration and 
profitability, however two factors are of special interest. 
First, in the presence of effective protection, price controls 
and other regulatory policies, profit cannot be taken as a 
satisfactory measure of performance. Second, the
x-inefficiency hypothesis may be relevant in explaning the 
weak relationship between concentration and profitability. It 
is possible, that large dominating firms are inefficient, the 
fact that they have large size, and pressures of competition 
are not confronted they may prefer a quite life without 
seeking continuous reductions in cost. And more so when 
prices are controlled. In this way concentration along with 
regulatory policies breed inefficiency, the potential increase 
in productivity that might have been the result of 
technological progress and capital accumulation is not 
realized. But from this hypothesis it is not clear whether 
high costs associated with concentrated enterprises arise from 
the inefficient use of labour or capital or both. If they are 
supposed to be the outcome of an inefficient use of labour
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then the positive correlation between labour productivity and 
concentration would be smaller than capital productivity and 
vice versa. Holterman [1974]. So for the above two reasons we 
would like to take up two other measures of performance i.e 
labour and capital productivity and asess the association 
between concentration and productivity.
InAcase of Pakistan, the X-inefficiency hypothesis has 
been supported by three sources of empirical evidence. Studies 
of effective protection show that most industries in Pakistan 
are grossly inefficient. Lewis and Guisinger [1968]. The 
argument is that protection breeds inefficiency which
in high costs, prices and monopoly 
returns. Second, there is evidence about the wasteful use of 
scarce capital resources due to the low rates of capital 
utilization Winston [1971] , and this uf u*. the existence of
inefficient high cost of production, and high prices, along 
with low capital productivity. The World Bank financed 
capacity utilization study by the Planning Commission [1987] 
concludes that the present situation in Pakistan demands new 
products, new technology and new organisations, but more 
importantly Pakistan must improve the utilization of capital 
to increase value added per unit of capital assets at a 
progressively lower economic cost. Thus in this part of the 
chapter we shall attempt to see whether our data allows us to 
infer something about the importance of X-inefficiency 
hypothesis in the manufacturing industries of Pakistan. We 
will do so first by assessing the importance of level of
2.2 2
concentration and other variables in influencing the level of
labour and capital productivity in 197 0, 1978 and 1984. As a
second test the importance of changes, both absolute and
proportionate, in concentration and other explanatory
variables in explaining changes and labour and capital
productivity is also examined. According to the X-inefficiency
hypothesis we Should expect to find in our data a suggestion of
a negative correlation between productivity and concentration.
fax*
While investigating productivity-concentration relationship we
A
cMioutd N aware that other factors like capital
intensity, and growth of industry etc also contribute towards 
the explanation of productivity. We have included some of 
these factors in our model, but we fail to include the dynamic 
aspect of efficiency like research and development 
expenditure, mainly because of the non-availability of data. 
However our prime concern is to measure the productivity 
concentration relationship for the industrial sector of 
Pakistan. The two models representing levels of productivity 
and concentration are given as below:
5.9 VA/L = a + bCR + cK/L + dIG + ePC
5.10 VA/K = a + bCR + cK/L + dIG + ePC
and the hypothesis to be tested is that
b, and e < 0 where as c and d > 0
similarly for 5.10
b, and e < 0 and c and d > 0
The models representing changes in productivity are:
5.11 D(VA/L) = a + bDCR + cDK/L + dIG + ePC
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5.12 D (VA/K) = a + bDCR + cDK/L + dIG + ePC
5.13 d(VA/L) = a + bdCR + cdK/L + dIG + ePC
5.14 d(VA/K) = a + bdCR + cdK/L + dIG + ePC
where the left and right hab. side variables represent absolute 
change, in the respective variables, between 1970-84 and
proportionate change as a percentage of 197 0.
The regression equation for 1970 includes only CR , K/L 
and IG as the explanatory variables, whereas for 1978 and 
1984 we include an additional explanatory variable PC in the 
regression equations. Since the log-linear regressions for 
the models representing levels of productivity had more 
explanatory power than the linear regression estimates, we 
therefore report only the log-linear results.
Table 5.13 that contrary to our hypothesis,
ft*concentration exerts^positive but modest influence on labour 
productivity in 1970, this relationship deteriorates in 1978 
and improves in 1984. The other explanatory variable, capital 
labour ratio and industry growth show a strong positive
association with labour productivity. Price control has the 
expected sign but its t ratio is not very significant. Table
5.14 presents evidence about absolute and proportionate 
changes in labour productivity during 1970-84; and the
importance of concentration in bringing these changes. In 
comparison to the results representing absolute changes, 
regression results of proportionate changes are fairly 
important. It is shown that concentration has the right sign 
and explains labour productivity only modestly. Both capital
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Table 5.13 : Labour Productivity and Market structure Log 
Linear Regression Results(1970, 1978, 1984)
Variables
2,
Equations Constant CR K/L 16 PC R
1970.
1. 2.70 0.08 0.09
(0.47)
2. 1.50 0.08 0.49 0.34
(0.58) (3.69)
3. 1.54 0.08 0.44 0.22 0.35
(0.58 (3.70) (0.50)
1978.
1. 3.72 0.03 0.00
(0.01)
2. 2.95 0.02 0.36 0.17
(0.13) (2.72)
3. 3.18 0.03 0.30 0.09 0.18
(0.21) (1.50) (0.54)
4. 2.82 0.11 0.17 0.16 -0.71 0.31
(0.80) (1.58) (1.05) (1.96)
1984.
1. 4.38 0.02 0.00
(0.15)
2. 2.75 0.03 0.51 0.26
(0.21) (3.10)
3. 2.83 0.11 0.34 0.27 0.33
(0.65) (1.85) (1.68)
4. 2.70 0.05 0.24 0.35 -0.72 0.46
(0.32) (1.37) (2.27) (2.47)
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Table 5.14 : Regression Results of Absolute and Proportionate 
Changes in Labour Productivity on Absolute and 
Proportionate changes in Concentration and other 
Variables (29 Sectors 1970-84).
Equations
Variables Absolute Changes Proportionate Changes
Constant 97.80 86.46 19.46 3.17 1.60 1.50 5.24 6.37
DCR 0.39 0.40 0.65 0.76 5.76 5.74 5.52 5.46
(0.37) (0.37) (0.61) (0.78) (2.41) (2.30)(2.22)(2.17)
DK/L 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.49 0.01
(0.52) (0.02) (0.24) (0.02) (0.25) (0.06)
IG 0.55 0.88 -4.65 -3.93
(1.31) (0.93) (1.15) (0.93)
PC 0.97 -2.18
(2.60) (0.70)
2
R 0.005 0.01 0.07 0.28 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.23
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labour ratio and industry growth manifest strong influence on 
labour productivity. The effect of price control is negative 
and the t- ratio is significant.\ Altogether the right
hand side variables explain 0.57 percent of variation in 
labour productivity, which is quite satisfactory.
Regression results of capital productivity presented in 
Table 5.15 indicate that concentration has a weak negative 
effect on capital productivity. Whereas both capital labour 
ratio and price control also show negative association with 
capital productivity. The t-ratio for capital labour ratio is 
quite high and its relationship with capital productivity 
seems to have grown overtime. Industry growth loses its 
importance in influencing output per unit of capital. However 
the explanatory power of the regression equations explaning 
capital productivity is limited. Results regarding changes in 
capital productivity in Table 5.15 are extremely poor, all 
the variables together could only explain 0.08 percent of 
variation in capital productivity.15/. As suggested by the 
x-inefficiency hypothesis that concentrated firms fail to 
increase productivity, there is no such indication in our 
results to support the hypothesis so far as labour 
productivity and concentration are concerned. Concentration 
does not show a negative effect on labour productivity, nor 
is capital labour ratio which is expected to have picked up
15. In addition to the explanatory variables mentioned in Table
5.12 and 5.14 another variable capacity utilization was 
dropped from the regression equation for its poor explanatory 
power.
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Table 5.15 : Capital Productivity and Market Structure Log 
Linear Regression Results (1970, 1978, 1984).
Variables
z
Equations Constant CR K/L 16 PC R
1970
0.44 -0.08
(0.39)
0. 005
• 1.20 -0. 07 
(0.38)
-0. 34 
(1.78)
0.11
• 1.26 -0. 07 
(0.39)
-0.45
(1.94
0.51 
) (0.83)
0.14
1978.
1 . 0.32 -0.24
(1.24)
0.05
2 . 0.91 -0.27
(1.53)
-0. 43 
(2.46)
0.23
3 . 1.29 -0.22
(1.21)
-0.54 
(2.62)
0.18
(1.00)
0.26
4 . 1.06 -0.32
(2.00)
-0. 69 
(3.79)
0.27 0.94 
(1.73) (3.24)
0. 48
1984.
1 . 2.0 -0.39
(1.92)
0.12
2 . 1. 87 -0.009 
(1.00)
0.56 
(2.39)
0.27
3. 2.2 -0.22
(0.92)
0. 44 
(2.80)
0. 004 
(2.87)
0.45
4. 2 . 0 -0. 03 
(0.94)
0.50
(2.30)
0.004 0.28 
(2.20) (1.28)
0.48
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Table 5.16: Regression Results of Absolute and Proportionate 
Changes in Capital Productivity on Absolute and 
Proportionate Changes in Concentration and other 
Variabls (29 sectors 1970-84).
Equations
Varables Absolute Changes Proportionate Changes
Constant 0.04 0.42 0.45 0.53 0.19 0.18 0.05 0.10
DCR -0.04 -0.004 -0.001 -0.0008 -0.12 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(0.21) (0.18) (0.04) (0.0003)(0.63)(0.35)(0.30)(0.31)
DK/L -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.18 -0.19 -0.22
(0.82) (1.07) (1.00) (1.22) (1.28)(1.33)
IG 1.04 0.92 0.16 0.19
(0.82) (0.30) (0.49)(0.58)
PC 0.42 -0.11
(0.49) (0.44)
l
R 0.001 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.08
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the effect of concentration on productivity, negatively 
related to labour productivity. We do admit that labour 
productivity is not the best measure of efficiency and that 
the results derived on the basis of such a measure of 
efficiency are approximations. However straight forward and 
simple inferences as above cannot be drawn from the results 
reported in Table 5.15. Although our results dc^not confirm 
^.strong negative association between concentration and capital 
productivity, the negative influence of both concentration and 
capital intensity on value added per unit of capital cast 
doubt on the rejection of x-inefficiency hypothesis regarding 
the use of capital by concentrated enterprises.16/. Table
5.14 indicates the x-inefficiency of large establishments in 
the use of capital. These concentrated enterprises surely 
failed to increase the productivity of capital. And also 
indicate the existence of an entrepreneurial class which lacks 
the readiness to take innovational investments. Perhaps the 
pressure of improved performance is not great, or in a less 
developed and politically unstable economy like Pakistan risk 
and uncertainties regarding demand and supply conditions tend 
to make management delay and postpone innovative investment to 
improve efficiency and value added per unit of capital.17/.
16. Holterman [1973] in a study of market structure and economic 
performance in UK manufacturing industry also found negative 
effect of capital labour ratio on capital productivity and 
positive on labour productivity.
17. Care needs to be taken while interpreting the relationship 
between capital labour and value added per unit of labour and 
capital,we cannot be very sure about the economic meaning
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Perhaps the way the entrepreneurs perceive the risks 
associated with investment decisions is that they continuously 
strive to diversify their portfolio balance and internalize 
the risk and uncertainity in the imperfect factor market 
conditions.
In short our results suggest that large establishment 
have higher labour productivity and that x-inefficiency 
emerge out of the inefficient use of capital rather than 
labour. However, it is important to add that the relevance of 
our results vary from case to case and it is quite possible
. t SS&that different set of results nrwycome to light inA case of 
different industries irrespective of their size and market 
power, for example some industries may be efficient in the 
use of either labour or capital or both and vice versa.18/.
fulness of the productivity variable because both labour 
productivity and capital labour ratio has employment in the 
denominator, and capital productivity has capital in the 
denominator while capital appears in the numerator of the 
variable measuring capital intensity. Whether the relationship 
revealed in the regression results is economic or a 
satistical artifact is not clear to us. However, our set of 
results are to a large extent supported by the findings of 
Ahmed and Irfan [1985]. They report that between 1970-76 
labour productivity increased by only 1 percent per annum and 
capital productivity by 3.6 percent, but between 1976-81 
labour productivity increased by 15 percent per annum and 
capital productivity was zero.
18. Although our results do not show a positive link
between capital productivity and concentration, it is quite 
possible that in some industries positive labour productivity 
is sufficient to offset the negative capital productivity and 
so total factor productivity is associated with 
concentration. If that is so then on balance welfare loss 
from concentration may not be significant. Similar suggestion 
are made by Micha Gisser (1982) for Food Manufacturing 
Industries in U.S.
V
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This hypothesis is tested in the next chapter.
232
CHAPTER VI
Concentration, Efficiency and Monopoly Profits.
In the previous chapter the most significant statistical 
fact that emerges from our data is that structure 
concentration has a*,limited influence on performance. 
However, it is well known that even if the link between 
concentration and performance is established it is 
difficult to tell whether it is so due to monopolistic 
practices or due to large firms gaining more of the market 
by their superior efficiency as reflected in their ability 
to earn high profits. Thus inferences made in these two 
situations and policies recommended would be very 
different. Prior to drawing any inferences about the causal 
link between concentration and profits it would be 
worthwhile if studies of this nature enquire about the 
source of large profits in the first place. Or case 
studies across individual industries could possibly be 
another relevant approach to issues of this nature i.e the 
structure-performance model may be extended to individual 
industries to test the relevance of the model from case to 
case.
It was argued in the previous chapter that increased 
profits stem from price and cost conditions prevailing in 
the market. This chapter therefore concerns itself with 
some tests to identify the source of profits. But we know 
ffolin^seventies and eighties prices were controlled and to
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obtain maximum returns entrepreneurs were left with the 
only choice of minimizing cost. So our enquiry is 
restricted to the examination of major components of cost 
and the use of labour and capital according to size. To do 
so selected estimates of profits and ratios of cost of 
value added, capital-labour; wage labour, value added to 
labour and value added to capital are examined in relation 
to size for all industries and selected industries of 
Pakistan manufacturing industries. Before doing so a brief 
discussion of the conflicting hypothesis about
structure-performance relationship mentioned above is 
provided.
A central issue related to the structure-performance
hypothesis is that often public policy makers suggest that
if monopoly power is obtained through monopoly practices
then discouraging large size of firms will reduce price and
benefit the consumers. But Demsetz1 [1973] main worry is
that if high concentration is entirely the result of
superior cost efficiency then public policy of dismantling
A
large sized firms would imply sacrificing the benefits of 
scale economies. This policy dilemma confronts most public 
policy makers. However,serious objections may be raised 
against this line of thinking,particularly the views 
related to the distribution effects may question the merit 
of efficiency hypothesis. It may be contested that it is 
of central importance to enquire whether the benefits of 
economies of scale, in terms of low average costs are 
passed on to the consumers in the form of low prices, or 
are solely enjoyed by the capitalists due to their ability
234
to either raise the prices or at least keep them at the 
same level and thus ensure the target mark ups above costs. 
If that is true then the benefits of economies of scale 
will do little good to the society and labouring class in 
terms of prices paid by the consumers and wages received 
by the labourers. To remedy the situation public policy 
makers may suggest that prices &kcuid be administered by the 
State, in that case the absence of price competition may 
possibly do more harm than good to the society in the form 
of leaving little incentive for the entrepreneurs to 
reduce the cost of production when a given rate of return 
is ensured.
In order to deal with the above discussed issue, 
economists have approached the problem by developing 
different estimation techniques that can identify and 
separate the impact of monopoly power derived through 
collusion from monopoly power obtained via superior cost 
efficiency or profits. Generally results show that both the 
sources are at work. For example, most researchers have 
relied on the estimation of the importance of economies of 
scale as a determinant of market structure.Scherer [198 0] 
does so by directly measuring firms' cost curves and his 
results are not sympathetic towards the efficiency 
hypothesis. He shows that economies of scale are exhausted 
long before they are capable of raising the levels of 
concentration. But where product specific, capital raising 
and procurement economies exist the industry will 
inevitably evolve towards a loose oligopoly. However, Me 
Gee [1973 ] objects to the accuracy of such results
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undermining the importance of economies of scale as a 
determinant of market share concentration because the data 
on which these studies are based is full of measurement 
error.
Demsetz [1973] in his study related to the efficiency 
hypothesis, supposes that if less concentrated industries 
have lower profits, and highly concentrated industries 
have higher profits, the usual interpretation is that this 
relationship arise from the ease of collusion. His argument 
is that all the firms in the highly concentrated industry 
should have the same high level of profits because 
collusion would support them all. Price would be lifted 
above cost and all will enjoy benefits of collusion. But 
the evidence that only large firms in concentrated 
industries earn high profits suggest that significant 
economies of scale prevail in these industries. He used 
disaggregated data to see whether large firms in highly 
concentrated industries had higher rates of return on 
capital than the smaller firms in the same industry. If 
bigger firms had high profits this would go against the 
collusion explanation. Higher profits of the industry as a 
whole represent the above normal profits of big but 
efficient firms who may not be restricting output but would 
make up a large part of the industry. On the same basis the 
low concentrated industries could have low profits and all 
firm sizes would have roughly the same profit because 
there is no differential efficiency. His results manifest 
that in a highly concentrated industry the biggest firm 
group had systematically higher profit than the other firms
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in the same industry. Hence the efficiency explanation was 
to explain his findings.
However, there are problems with this type of analysis 
because another mechanism could generate the within 
industry results which Demsetz offers as support for the 
efficiency hypothesis i.e how is one to distinguish those 
situations where scale economies only have efficiency 
effects from those where firms enjoying such economies 
realize entry into the industry is difficult, for whatever 
reason, and thus set higher prices. In both cases industry 
profit is higher in concentrated industries and within 
these is higher among the larger firms.
A further study on similar lines was done by Carter 
[1978] using much better data i.e market share figures for 
each of the four largest firms in each of the industry and 
he finds that in a highly concentrated industry again the 
profit for the bigger firm is greater than for the
remaining firms. He concludes "..... the degree to which
price exceeds leading firms costs m^concentrated industry 
is limited to the extent of the cost advantage of the 
secondary firm," (pkHi ) . His results support the Demsetz 
results in a much more refined way.
If Demsetz and Carter are correct then the 
implications for deconcentration policy measure are quite 
different. Because if the government policy broke up the 
largest four firms it would be sacrificing efficiency 
advantage even though concentration is reduced. There would 
be a problem between a less concentrated industry on the 
one hand and a less efficient on the other. The trade off
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is still there because even if deconcentration reduced 
collusion and prices the ultimate price may be higher if 
the elimination of the more efficient firms tended to raise 
cost and prices.
Another study done by Peltzman [1977] calculates for 
each industry a measure of productivity i.e total unit 
cost and he finds that where over time, concentration in an
t *
industry had increased then average cost decreased or 
productivity increased, which ties in with the results of 
Demsetz and Carter. Peltzman, comes to the conclusion that 
increasing concentration reduced prices as compared with 
what they would have been had increase not taken place 
with improvement in productivity and declining costs. 
Further, the cost reductions achieved by higher 
concentration more than outweigh any disadvantage to 
consumers of higher collusion as a result of more 
concentration conditions.
Schemer [1980] replied that one should look at 
particular industries, which have increased their 
concentration significantly. He pointed out that quite a 
large number of industries which had experienced^ 
significant increase in concentration were consumer goods 
industries in which advertising, for example; was quite 
important. And that one could not assume that the 
differential success of the biggest firms which caused 
concentration to increase was due to lower cost or to more 
successful promotion of their particular version of 
industry product. The results of Peltzman could not 
distinguish between a unit cost reduction and ^ increase in
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the product line. This leads to the problem whether it is 
a genuine improvement to consumers if firms adapt their 
product more successfully to the tasCe of consumers i.e. 
whether advertising is a good thing. The most logical 
point about Scherer1s intervention was that one should look 
at individual industries and draw inferences for each 
industry separately.
Moreover, as pointed out earlie^at least in the short 
run the relevance of the notion forwarded by Peltzman to 
the industrial structure of Pakistan is very little. 
Because, when large firms experience cost reduction due, 
for example to exceptional improvements in 
productivity, there is no compulsion on them to reduce 
prices correspondingly.
Finally, Clarke and Davies [1982] have shown that the 
more efficient firms will earn higher profits than the 
less efficient firms by introducing the notion of 
differences in efficiency among the firms i.e each firm in 
an industry has a constant marginal cost but different 
firms have different levels of marginal cost. Taking 
Cournot model with zero collusion they show that,
2 I
II = 1 + (1 - EN]Vc
R NE NE
where II is monopoly profit, R is total revenue, N is 
number of firms, V is coefficient of variation in cost 
levels and E is elasticity of demand. The first term in 
the above equation is the normal result if the industry 
consists of equal sized firms. The second term comes in 
because it captures the effect on profits of dispersion of
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marginal cost.
They also showed that:
H = 1 + (1 - ENVVc
N N
so, the same variables which determine the profitability of 
an industry determine the structure of the industry, H.
In short, empirical literature suggests that large 
profits are the result of either high prices or low costs. 
It is quite possible that if a third factor affects one or 
both of these along with an increase in concentration and 
profits simultaneously, the data will support the
hypothesis that increased concentration leads to increased 
profitability on the face of it. Such a phenomenon makes 
it difficult to distinguish the part of profit arising due 
to the external factor and the part due to concentration.
For some unknown reason up till now no attempt is made 
in Pakistan to answer and clarify some of the doubts cast 
above. Therefore in the rest of this chapter we undertake 
a few exercises which will be first of its kind.
As discussed above there is no entirely satisfactory 
procedure or test through which it is possible to separate 
the effects of economies of scale and concentration on 
profits. Therefore we will rely mostly on the techniques of 
estimation which are simple to interpret and require the 
type of data available to us. Instead of relying on 
complicated models which are too difficult to interpret it 
would be worthwhile if we start by examining the basic 
relations like the behaviour of profit rates, cost and 
productivity in relation to size in sub. section 6.1-6.3.
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Such an approach may perhaps pick up the over all scale 
effect in a static sense or limited nature and the 
inferences drawn may be mere approximations. The analysis 
carried out is based on grouped Census of Manufacturing 
data for three points of time 1970, 1978 and 1984; which 
includes all industries inAaggregated sense, and also a 
sample of selected industries. The data is grouped by one 
measures of size, namely employment. The selected variables 
are profitability, cost, factor productivity and size. The 
measurement of these variables is already explained in 
earlier chapters except for cost measurement which is 
described in sub section 6.2. The statistical operations 
carried out are restricted to averages, various ratios and 
the rank correlation coefficients.
6.1 Average Profits and size:
In this sub section we first calculate average profits then 
examine the differences in profits across various size
groups and its behaviour overtime. The hypothesis is that 
higher profits are associated with large
establishments. Table 6.1 presents the average profit for 
each size group for the years 1970-84 and also the average
for all size groups. Figures mentioned in the Table when
inspected column wise . the differences associated
with firm size. It is observed that size and profit rate do 
not show any systematic relationship and this is confirmed 
when rank correlation coefficients are calculated between 
profit rates and size groups, these correlation
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coefficients are mentioned at the end of each column, they 
are positive for 1970, 1978 and become negative for 1984.
However all the correlation coefficients are not highly 
significant which suggests that size does not exert a 
strong influence on profits, in fact between 1970-84 
profit rate tend to decrease with the size of firm. The 
second last row of the Table provide average profit rate 
for all the three years. Comparison of average profit rate 
with each size group reveal that except for 1970, the 
profit rate of the largest size groups are less than
the average profit rate for 1978 and 1984. In contrast, the 
small and medium size groups seem to have profit rates 
higher than the average profit rate particularly in 1978 
and 1984.
When size is measured by Rupee value of fixed assets,
Table 6.2, it is noted that higher profits are associated
with the smaller firms and this association is confirmed by
the rank correlation coefficients all of which are negative 
, fob
suggesting thatAprofit rate tends to decrease tKz, the size 
of firm. All the rank correlation coefficients are 
significant atA5 percent level. Similar results were found 
by Samuel [1968] and Whittington [1980] for U.K. data. On 
the contrary Hall and Weiss [1967] suggest that size tend 
to result in high profits because of the capital 
requirement barriers, large firms have not only all the 
options of the small firms, they have an additional benefit 
of investing m Ascale of production* not open to the small 
firms. Reading the same Table by rows givesAannual mean 
rate of profit of different size groups in successive
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Table 6.1: Average Profits/ Size and Rank Correlation 
Coefficients (Size Measured by Employment) 
1970-84
size Group 1970 1978 1984
A B A B A B
Upto 9 persons 29 23 51 35 64 52
From 10 to 19 persons 88 58 21 13 96 63
From 20 to 49 persons 66 39 156 88 91 57
From 50 to 99 persons 90 48 123 67 96 56
From 100 to 249 persons35 20 69 46 99 53
From 250 to 499 persons70 42 145 63 99 62
From 500 to 999 persons83 50 76 44 88 51
From 1000tol999 persons95 62 187 92 110 74
From 5000to4999 persons72 38 63 25 68 31
5000C> and above personsl07 64 24 14 5 4
average profit 79 47 98 52 76 48
rank correlation
coefficient .57 .42 .10 .05 -.13 -.41
A: VA - wages/Fixed assets
B: VA - wages/Fixed assets + stocks.
Source: Calculated from Census of Manufacturing Industries 
1970-71,1978-79, 1984-85, Statistics Division, 
Government of Pakistan.
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Table 6.2: Average Profit Size and Rank Correlation
Coefficients. (Size measured by capital assets 
1970-84).
Size Group
Upto Rs. 250,000
RS. 250,000 - 500,000
RS. 500,001 - 1000,000
Rs. 1000,001 - 2000,000
Rs. 2000,001 - 2500,000
RS. 2500,001 - 5000,000
RS. 5000,001 & above
Averages ( n = 7 )
Rank correlation 
Coefficients
(profit rate & size group)
1970 1978 1984
1.1 1.82 3 .00
0.96 3 . 04 1. 60
0.88 3.20 1.80
- 1.28 1.90
- 0. 92 0.77
1.10 1.99 1. 53
0.84 0.82 0. 69
1. 87 1.67
0.20 - 0.57 - 0.76
Source: Calculated from Census of Manufacturing
Industries, Federal Bureau of Statistic, Statistics 
Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.(1970, 1978,
1984) .
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Table-6.3: Rank correlation Coefficient Between Size And 
Average Profit For Selected Industries (1970-84)
industry Rank Correlation Coefficient
1970 1978 1984
All Industries 0.70 0.78 0.83
Beverage 0.80 -0.30 1.0
Tobacco 0.78 1.0 0.79
Textile 0.82 0.70 0. 60
Wearing Apparel -0.80 -0.75 -0.88
Leather 0. 65 0.37 0.74
Footwear 0.74 0.50 0.80
Ginning 0.42 0.43 0. 38
Furniture 0. 60 0.80 0.16
Paper -1.00 0.80 -1.0
Printing 0. 66 0.68 0.82
Drugs 0.32 0. 68 0.82
Industrial Chemicals 0.80 0.32 -0.48
Other Chemicals 0.33 0.36 0.92
Rubber 0. 65 0. 61 0.71
Plastic 0.58 0. 47 0.49
Pottery 1.00 1.0 1.0
Glass -0.35 -0.25 -0.14
Non Metallic Mineral 0.16 0.95 0.74
Iron and Steel 0. 24 -0.47 -0. 07
Fabricated Metal 0.15 0.43 0. 09
Non Electrical 0.95 0.15 0.29
Electrical Machinery 0. 38 0.39 -0.04
Transport -0.34 0.25 -0.65
Science Instruments ■-0.80 -0. 50 -0.80
Source: Calculated from Census of Manufacturing Industries 
1970-71,1978-79,1984-85. Statistics Division 
Government of Pakistan.
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years. It is found that the profit rate tend to rise in 
case of small/medium size and fall or remain constant in 
case of large size establishments. Thus the first two size 
classes tend to survive best. The annual rank correlation 
coefficients also suggest that in general the differential 
profit between large and small firms is becoming stronger. 
To confirm this hypothesis rank correlation coefficient 
between the six annual rank correlation coefficients and 
time is calculated. A value of 0.61 which is significant at 
5 percent level is obtained, thus supporting the 
hypothesis.
Average annual profit rates were also calculated for 
a sample of twenty five concentrated industries for 1970, 
1978 and 1984‘1/taperformance of the largest size group of 
most industries is poorest against the medium and small 
size groups reporting highest mean profit rates. Rank 
correlation coefficients mentioned in Table 6.3 are also 
calculated for each of these industriesTT^ajority of the 
rank coefficients are positive except for wearing apparel, 
paper, glass, iron and steel and scientific instruments 
which showed negative rank correlation coefficients between 
size and average profit rate. Although out of twenty five 
industries about half of the cases have rank correlation 
coefficients significant at^ 5  and 10 percent level of 
significance. And out of the significant cases only two to 
three cases showanegative rank correlation coefficient. In 
contrast to our earlier findings particularly those 
mentioned in Table 6.2, it is noted that uniformity of 
results between size and profit rate is not found for
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individual industries. Largest size of all concentrated
industries do not show higher profit rate. The size profit
relationship varies from industry to industry. Thus the
importance of size is minimized in determining profit rate
when other forces exercise important influence on profits.
Similar results are found by Marcus [1969] for U.S, data, 
^ I'rw S
that size ofAtend to influence profits in some not in 
all industries. Because several forces like product prices 
factor cost production function etc influence profits, and 
the association of these prices with firm size vary from 
industry to industry.
In this respect it is of particular importance to 
examine some of these other forces in relation to size, for 
example it is of interest to enquire about the cost and 
value added size relationship. It is quite possible that 
either various components of cost like fixed assets, 
stocks, wages, industrial and other costs or value added 
are substantially higher or lowe/m *case of some of the 
large sizes which result in low-high average profit rates 
in those industries relative to other industries and small 
size in the same industries. Sub sections 6.2 and 6.3 deal 
with these exercises.
6.2 Cost-Size Relationship:
In this sub-section we examine total and various components 
of cost, considering first the differences associated with 
size for all industries and then for related industries. 
Our measure of total cost include fixed assets, stocks,
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wage, raw material and fuel costs. A priori it is assumed 
that cost per unit of output declines with size because of 
the scale economies and other advantages associated with 
size.
Total cost-value added ratios were calculated for all 
industries for 1970-84 and Table 6.4 report only the rank 
correlation coefficients between the ratio of total cost to 
value added and size for all industries. In support of our 
hypothesis the coefficients are negative but insignificant 
except for 1970. Obviously no firm conclusions can be drawn 
about cost-size relationship unless we undertake a similar 
exercise for individual industries and enquire whether 
cost-size relationship differ from industry to industry. 
Table 6.5 report rank correlation coefficient for the same 
ratios for selected industries. It is observed that out of 
twenty five industries about half of the industries show 
negative rank correlation coefficient, the rest manifest 
either positive or zero rank coefficients. The rank 
coefficients fbf 16 industries ay& significant, out of which 
8 are positive and 8 are negative at 5 and 10 percent
significance level. This suggests that cost size
relationship vary from industry to industry. However it is 
too early to suggest that the industries showing negative 
rank coefficients <h so simply . * because their large 
units are able to operate at lower unit costs. It is quite 
possible that the small have high total cost value added
ratio not because they have high costs but because they
have low value added.
It is therefore important to examine separately and in
2 4 8
Table 6.4: Rank Correlation Coefficient Between Size And
Ratios of Total Cost And Various Components 
of Cost (All Industries) 1970-84
Rank Correlation 1970 1978 1984
Coefficient Between E K E K E
Size and TC/VA -0.78 -0. 60 -0.25 -0.22 -0.23
Size and K/L 0.97 1.0 0.79 1.0 0.53
Size and W/L 0.73 0.90 0.30 0.93 0.87
Size and IC/VA -0. 67 -0. 60 -0. 85 -0.42 -0.87
E: Size measured as employment
K: Size measured as book value of fixed assets.
Source: Calculated from Census of Manufacturing Industries 
Statistics Division Government of Pakistan 
1970-71,1978-79,1984-85.
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detail the various components of cost associated with size 
for all industries and for selected industries. To gauge 
the importance of various components of cost three major 
- were selected for our analysis, uxcfz.
fixed capital and stocks, employment cost and industrial 
cost which includes raw material, fuel and repair costs. 
First the ratios of fixed capital plus stocks to labour, 
wage-labour and industrial cost of value added are 
calculated and rank correlation coefficients are estimated 
for all industries. Table 6.4 present these rank 
correlation coefficients for two measures of size between 
1970-84. The first hypothesis tested is that size and 
capital-labour ratio/technology are positively related. 
The data confirm the hypothesized direction of
association. The rank coefficient is significant at 5 
percent level. The relationship between wage- labour ratio 
and size measured again by the rank coefficient and 
reported in the same Table also manifest that employment 
cost is significantly high in large size units of 
production.The same Table records the rank coefficient for 
industrial cost per unit of value added and size as well, 
and it is noted that the large establishments have
lower industrial cost per unit of value added relative to 
the small size groups. The coefficients are negative and 
significant particularly for employment as a measure of 
size. Although it was not possible to separate the fuel 
cost from raw material cost but it can be stated with 
confidence that large units have higher fuel costs
than the small.
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Table-6.5: Rank Correlation Coefficient Between Size And 
Total Cost or Selected Industries (19970-84)
Rank Correlation coefficients
Industries 1970 1978 1984
All Industries -0.81 -0.75 -0.23
Food -0.40 -0.80 -0.81
Beverages 0.25 0.30 -0.
Tobacco -0.90 -1.0 1.0
Textile -0.74 0.0 0.30
Wearing apparel 0.80 0.30 0. 94
Leather 0.12 0.60 -0.44
Footwear 0. 60 1.0 1.0
Ginning -0.31 -0. 03 -0.83
Furniture 0.40 0.80 1.0
Paper 0.10 1.0 0.31
Printing -0.25 -0. 18 0.57
Drugs -0.65 -0.40 -0.89
Industrial chemicals -0.48 -0.82 0.32
Other Chemicals 0. 03 -0.86 -0.77
Rubber 0. 60 0.0 -0. 37
Plastic -0.21 -0.37 -0.77
Pottery 0.0 0.0 0.0
Glass -0.37 0.0 -0.43
Non Metallic Mineral -0.14 -0. 65 -0.60
Iron and Steel 0.0 -0.36 0.07
Fabricated Metal 0.0 0.0 -0.71
Non Electrical 0.32 0.42 0. 07
Electrical 0.0 -0.14 0. 64
Transport 0.53 0.35 0. 68
Scientific Instruments 0.10 0.75 0.60
Source: Calculated from Census of Manufacturing Industries
1970-71,1978-79,1984-85. Statistics Division; 
Government of Pakistan.
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From the above it is clear to some extent that the 
small • establishments have i) Lower fixed assets and
stocks per head. This may be because they mostly employ 
local and simple technology, and do not keep large stocks, 
3^ contrast the larger units of production have higher 
capital plus stocks per head, mainly because they use
imported technology and are capital intensive, (ii) Smaller 
wage bill. Some of the small establishments may not
even be constrained by wage legislation. Whereas the large 
units . . pay higher wages, 0esides that they
also provide other benefits which the small establishments 
do not pay. iii) Larger industrial cost per unit of value 
added than the large establishments. It is possible that 
the economies of bulk buying particularly the raw material 
enable the large units to have cost advantage.
However their fuel repair and other costs are
substantially larger relative to the small size 
establishments.
Thus our earlier finding that the ratio of total cost 
to value added and size show a. negative but weak rank 
correlation coefficient is not consistent with the
. ItvL ,
findings reported above whenAvarious components of cost 
are examined separately across various size groups. 
However, these results do not imply that all large ' :
establishments have higher costs and all small units have 
lower cost. It is possible that cost-size relationships 
differ from case to case. It is therefore worth while to 
extend the same exercise by calculating the same cost 
ratios across selected industries for 1970-84.
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Table 6.6 reports the rank correlation coefficients 
between size and the three components of cost. And it is 
observed that except for beverages, ginning and plastic 
industries all other industries show positive rank 
coefficient between size and capital plus stocks per head.
» • • TKjuBut the coefficient is zero for leather and fragile in^case
of textiles, ginning, rubber, plastic and scientific
instruments. The rank coefficients for wage labour ratio
and size are also reported in the same Table. These
coefficients also manifest that, except for ginning^large
establishments in all industries pay higher
wages. The rank coefficient is significant in all
industries except beverages, textiles and leather. It is
interesting to note from the wage-labour ratio that the
largest establishments in textiles pay almost the same
wage per head as the small size establishments. This may be
so because of the competitive nature ofA textile industry.
The rank coefficients for industrial cost, and size are
. . .negative but non significant m Acase of nine industries. 
This may be so because there large ' units depend in 
some cases on imported raw material and the advantage of 
bulk buying is minimized.
Thus results reported in Table 6.6 confirm our belief 
that different industries experience different cost size 
relationship. And with a few exceptions large . . units in 
all the industries experience relatively high capital 
labour and wage-labour ratios, but this may not be so 
regarding industrial cost value added ratio, which vary 
from case to case and may not necessarily be high in all
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Table 6.6 Rank correlation Coefficients Between 
Selected Components of Cost and size 
for Selected Industries (1970-84).
Rank Correlation Coefficients
Industry 1970 1978 1984
K/L W/L IC/L K/L W/L IC/L K/L W/L IC/L
All
Industry
0.17 0.73 -0.72 0.09 0.30 -0.85 0.54 0.87 -0.87
Food 0. 64 0.48 -0.39 0.20 0.91 -0.88 0.78 0.83 -0.88
Beverages--1.00 -1. 00 -1.00 -0.90 -0.70 0.30-■0.80 0.70 -0.20
Tobacco 0.96 -0. 64 -0. 68 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.70 1.00 -0.60
Textile --0. 67 -0.35 0. 66 0. 01 -0.28 0.27 0.23 0.21 0.20
Wearing
Apparel
Leather
0.80 
0. 95
0.46
0.02
0.60
-0.77
-0.70
-0.20
-0.80 0.81 
0.38 0.69
0.88 
0. 00
0.71 0.42 
1.00 -0.43
Footwear 0.80 0.30 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1. 00 0.40 1.00
Ginning --0.82 -0.77 -0.37 -0.94 -0.74-0.03 -0.43 -0.98-0.66
Furniture--0.62 -0.40 -1. 00 0.40 0.60 0.00 -0.80 0.80 0.40
Paper 0.40 0.50 0. 00 -0.60 1.00-1.00 0.54 0.65 0.14
Printing 0.77 0.97 -0.64 0.15 0.61-0.17 0.57 0.78-0.60
Drugs 0. 68 0.97 -0. 64 0.86 0.90-0.39 0.78 0.92-0.92
Chemicals 1.00 0.82 0.48 0.75 0.81-0.85 0.70 0.92-0.10
Other
Chemicals
Rubber
0.50 
0.14
0.83
0.37
0.48
0.60
0.43 
-1. 00
0.94-0.02 
0.43 0.13
0.71
0.08
1.00-0.78
0.82-0.49
Plastic 0.00 0. 80 0. 00 0.77 0.77-0.28 -0. 09 0.71-0.66
Pottery - - _ 0.80 1.00-0.80 1.00 0.70-0.60
Glass 0.39 0.72 0. 25 -0.10 0.70-0.10 0.60 0.77-0.49
Non Metal 0.62 0.73 
lie Mineral Prod 
Iron & 0.64 0.82 
Steel
FabricatedO.83 0.66 
Metal
Machinery-0.08 0.54
0.74 
0.03 
0. 03 
0.88
0.52 
0.54 
0. 66 
0. 74
0.76-0.54 
0.97 0.21 
0.95 0.18 
0.35 0.91
0.66 
0.92 
0. 77 
0.82
0.82-0.79 
0.94-0.67 
0.94-0.32 
0.75-0.55
2 5 4
Electric 0.86 
Machinery 
Transport 0.93
Science -0.90
0.96 0.53 0
0.89 0.54 0
0.50 -0.25 -0
63 0.97 0.18
78 0.93 0.50
90 0.93 0.75
0.53 0.80-0.27 
0.71 0.96 0.68
0.20 0.90 0.60
Source : Calculated from Census of Manufacturing
Industries 1970- 84 Statistics Division, Federal 
Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, 
Karachi, Islamabad.
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large * establishments.
6.3 Factor Productivity and Size:
From the previous sub-section it is learned that in general 
large* size establishments have higher capital cost and 
large^wage bill. It is therefore of interest to investigate 
the use of capital and labour force in the production of 
industrial output, first in the aggregate sense and then in 
individual industries. For this purpose labour and capital 
productivity is measured by the ratios of value added to 
labour and value added to capital for all industries and 
a sample of twenty five industries. And the direction of 
association between size, examined value added per unit of 
labour and capital is examined. Besides the measure of size 
used in the previous sub-sections another measure of size 
is also used where size is defined as the share of each 
industry in the total sample value added using only 1984 
data.
The hypothesis tested in this sub-section is that the 
direction of association between size and labour 
productivity is positive. Where as according to 
x-inefficiency hypothesis it is expected that size and 
capital productivity are negatively related.
Value added/labour; value added^capital and capitay 
labour ratios are calculated for all industries and 
selected industries across various size groups. But only 
the rank correlation coefficients are reported. Taking the 
all industries case, values of the rank correlation
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coefficient between labour productivity and size are 
mentioned in Table 6.7. The hypothesis that size and 
productivity are positively related is not confirmed for 
1970 and 1978, as indicated by the rank correlation 
coefficient which is almost zero for 1970 and negative but 
insignificant for 1978. However the hypothesis is accepted 
for 1984 at 10 percent significance level. Rank correlation 
coefficient between size and ratio of value added to 
capital are also reported in the same Table. The evidence 
does not support the hypothesized relationship. It is 
positive for 1970 and 1978 and negative but weak for 1984. 
Table 6.8 provides evidence regarding labour and capital 
productivity in relation to size across a sample of 
selected industries. It is observed that the hypothesis of 
positive association between size and labour productivity 
is supported in most of the cases, however, the rank 
correlation coefficients are significant at 5 and 10 percent 
level of significance only for 18 industries. Column 4-6 
record? the rank correlation coefficient between size and 
the ratio of value added to capital. The hypothesized 
negative association is not confirmed in most cases. Out of 
a total of 24 industries only 7 show negative association 
at 2.5 and 10 percent level of significance.1/.
1. In a study; for India, Sandesra [1960] undertakes a similar 
exercise by testing the relationship between (i) 
productivity of labour and capital and size (ii) technology 
and productivity of labour and capital and other variables. 
He finds that productivity of labour is high in large size 
establishments, whereas it is not so in case ofj[ 
productivity of labour and technology was conflicting and 
the data did not support the hypothesized positive 
relationship.
However he finds a negative relationship between 
productivity of capital and technology. Generally his
Xproductivity of capital.The evidence for the relationship 
between
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Table-6.7: Rank Correlation Coefficient Between
Productivity And Size, Productivity And 
Technology.
All Industries 1970-84
Rank
1970
Correlation Coefficient 
1978 1984
V/L and size 0.05
V/K and size 0.19
V/L and K/L 0.50
- 0.11 
0.31 
0. 09
0.50 
-0. 37 
0.40
Source: Calculated From Census of Manufacturing Industries 
1970-71,1978-79,1984-85. Statistics Division; 
Government of Pakistan.
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Table 6.8: Rank Correlation Coefficient Between Labour, 
Capital Productivity and Size for Selected 
Industries(1970-84)
Rank Correlation Coefficients 
V/L and size V/K and size
Industry 197 0 1978
All Industries 0. 05 -0.11
Food 0.38 0.43
Beverage 0.50 0.90
Tobacco 0.75 1.0
Textile 0 . 11 -0.54
Wearing Apparel 0.80 0.0
Leather 0.70 -0.14
Footwear 0.40 -1.0
Ginning -0. 60 -0.83
Furniture 0.30 0.20
Paper 0.70 0.80
Printing 0.0 0.61
Drugs 0.85 0.75
Chemicals 0. 60 0.78
Other Chemicals 0.66 0.43
Rubber 0. 89 0.42
Plastic 0.90 0.54
Pottery - -
Glass 0. 02 -0.10
Non-Metal1ic 0.70 0.94
Iron and Steel 0.10 0.58
Fabricated Metal 0.89 0.18
Machinery 0.83 0.92
Electrical Goods 0.68 0. 60
Transport 0.71 -0.28
Science 0.40 -0.70
Instruments
1984 1970 1978 1984
0.50 0.19 0.31 1 o OJ o
0.78 0.21 0.48 0.38
0.70 0.50 0.90 1.0
0.70 0.36 1.0 0. 60
0.35 0.72 0. 01 -0. 69
0.05 -0.12 0.30 0.54
0. 60 -0.08 -0.14 0.34
0.40 0.20 0. 50 -1.0
-0.88 -0.30 -0.05 0.43
0.80 -0.60 -0.40 -0.40
0.76 0.40 0.80 -0. 60
0.03 0.77 0.84 -0.57
0.92 0. 92 0.86 0.50
0.59 0 . 60 0.21 0.21
0.94 0.11 0.94 0.89
0.83 0.14 0.45 0. 65
0.77 0.20 0.26 0. 37
0.77 0.20 -0.50 -0.11
0.83 0.23 0.83 0.12
0.54 -0.57 -0.25 -0. 07
0.83 0.02 0.77 -0.14
0.86 0.89 -0.40 -0.70
0.14 0.30 -0.16 -0.64
0. 61 0.25 -0.59 -0.17
0.10 0.30 -0.20 -0.80
Source: Calculated from Census of Manufacturing Industries 
1970-71,1978-79,1984-85. Statistics Division; Government of 
Pakistan.
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At this stage the three sets of results at hand provide 
an interesting comparison of the significance of our three 
key variables, average profits, cost and labour 
productivity in relation to size across 25 industries 
grouped according to employment. Such a comparison helps in 
drawing approximate inferences about the performance of 
the manufacturing sector. Table 6.9 records the comparison 
of the three sets of results and manifest that both monopoly 
power and efficiency are at work which enable large firms 
to earn higher profits. This suggest that higher profits 
may not always stem from lower cost of production. In a
results do not indicate that size and technology determine 
the productivity of labour and capital.
Lydall [1960] believe that only efficient and promising 
small size enterprises have an important role to play in 
the Indian Economic Development. To test the hypothesis he 
calculates output-capital ratio in small and large 
factories. Statistical evidence confirm that very small 
firms have a more favourable output capital ratio, which 
is disturbing for the author. He also calculates wages per 
employee in different sizes of factories in four countries, 
India, Japan, U.K and U.S.A and find that average payment 
is less in small than in large firms.
Another Indian author Banerji [1978] examine the hypothesis 
that small scale units of production have a greater 
potential for faster growth of production and that the 
gains of such growth ensure better distribution. She finds 
that the basic assumptions on which these hypothesis are 
based and their consistency with the Indian situation are 
not true. Her findings do not support the argument that 
small size units are better or have faster growth 
and that the gains of fast growth are better distributed. 
For Japanese manufacturing industries Ishikawa [1979]
reports that 1 technologies chosen in the smaller size
groups were characterized by lower capital labour ratios 
and lower labour productivities than those in the large 
size groups, and side by side with it the wages of labour 
available to the smaller size groups were lower than those 
for the larger size groups while the reverse was true for 
the prices of capital equipment; (p.108). In contrast, he 
finds that wage rates and productivities are uniform 
across all size groups in U.S.A and the case of India 
appear to be similar to Japan.
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Table-6.9: Comparison of Rank correlation Coefficients
Between Selected Variables And Size Across 
Selected Industries (1984-85)
Rank Correlation Coefficients
Industry Profits TC K/L W/L K/V VA/L
Food 0.83 -0.81 0.78 0.83 -0.88 0. 78
Beverage 1.0 -0. 51 -0. 80 0.20 -0.20 0.70
Tobacco 0.79 -1.0 0.70 1.0 -0. 60 0.70
Textile 0.69 0.30 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.35
Wearing Apparel -0.88 0.94 0.88 0.71 0.42 0. 05
Leather 0.74 -0.44 0.0 1.0 -0.43 0. 65
Footwear 0.80 1.0 1.0 0.40 1.0 0.40
Ginning 0.38 -0.83 -0.43 -0. 95 0 . 66 -0.88
Furniture 0.16 1.0 -0.80 -0.80 0.40 0.80
Paper -1.0 0.31 0.54 0. 65 0. 14 0.76
Printing 0.82 0.57 0.57 0.78 -0.60 0.03
Drugs 0.82 -0.89 0.78 0.92 -0.92 0.92
Chemicals -0.48 0.32 0.70 0.92 -0.10 0.59
Other Chemicals 0.92 -0.77 0.71 1.0 -0.78 0.97
Rubber 0.71 -0.37 0. 08 0.82 -0.48 0.83
Plastic 0.49 -0.77 -0.09 0.71 —0 .66 0.77
Pottery 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.70 0. 60 -
Glass -0.14 -0.43 0. 60 0.77 0.49 .77
Non-Metallic 0.74 -0.60 0.66 0. 82 -0.79 0.83
Iron and Steel -0. 07 0. 07 0.92 0. 94 -0. 67 0.54
Fabricated Metal 0. 09 -0.71 0.77 0.94 -0.32 0.83
Machines 0.29 0.07 0.82 0.75 -0.55 0.86
Electrical Goods 0.04 0. 64 0. 53 0.80 -0.27 0. 14
Transport -0. 65 0. 68 0.71 0.96 0. 68 0. 61
Scientific -0.80 0.60 0.20 0.90 0.60 0.10
Instruments
E: Efficient, IE : Inefficient, M: Monopoly. 
Source: Derived from Tables 6.3, 6.5, 6.6 and 6.8.
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number of cases like leather, footwear, printing, pottery 
etc it is noted that the rank correlation coefficient 
between profits, total cost and its components, labour 
productivity and size is mainly positive and also 
significant, which indicates that the force of monopoly is 
at work enabling large firms to earn higher profits despite 
higher costs of production. In contrast large firms in food, 
beverages, tobacco, drugs, other chemicals and non-metallic 
industries experience higher profits but lower costs. For 
such cases our results are sympathetic towards the 
efficiency hypothesis. A third feature of the data 
contained in Table 6.9 is that large firms also experience 
losses due to higher costs in an over all sense and also 
regarding different components of costs. Some, such 
examples are paper, glass, iron and steel, electrical 
machinery, transport and scientific instruments. Their 
inefficiency may arise from the use of inappropriate 
technology in terms of obsolete or advanced technology 
which in most cases result in lower productivity or ^ higher 
costs of capital and labour.
Employing our second measure of size that is the share 
of a sample of 35 industries in total sample output, 
ratios of value added to labour and capital are calculated 
for individual industries using only 1984 data: These
ratios are compared to the sample averages of the two 
ratios to identify the relatively more efficient industries 
in their use of labour and capital resources from the least 
efficient. And to relate these industries with size, 
concentration and cost. Industries showing values 100
262
percent greater than^ample average may be taken as an 
indication of their relative efficiency. Table 6.10 report 
the six industries which showed value added per unit of 
labour more than 100 percent of the sample average value 
of 91 given in the last row of the Table. One would expect 
that workers in heavy capital using industries produce 
value added significantly greater than the sample averages. 
For example normally cement and fertilizer industries 
should be among the leaders it is some what surprising to 
see cigarette and paint manufactures in the top few.
Table 6.11 compares the value added assets ratio of 
selected industries to the average for the total sample 
average which is 1.67 as mentioned in the last row of the 
Table. Once again using the 100 percent as the criteria 
for efficiency some 7 industries are included.2/. Except 
for fertilizers, all other industries on the list in Table
6.10 are included in Table 6.11 as well. For fertilizer it 
would be suggested that while it uses labour to advantage^ it 
does less well with its capital, though it is reported as 
the industry with the highest capacity utilization.3/. It 
may be reported that industries reported in Table 6.10, 
and 6.11 are quite concentrated industries, as^few large 
firms produce the total market output. However, the 
relative size of these large firms may not be large in a 
general senseAwell. Table 6.12 compares the ranking between
2. Except for cement and hydrogenated oil rest of the 
industries have fairly low capital-labour ratios.
3. Table 6.10, 6.11, 6.13 and 6.14 also report the percentage
of capacity utilized by each of the industries mentioned 
in the Table.
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Table-6.10: Value Added Per Worker As Percentage of 
Sample Average of 3 6 Industries (1984)
Efficient Industries (VA/L 100% of Sample Average)
Industries Value Rank CU CR/4 (198-
Tobacco 479 1 62 61
Cement 323 2 95 54
Paints 258 3 58 -
Fertilizers 253 4 112 66
Beverages 202 5 - 13
Hydrogenated Oill93 6 68 -
Sample Average: 91
CU : Capacity utilization, is defined as
CU = a /t= (actual hours per year of plant operation)xlOO
8760
=actual time utilization over potential time.
CR : Four Firm Concentration Ratio
Source: 1. Calculated from census of Manufacturing 
Industries 1984-85. Statistics Division, 
Government of Pakistan.
2. "Capacity Utilization in Pakistan's
Manufacturing Sector"; Robert Nathan and
Associates and United Consultants (PVT) LTD March 
1987 .
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Table-6.11: Value Added to Fixed Assets Ratio As a
Percentage of Sample Average of 3 6 Industries 
(1984-85)
Efficient Industries (VA/K 100% of Sample Average)
Industry Value Rank CU CR/4(198
Cigarettes 5.9 1 62 61
Beverages 4.3 2 - 13
Cement 4.15 3 95 54
Hydrogenated Oil 3.1 4 68 -
Paints 2.9 5 58 -
Tyres 2.7 6 63 66
Batteries 2.2 7 68
Sample Average: 1.67
Source: 1. Calculated from Census of Manufacturing 
Industries 1984-85 Statistics Division, 
Government of Pakistan.
2. Capacity Utilization in Pakistan's Manufacturing 
Sector, Robert N, Associates, and United 
Consultants (PVT) LTD, March (1987).
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most efficient industries with respect to their size and 
concentration ratio. The figures show where each industry 
is placed with respect to size within the sample. For 
example paints and varnishes etc which is number 2 in Table
6.10 an 5 in 6.11 is ranked 21 in value added (VA) out of 
the 3 6 industries, only 3 3 in the number of workers 
employed and in the Rupee value of its assets. Yet it is 
ranked among the relatively very efficient industries. By 
contrast, the manufacture of cigarettes is placed on top in 
Table 6.10 and 6.11 is ranked as the largest contributor in 
the sample value added, it is the 8th largest employer,it 
has also the 8th ranked volume of fixed assets. Inspite of 
its largest size and the fact that it has relatively fewer 
assets per worker, its use of capital and labour is highly 
efficient. Furthermore, except for vegetable oil, 
fertilizers and cement industries which are public 
enterprisesJ^rest of the industries reported in Table 6.10 
and 6.11 belong to the private sector. One reason why 
cement and fertilizer industries have high value added per 
labour and capital is that they work at almost full 
capacities, due to market disequilibrium, and investment 
sanctioning policies which discourage excess capacity.4/.
Industries like tyres and batteries are more 
competitive as they face tough competition from foreign 
products. Paints on the other hand is doing well because
The column reporting capacity utilisation rates shows that 
fertilizer and cement industries are already working at 
full capacity, however,it is suggested that industries 
like cigarette, paints, hydrogenated oil, tyres, and 
batteries can attain even higher productivity per labour 
and capital if they produce at full capacity which they 
are not doing currently.
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cement and paints are to some extent complimentary goods 
(particularly in the construction of houses and plazas). 
Therefore,auboost to the cement industry indirectly lead to 
increased demand for paints as well.
Analysing the capital and operating costs of these 
industries it is noted that cement, fertilizer, tobacco, 
paints and beverage industries depend on local technology 
and equipment and their repair or replacement costs are 
relatively low. Similarly except for fertilizers, 
hydrogenated oil, batteries and tyres fa rest of the 
industries utilize locally produced raw material. High costs 
for large import content of raw material in
these industries might have been compensated for by low 
electricity and fuel changes and other factors (except in 
case of hydrogenated oil, whereAfuel and electricity bill 
is relatively high).
In general these results tend to be similar to those 
reported in Table 6.9 where food includes hydrogenated 
oil,beverages, tobacco, drugs, other chemicals (include 
paints) and non-metallic mineral products (which include 
cement manufacture) were also outlined as efficient 
industries.
Results report«fin Table 6.13 and 6.14 are a repetition 
of the above exercise in an effort to identify the least 
efficient industries in the sample. The cut off point was 
50 percent of sample average. Table 6.13 indicates that 
tftcycles industry is the lowest in the sample, although a 
total of industries qualified. It is followed very closely 
by glass, textile machinery, spinning and weaving and
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Table 6.12: Ranking of 8 Leading Industries in Sample
Value Added (VA) Employment (E) and Fixed Assets (K) 1984.
% of total
Industry VA E K CR NOE
Hydrogenated oil 5 6 10 - 35
Beverages 10 18 17 13 42
Cigarettes 1 8 8 61 20
Fertilizers 7 15 4 66 8
Paints 4 33 33 - 25
Tyres & Tubes 29 30 34 66 8
Cement 4 11 5 54 11
Batteries 30 28 29 - 11
NOE = Number of establishments.
Source : Derived from Census of Manufacturing Industries, 
Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistics 
Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad. 
(1984-85).
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Table-6.13: Value Addded Per Worker Ratio 
As Percentage ofsample Average 
of 36 Industries (1984)
Inefficient Industries (VA/L 50% of Sample Average or Less)
Industry Value Rank CU CR/4 1984
Spinning Weaving of Wool 48 1 55 -
Iron and Steel 46 2 53 61
Spinning Weaving of Silk 45 3 - -
Ship Building 38 4 - 100
Spinning Weaving Cotton 34 5 55 -
Spinning Weaving of Jute 32 6 79 -
Textile Machinery 30 7 63 -
Glass 27 8 73 49
Cycles 26 9 79 —
Sample Average: 91
Source: 1) Calculated from Census of Manufacturing
Industries 1984-85. Statistics Division. Government 
of Pakistan.
2) Capacity Utilization in Pakistan's Manufacturing 
Sector, Robert.N, Associates and United Consul­
tants (PVT) LTD, March (1987) .
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Table-6.14: Value-Added Assets Ratio As Percentage
of Sample Average of Industries (1984).
Inefficient Industries (50% of Sample Averages Or Less)
Industry Value Rank CU CR/4 (19!
Motor Vehicles 0.78 1 75 -
Tea 0.76 2 - 100
Carpets 0. 67 3 58 -
Iron and Steel 0.65 4 53 61
Petroleum 0.26 5 _ 100
Sample average: 16
Source: 1) Calculated from Census of Manufacturing 
Industries 1984-85 Statistics Division's 
Government of Pakistan.
2) Capacity Utilization And Pakistan Manufacturing 
Sector, Robert. N. , Associates and United Consul 
tants (PVT) LTD March (1987).
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finishing of jute, cotton, silk and wool. Except for ship 
building and iron and steel they are all fairly labour 
intensive industries. As mentioned earliei^ productivity in tlx. 
textile industry was low because of increase in labour and 
raw material cost and * imposition ofq>) other restriction 
which did not ensure increase in productivity.5/. In case 
of other industries either their cost of the imported raw 
materials is high, or their fuel, electricity and repair 
changes are high. Table 6.14 reports the value added 
assets ratio comparison, only 5 industries qualify. In the 
list of least efficient industries iron and steel and 
petroleum refining are placed as lowest followed by tea and 
motor vehicles. Except for tea they are dependent on both 
imported technology and raw material. The fuel and 
electricity bill of petroleum>and iron and steel refining> 
is also *. high. It may be noted that most of
the industries mentioned in Table 6.13 and 6.14 have 
excess capacity which means that their efficiencies can be 
improved if they utilize their capacity fully or if 
required modernize production.
It may further be added that large investment has been 
made in iron and steel and petroleum refining and the large 
effect of investment way. be realized in the form of 
increased output in the years to come. It is again noted 
that industries showing lowest value added-labour and
5. Annex l.B shows that out of a total of 223 textile mills,
89 (or 40 percent) were out of production at the end of 
1986. These mills have been closed for years due to 
financial problems in the industry. Many of these would 
require complete replacement of plant, and equipment to 
resume, as their assets have deteriorated to the point of 
only scrap value.
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value-added assets ratios are among the most concentrated 
industries like iron and steel, ship building,'^petroleum 
refining textiles. Table 6.15 compares the size,
inefficiency and concentration, again contrasts appear ."7^, 
tycle industry is one of the smallest sectors in terms of 
value added, employment and fixed assets yet the least 
efficient.Conversely iron and steel and spinning; wearing 
and finishing of textiles are among the very largest 
industries. Iron and steel is largest in assets, third 
largest employer, sixth in value added and spinning 
weaving and finishing of cotton is the largest employers, 
third in assets and in sample value-added yet they are the 
least efficient industries .Furthermore inefficiency may 
exist in both the private and public sector industries. For 
example , glass, iron and steel, petroleum refining, 
textile machinery, ship building industries are owned by 
the public sector whereas the rest of the industries 
mentioned in Table 6.15 belong to the private sector. 
Summary:
From the above results we may conclude that both the 
forces of monopoly and efficiency determine the performance 
of the manufacturing industries. And except for efficient 
industries it cannot be generalized thatAcost of all large 
size establishments is relatively lower. The monopoly firms 
may manage to earn higher profits perhaps due to higher 
prices. Besides that a third group of large size 
establishments exist which are inefficient and have least 
profits. We may add that capital or labour intensity or 
size and concentrated structure of an industry may not
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Table-6.15: Ranking of 13 Lowest Industries In Terms of
Their Share In Manufacturing Value Added (VA) 
Employment (E) And Fixed Assets (R) 1984.
% of Total. Sample Value
Industry VA E K CR NOE
Tea 16 24 29 - 4
Spinning Weaving Cotton 3 1 3 - 166
Spinning Weaving Silk 8 10 15 - 207
Spinning Weaving Wool 20 14 14 - 51
Spinning Weaving Jute 15 5 16 - 8
Carpets 33 26 19 - 26
Glass 24 20 20 49 30
Iron and Steel 6 3 1 61 184
Petroleum 13 17 5 100 3
Textile Machinery 36 34 35 - 25
Motor Vehicles 11 12 8 - 45
Ship building 32 19 28 100 4
Cycles 35 23 32 — 17
Source: Derived from Census of Manufacturing Industries
1984-85. Statistics Division, Government of Pakistan.
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always indicate efficiency and inefficiency. In fact our 
results do not support such^hypothesis of efficiency. It is 
observed that a mix of capital/labour intensive, 
large/small size, concentrated/unconcentrated and 
privately/publicly owned industries are listed among both 
the efficient and inefficient industries. This suggeststhat 
besides technology, size, and structure other forces may 
also be exerting their influence on^efficiency/inefficiency 
of the manufacturing sector. These forces may be systematic 
or random like government regulatory policies, both 
economic and political uncertainty, internal/external 
shocks that AfH&t specific industries and the system in 
general receives. Of course, the importance
of these forces may vary from case to case.
Thus it is suggested that small size may not oJcooms 
btbeautiful, ' ' 5 neither can large
size be considered tofrxt^ . in vYftue,-
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The central task at hand was to first measure the extent of 
market power in Pakistan manufacturing industry and enquire
to establish the relationship between structure and
also mad£-A. to cover a few related topics
Although it was convenient to start with estimating
bJk
simple average relationships as we have done, butA on 
economic grounds, and in practice, matters are more complex. 
Keeping in view all such problems we extendedour analysis to 
the measurement of proportionate changes in concentration 
and performance and their determinants. Still some caution 
is warranted in the interpretation of results about market 
power, measured through concentration ratios, the direction 
of association between structure and performance and the 
effects of market power on profits. Such studies suffer 
from several shortcomings and need to take account of the 
fact that concentration ratios are influenced by market 
size, openness of the economy, changing economic 
environment (particularly due to government regulatory
what determines market concentration. And secondly
performance  as suggested by the ^structure
. . .performance classificatory scheme. In addition
conduct
we
Soma- attempt
resulting impact on entrepreneurial
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decision making. Second, ^  limitation of the 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm is that even if the 
researcher is able to detect a strong relationship between 
structure and performance it is not clear whether^ high
e>L
profits are the result of monopoly practices or^superior 
efficiency i.e efficient management and low cost per unit 
of output. This ambiguity in the results haunts most policy 
makers whether to encourage or discourage large size 
establishments. To clarify the ambiguity it is suggested by 
writers that even if high profits are e W  fo low
operational cost^ it may be of little use if reduced costs 
are not passed on to the consumers in the form of reduced 
prices hence the welfare implications of a concentrated 
structure are clear. However, our contention is that in the 
seventies domestic producers were encountered with world 
wide inflationary reassures, increase in oil and raw 
material prices, increases in labour cost and investment 
sanction policies, thus limiting the chances-/or a/? absolute 
reduction in domestic prices. Moreover in a regime of price 
controls and competition from goods entrepreneurs
have little control over price determination to influence 
profits. Third, more recently the criticism is made that 
the structure conduct performance paradigm suggests one way 
causation between structure and performance, it undermines 
the probability of a joint determination of structure and 
performance by some third outside factor. If that is so, 
inferences based on ordinary least square estimates become 
invalid. Fourth, the structure-performance paradigm is a 
static model which establish^ relationships between market
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£on<Jiji'Sr^ and performance for one point of time. It fails to 
consider the problem from a dynamic perspective. Hence 
inferences drawn on the basis of a static approach may be 
weak and invalid for other points of time.
Given the above cautions and pitfalls related to the 
study of structure and performance we set out to address 
the following issues:
1. What is the distribution of firmsA size and type of
ownership?
2. Is the structure of Pakistan manufacturing
and
concentrated, has concentration increased over time, both 
.m Aaggregate and disaggregated manner?
3. What is the average size of an establishment? Is it
approximately equal to the international standards of 
average size?
4. What determines the level and changes in 
concentration?
5. Does structure affect profit/performance, if so, how
strong is the association between concentration and 
performance?
6. Is high profit a result of monopoly practices or 
superior efficiency?
The importance of undertaking this exercise is that studies 
in the past examined the structure-performance relationship 
from a static point of view ftr\cJ toe-re. tkus, limited in nature 
and scope. Earlier authors suggest that the structure of 
Pakistan industry is concentrated and that large firms 
earn above normal profits because they had access to 
investment licenses, credit and other facilities which
21\
their rival producers had difficulty in achieving. However, 
they failed to leave any room for the influence of changes 
taking place over time. The nature of data available to us 
in published and other sources mainly determined our 
approach in analysing the above stated queries. It is noted 
that our results differ from the previous writers for 
several reasons. Nevertheless, it was not easy to match our 
findings with the previous studies and the interpretation 
of the results is not so straightforward.
Main findings of our enquiry are that althougti^general
the manufacturing sector is concentrated, there is a
tendency of increase in market power of some while decline
in market share of others over time. But the plant sizes
tend to be smaller relative to international standards of
optimum scale of production because of the use of older
technology with lower m.e.s. And the informal sector mainly
uses local technology with even smaller m.e.s. However, it 
■ TU* ■ »
is noted that same industries have a concentrated market 
structure in both developed and less developed countries; 
which indicates that similar factors are responsible for
, , «v> , , ,
establishing ^ oligopolistic market structure irrespective of 
the level of economic development of a country.
In the next exercise attention was focused on the 
factors responsible for a concentrated market structure. 
It is argued that a large part of concentration is a 
direct result of dependence on foreign technology. And in 
this respect government policies regarding factor pricing, 
tariffs, foreign exchange regulations, and bank lending 
have an important bearing on the choice of technology in
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the private sector in the sixties. These policies were 
directly instrumental in shaping the structure of 
industry. However our results do not lend support to the 
belief that concentration is an inevitable result of 
technological need for larger plants, and the above 
argument cannot beA forward; with equal force -fay 
all industries* it may be more important in one industry 
and less in others. In the following years attempts were 
made through government regulatory policies to reduce 
Pakistan industry's dependence on imported technology and 
raw material.?. £u£ there has been little change in the 
overall structure of industry, perhaps because of the 
changes in the economic and political environment both 
internally and externally which led to changes in 
investment decisions of the entrepreneurial class. For 
example, governments decision to nationalize and the manner 
in which it was carried out had^lasting negative impact on 
both domestic and foreign private investment; so much so 
that even in the eighties government could not regain the 
confidence of the investors at home and aboard. Other 
policies like investment sanctions, withdrawal of 
concessions, increase in labour cost etc, also contributed 
to the entrepreneurs, preference for^quiet life. In other 
words unpredictability and inconsistencies in policies of 
the three regimes led to strong reactions by the 
entrepreneurs. Another factor responsible for the 
postponement of new investment in manufacturing 
was political instability A internally and on the
bo. rders .
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Whether the policies of the government were consistent with 
the industrial strategies and whether these policies 
pursued since independence are consistent and compatible 
with many of the government's stated objectives for 
national economic development are questions open to 
extensive criticism. The use of capital and import 
intensive technology in some areas of production has 
probably caused a serious waste of scare capital and 
foreign exchange. As a result, it is likely that the rate 
of growth of industrial employment and output and therefore 
national income is less than what it would have been if 
the policies actually pursued by the government had more 
closely resembled its objectives regarding the achievement 
of national economic development.
Furthermore our results suggest that not only the 
importance of the explanatory variables changes but new 
variables may also emerge as significant determinants of 
concentration overtime.
The more important point of the thesis was to assess the 
influence of concentration on profits and productivity 
ofjl^bpur! and capital. The main question dealt with was 
whether there exists a relation between structure and 
economic performance, if so, then what is the effect of 
proportionate changes in concentration on increases in
AW-
profits? And how farAthe two results . consistent? In the 
first test of levels of concentration on levels of profits 
we were unable to derive orthodox results like previous 
studies suggesting that structure is an important variable 
in influencing performance. Our results manifest that the
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relationship between concentration and profits has declined 
over time. Variables exerting significant influence on 
profits are capital / labour ratios, price controls and 
ownership pattern. The rest of the _ variables
have poor explanatory power. For proportionate changes, the 
results indicate that changes in concentration has limited 
positive influence on changes in profits and the 
explanatory power is poor.
Besides econometric and statistical reasons our 
explanation for differences of results, when compared with 
earlier writers is first,the importance of variables in 
explaining performance of industry may vary over time. For 
example, in the sixties concentration combined with 
effective protection and favourable economic environment 
created by the government policies ensured high profits. 
The oligopolists used their power to set prices such as to 
ensure a given rate of return. The price policy remained 
insensitive to cost and changing conditions of cost 
experienced through access to technology and credit 
facilities. Thus the scene was all set for oligopolists to 
earn above normal profits. Second, our results show that 
concentration afo>ie does not explain the performance of the 
manufacturing sector in terms of profits, which suggests 
that concentration is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition to ensure high profits. Since 1970 the structure 
of industry has remained as concentrated as before but the 
relationship between structure and performance is weak 
possibly because the conditions favouring oligopolist to 
earn high prof its, Swcfv economic and political environment^
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changed. As a result capital and operational costs 
increased, price controls and smuggling together
undermined the importance of A x  structure
performance relationship. Under such circumstances it is 
difficult to assert that structure exerts^strong influence 
on performance when profit itself cannot be taken as a 
satisfactory measure of performance.
The effect o:^  concentration bn labour and capital 
productivity was also tested. And it tOas found that 
concentration exerts^weak positive influence on labour 
productivity and . is negatively associated with capital 
productivity. Generally it appears that large size 
establishments are efficient in the use oflabour fcut not so 
in case of capital.
Our task attempt was to separate the influence of 
monopoly practices from superior efficiency on profits 
followed by medium size enterprises. This may be so 
because of the cost advantage that the small units enjoy. 
They use local technology and raw material, they do not 
come under labour and taxation laws. On the other hand 
cost per unit of output is high in large size 
establishments mainly because of their dependence on 
imported technology and raw material, and increases in 
labour cost over time. Along with thes^.price control left 
little room for these entrepreneurs to pass increased cost 
per unit to consumers in the form of increase in prices or/o 
use monopoly practices to earn above normal profits.
However our results hide differencesin performance so 
far as individual industries are concerned. A more
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disaggregated view of the data reveal that the strength of
association between size and economic characteristics like
profits, cost and value added etc may vary from industry to
/JCl
industry. This suggests that the relevance of A structure 
performance model may vary from case to case and it cannot 
be generalized that all large, „ or all small
establishments are virtuous. In fact the data manifest that 
a mix of large and small size establishments are listed 
among both efficient and inefficient industries, which 
suggests that the manufacturing sector has both an element 
of monopoly/oligopolistic power and superior efficiency.
Our overall view in the aggregate sense is 
that in the earlier period of development, oligopoly market 
power has structural and technological origins and specific 
trade policies were designed to buttress oligopolistic 
market power. Technological d i s cont inuit ies led to 
insensitivity of prices to cost reductions which were 
translated into higher profits and ultimately economic and 
social inequalities. These increases in profits above normal 
level were partially reinvested. However, in the process it 
was not realized that if the benefits of reduced cost were 
passed on as increases in wages it would have been a lesser 
evil than an increase in profits because the labourers' 
propensity to consume is much higher than the 
entrepreneurs. When wages rise the danger of stagnation or 
disequilibrium is less, but it is high when profits rise, 
particularly when a large part of the profits is spent on 
the consumption of imported luxuries. Afterwards, 
government intervention designed to control^market power of
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the oligopolistic group and to modify its consequences was 
prescribed. Tight regulatory policies, price controls and 
strong trade unions and a couple of external factors, the 
labour, capital and raw material costs which altogether 
increased, were translated into a substantial decline in 
private investment. Thus the structure remained as 
concentrated as before and the growthAmanufacturing income 
and the absorption of unemployment either did not take 
place or happened more slowly and within narrow limits. It 
would therefore be an illusion to place so much hope on 
policies of this nature. Particularly when government 
intervention policies provoke entrepreneurs' reaction in 
the form of decline in investment and shift from industry 
to trade and commerce. Furthermore, policies aimed at 
reducing market powerA has structural and technological 
origins, ~ are of limited value. Thus our policy
recommendations must reflect at least two realities,the
- - •)
planning authorities need to\ first 1 relate the industrial 
developmentstrategy with the resource endowment of the 
country,i.e increasing labour force and scarce capital and 
foreign exchange. (Second,I bring and maintain consistency in 
industrial development strategy over time and with national 
objectives regarding economic development. Any deviations 
of one from the other may aggravate the situation and lead 
to serious economic inefficiencies and loss of national 
output and capital. In this respect clarity regarding the 
choice of technology is urgently required, a) If the 
government wants to avoid renewed pressures of cost and a 
shift towards labour displacing technology, it will have to
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/"  >
ease the pressure of increase in real wages / b)jlt is often 
suggested that large size leads to a concentrated structure 
and X-inefficiency in the use of resources therefore, small 
size is better. However, White [1979] warn&Jthe reader,
11......Appropriate technology is currently a fashionable
topic of research and interest. There is, though, a serious 
risk. Appropriate technology is sometimes suggested as a 
quick and easy way of raising LDCs1 incomes to developed 
country levels. Five or ten years from now, after some 
(but not all) measures to encourage appropriate technology 
have been taken, many current enthusiasts will look around 
and notice most of the people in LDCs are still very poor 
by developed country standards. They may then decide that 
appropriate technology was a fraud and will search for some 
other quick and easy solution. This, would be unfortunate.
 But appropriate technology can mean an improvement in
the allocation of resources in LDCs, Perhaps a slightly 
higher growth rate, a better distribution of capital 
resources across the economy and probably a slightly more 
equitable internal distribution of income, and more and 
better employment opportunities. The game should not be 
oversold, but it is definitely worth the candle. [ 
p.329-330].
Keeping in view the above statements it may be stated 
that if both small and large are so risky and virtueless 
then it would be worthwhile to adopt policies favouring
o~n K/l i'jpc i
medium size establishmentsA and vertically integrate the 
small size with the medium size units of production so 
that both labour and capital are utilized efficiently and
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distribution of income is fair.And the government 
regulatory and investment policies do not have to be biased 
in favour of the large scale industry only.
So far as consistency in government policies is 
concerned it should help create a more predictable and 
conducive environment for entrepreneurs' decision making. 
As noted in the earlier chapters the inconsistency, 
unexpected and random policy decisions to alter ownership 
patterns, prices of inputs and outputs, and concessionary 
policies regarding foreign exchange and taxes etc led to 
unforseen financial problems and frightened , 
entrepreneurs A from making new investments. It must be 
remembered that if such inconsistency prevails then the 
system may evolve towards a more concentrated structure 
because it is the highly prosperous and well- connected 
firms that generally have the internal and external 
resources to enable them to financially adjust to these
iu,
unforseen financial problems. Finally it would ^ worthwhile 
if efforts ocre made to increase production efficiencies so 
that the competitive position of producers in the domestic 
and export markets improve; among other benefits this will 
discourage smuggling and reduce the demand for imports and 
hence foreign exchange.
In the end a disturbing question remains to be 
answered, i.e given the relatively abundant and cheap 
labour at hand, why Pakistan could not emerge as the 
regions^powerful industrial nation. Would it be unfair to 
remark that in LDCs it largely depends on the will and 
determination of the governments and the politicians. If
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they will, they can remedy the situation to a large extent 
through a change in priorities and objectives in the larger 
interest of the people rather than seeking the well-being 
of a few.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
The aim of this appendix is to provide a satisfactory 
discussion about the data sources and measurement of some of 
the important variables of this enquiry. The appendix is 
therefore divided into two parts. As planned,part one deals 
with the coverage of CMI and its limitations. The second part 
is reserved for a review of issu, es and their remedies in 
estimating our principal variables and relationships. 
Coverage and limitations of CMI:
The Census of Manufacturing Industries is undertaken by 
the Provincial Directorates of Industries and Mineral 
Development and Industries Statistics Act 1942. Data is 
compiled by the Punjab Bureau of Statistic for Punjab and 
NWFP, by the Sind Bureau of Statistics for Sind and by the 
Federal Bureau of Statistic in the case of Baluchistan and 
Federal Capital Territory of Islamabad. The Federal Bureau of 
Statistics acts as a coordinator among the Provincial 
Directorates and prepares Tables for all Pakistan. This 
enquiry is mainly conducted through mail and supplemented with 
field trips where necessary. Although the enquiry is supposed 
to be conducted each year, the latest survey available at
the time of our enquiry was for 1984-85 published in June 1988.
The census report basically provides data dtoout such
variables as fixed assets, inventories, employment and
employment costs, industrial cost, value of production and
value added. It includes those establishments that are
operating full time or part time and are registered under
pu.
section 2(i) and 5(j) of Factories /-^ ct, 1934. Section
2 (i)refers to establishments employing 20 or more workers 
during the year and using power in their operations; Section 
5 (j) on the other hand, refers to establishments wherein a 
manufacturing process is carried out or is ordinarily carried 
out whether with or without the use of power whereever ten or 
more persons are working therein or have worked there on any 
day of the 12 months immediately proceeding, (CMI,1970-71, 
p.IX). The defence and government workshops though engaged in 
manufacturing activities and registered under the said Act, 
are however, excluded.
The reporting unit in the CMI is a registered factory, 
with single or joint ownership where the main economic 
activity is manufacturing. If, however, an establishment is 
engaged in more than one activity and separate accounts are 
maintained by the establishments for each activity, then 
seperate returns are collected for each such activity. All CMI 
returns are classified in a particular industry on the basis 
of value of major products and by porducts or services 
rendered, falling within the scope of the manufacturing 
activity according to Pakistan Standard Industrial 
Classification code (PSIC).
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Although the CMI provide the most comprehensive 
industrial statistics in Pakistan, . they are not free from 
limitations, the severity and importance of which depend on the 
type of research work undertaken. These shortcomings are i) 
coverage of establishments ii) Valuation problems iii) 
Continuity of reports iv) Change of definitions of variables 
over years.
The first limitation of CMI data is that of coverage; 
term used to convey the inaccuracies in the data arising from 
non- response, nonregistration or misreporting. Non-response 
means that a registered factory engaged in production fails to 
return the census questionare,or responds irregular ^ overtime. 
Non- registration takes place when factories eligible for 
registration are not registered.And misreporting means costs 
are overstated and output is understated to evade,or minimize 
the tax burden. So it is understood that CMI reports are 
incomplete and undoubtedly inexact. Whether this problem has 
become less severe over the years is difficult to tell.However 
quite a large number of factories do not respond to the CMI 
questionaire because they have gone out of operation and have 
not informed the chief inspector of industries ,of their 
respective provinces,about it. Some idea about the extent of 
gross and net coverage in the CMI over the years can be made 
from Table 1 and 2 below. It is noted that in Table lthe 
difference between coulmn 1 and 2 is not entirely due to the 
non-response of establishments. As the CMI of 1984-85 reports 
of the 8083 factories on the mailing list during the year,
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returns are received from 5150 factories (63.71 percent)of 
these, 1211 (14.98 percent) remained closed during the year or 
had ceased to exist as reported by the Provincial Directorates 
of industries. A further 727 (8.99 percent) returns were
rejected in editing due to non manufacturing activities and 
defective data. (CMI,1984-85 P xii).Thus column 3 and 4 of 
Table in a way show the gross coverage of the CMI data.
As noted earlier of the 8083 factories on the mailing list 
1984-85 1211 estblishments were untraceable, if adjustment is 
made for establishments that were untraceable, the net 
coverage of CMI might be higher as shown in Table 2.However, 
both the criteria show that non- response is large and varies 
overtime.
Second, and most troublesome shortcoming of the CMI data 
is that the output data are published in terms of current 
market prices. This makes the measurement of certain 
variables, particularly changes in productivity difficult. 
Besides that the available prices. i indexes are classified by 
commodity, with a coverage too restricted to permit the 
construction of indexes for deflation purposes at the industry 
level. We know that there are other sources of information on 
the level of manufactoring activity in Pakistan : Estimates of 
volume of output are prepared by the statistics division for 
selected items, data on phsyical production are received by 
the Central Board of Revenue for mainly excisable commodities. 
The provincial bureau of statistics also collect and publish
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data on physical production and employment for about 15 major 
commodities based on monthly returns submitted by 
manufactoring establishments located in those provinces. But 
the problem with all these other sources is that they are 
restricted to selected commodities and it far to difficult to 
relate them to the industrial level figures. So our 
productivity variable is measured in current prices.
Third, and less serious problem in the use of CMI data 
is that they are non-continuous. CMI reports for certain 
years are not conducted and this creates a problem of 
discontinuity in the series. However, for the present work, 
we were mainly concerned to estimate the relationships at 
almost the end points of the three regimes, 1970, 1978 and 
1984, an absolute and proportionate changes in variables by 
comparing the end points 1970,-1984 data in these years is 
available for our purpose.
Xast problem with CMI data stems from changes in the 
definitions of some key variables over the years. For 
example, 1959-60 CMI difines data on fixed assests as book 
value at the end of the year i.e. original costs less 
acumalated depreciation. From 1962-63 onwards the CMI reports 
original costs plus editions, alternations and loses due to 
fire etc, it does not mention deduction of depreciation. The 
definition of employment has also changed. In 1959-60 it is 
measured as the annual average computed from a twelve month 
average. In 1967-68 CMI report employment as number of 
persons on the payroll as on the 31st December, whereas 1969-
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70 and onwards record an average employment figures, but it is 
not stated how that average is calculated. The measurement of 
industrial output is also not consistant over the years. In 
1959-60 output is measured as the ex-factory value of final
products only; in 1965-66 output is equal to the value of
finished products plus the value of work in progress at the
end of the year, the CMI report of 1969-70 uses the same
definition of output as used in 1959-60 report but adds sale 
proceeds from industrial waste and value of electricity sold. 
Lastly there are problems with the computation of value added. 
In 1959 CMI it is measured as the value gross output less the 
cost of fuels and raw materials consumed. Other costs such as 
depreciation, maintenance and repair allowances, advertisment 
costs etc do not seem to have been deducted. From 1964-65 
onwards, the CMI defines value added as gross value of output 
plus sale proceeds from industrial waste and electricity, plus 
value of work in progress at the end of the year, minus cost 
of raw materials, minus payment to others for work done, minus 
cost of fuel and electricity.
The above mentioned changes in definitions of variables 
over time do not affect our analysis because the definitions 
of CMI from 1970 onwards have remained consistent.
Concentration Ratios (CR):
, , , iKt*
The central variable of our enquiry i s a CR, the purpose of
which is two fold, a) to measure the degree of entry barrier
in an industry and b) to ' S . the extent to which the
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price in a particular industry departs from its competitive 
level. More generally, it places an industry along the line of 
possibilities from monopoly/ oligopoly to many firms,
Thus a reasonable measure of concentration needs to be 
a combination of two characteristics:
a) the number of firms in the industry; other things being 
equal, the bigger the number of firms in the industry, the 
more competitiveljthe industry is likely to behave.
b) the size distribution of firms in the industry, i.e the 
more unequal firms’ sizes are the more likely one would expect 
to find non-competitive pricing and profits.
Literature on industrial economics suggests a number of 
indexes that measure industrial concentration. In such a 
situation a researcher is faced with the difficult task of 
choice of one measure of concentration for purpose of
t*L
anaylsis. Review of^literature reveals that various authors 
have adopted three different approaches to determine the 
choice of a particular measure. All the three aproaches and 
their limitations are discussed below separately.
First, numerous studies have shown that the ranking of 
industries by CR is very robust with respect to a) the 
alternative values of the number of firms and b) other indexes 
of concentration.
For example of a CR3 would rank a 100 industries almost 
indenticalfy with a CR4 or CR5. Although there is no agreed 
CR,most economists conclude that the choice of CRmeasure does
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not matter. In practice the choice of a particular index would 
depend upon the availability of data. However a few points 
regarding this approach about the choice of CR are noted:
i) The fact that various measures are correlated with each 
other does not mean that any one of them is good enough. If 
they all fail to capture what one is looking for, the fact 
that two measures are correlated may also mean that they are 
as bad as each other.
ii) There is a further doubt from this glim approach, it has
been shown by House[1977] that the higher the concentration 
the worst the fit between CR and Herfindhal index (H) of 
concentration. He plots H against CR4 and finds that for low 
values of concentration the deviations are very little, and at
rr\by
higher values the scatter is bigger. This tendency^bias the 
results.
iii) It is suggested that even if CR4 and H are highly 
correlated, provided they are not perfectly correlated, one 
can get quite different results if the two measures are used 
in the same regression analysis alternatively Kwoka [1981]. It 
is sometimes said that concentration ratios i) are adhoc 
measures, but because of the robustness of the rankings it 
does not really matter, ii) lack theoretical underpinnings and
a/n/therefore inapppropriate iii) do not take into account the
size distribution within the top four groups and within the
rest of the group. For example,
Industry A Industry B
Share of firm 1 = 0.3 Share of firm 1 - 0 . 2
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It 2 = 0.25 ii 2 = 0.2
II 3 = 0.15 ti 3 = 0.2
II oHOII it 4 = 0.2
0.80 o
00•o
these figures show the CR is same in both the cases, but the 
structure of the two industries is not the same. It may be 
said that CR4 assumes that each of the leading four firms is 
of equal importance in determining industry performance, 
profits or price. But the CR is highly correlated with other 
indexes that do take into account the size distribution of
, 'C, , ,
industies. In our case we deal with this problem by including
among the explanatory variables a measure of inequality of
size. Others have suggested that the H index should be used
because it takes into account the size distribution of firms
in an industry. The problem with the calculation of H is that
the size or market share of each firm is needed, most publicly
available statistics about industries do not give details of
every single firm in the industry, they are grouped together.
Thus very often the choice of index is determined by the data
availability. In our case^census of manufacturing does not
even give CR4 separately, it just so happens that the largest
size class in most of the sectors has only four firms, and
eaZw fh&n four"
where the largest size class constitute number of firms^we 
calculate the average share of the top four establishments.
A second kind of approach, regarding the choice of 
concentration ratios, adopted by a few researchers like
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Kilpatrick [1967], Miller [1972] and Lamm [1981] suggest5 that 
one should take that measure of concentration which has the 
highest coefficient in a regression in which profits are the 
dependent variable. The weakness of this approach is that it 
is not a rigo rous way of testing and one is inverting the 
issue. Nevertheless it is quite a common way of going about 
the subject. A third approach takeithe various (.alternative 
indices and examine^ their statistical properties Hall and 
Tidman [1967], House [1977] and Davies [1979]. But this is not 
a good criterion either because the statistical properties do 
not necessarily reflect an economic relationship and we do not 
go much further unless we can relate these properties to the 
properties of the theoretical models of competition and 
monopoly.
Third, a number of studies have tried to derive the 
measure of concentration from economic analysis, the trouble 
is again there is no nicely developed and generally accepted 
theory of oligopoly. There are a number of alternative 
theories with different descriptions of concentration like, 
Stigler [1964] and Cowling and Waterson [1976].
Given the above problems regarding the choice of a 
measure of industrial concentration, a more difficult problem 
is that even if an ideal measure of concentration is 
available, we would have to apply it to the concept of 
industry which may not be the same as required by an economist 
i.e how does one demarcate the relevant market for purpose of 
analysis. For example, on the demand side, ideally one would
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define an industry X such that it includes all products among 
which the cross elasticity of demand is high and exclude the 
ones which are not close substitutes of the main products in 
X. But it is very difficult to determine what are the cross 
elasticities of demand between different kinds of products. In 
any case one, would have to decide how high is high. On the 
supply side, we should include all suppliers of the included 
products, but what do we do about a firm X10 which does not 
make any of the included products but has the capacity to make 
one or other of these products at very low adaptation costs
i.e X10 may be canning fish and it may be easy for it to can 
fruit, the two products are not close substitutes; 
nevertheless these might be so on the supply side. 
Furthermore, if one does include all substitutes in one 
industry in the strict sense, then how widely should one 
spread ones net. In practice one has to use data prepared by 
census authorities and their classifications are not strictly 
based on the idea of cross elasticities on both the demand and 
supply sides.
In the same context, typically census of industries 
classify data at 4 digit level and one is often forced to use 
the figures at the given level of classification. Obviously 
finer sub-classification of an industry is bound to give much 
more non-substitutes than a higher digit classification. A 3 
digit classification is more realistic in terms of economic 
criteria. Census of Manufacturing classification is comparable 
at 3 digit level of International Stande^rd Industrial
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Classification. Another related problem is that as economies 
grow new industries come up, and old ones decline. The 
industry classification scheme expands and gets refined to 
accomodate changes within the manufacturing sector of the 
different activities and the introduction of new products and 
methods. If we do not take into account such changes they 
impart serious bias to results obtained. This is not a serious 
problem so far as our industrial cl assification scheme is 
concerned, except for a few new sectors since 1970 no marked 
changes have taken place.
A few more issues about census of manufacturing 
data also need to be dealt with. For example, census of 
production refers to the national industry, it is concievable 
that for some industries the relevant geographical market is 
smaller than the country itself. In such cases the CR for the 
whole industry will be lower than the CR for a region. At the 
other extreme there may be cases where the national 
goegraphical area is smaller than the economically relevant 
market in which case the CR for the whole country would 
probably understate the true measure of concentration in the 
wider relevant market.These problems can be dealt with by 
making some adjustments for the regional markets an. d for 
actual imports. But there is no satisfactory procedure of 
particularly adjusting for imports because the methods of 
adjustment are mere approximations.
The most difficult prblem is with product 
differentiation, where products of the same kind are included
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in the same industry classification but are not close 
substitutes for each other e.g very cheap pens and expensive 
pens or phamaceuticals of different qualities.
Measures of concentration are very often criticised as 
being imprecise proxies for the presence of monopoly or 
competitive forces. Clearly this coul d be a perfectly valid 
criticism because any proxy is approximate any way and we do 
not|have a particularly good theory from which to derive the 
specification of an index which would be ideal.These kind of 
criticisms are not htXpful because they simply refer to points 
which cannot be picked up by concentration measures of any 
kind. If there are certain aspects of behaviour or structure 
which an index of concentration does not pick up then one can 
simply add another explanatory variable which picks up the 
omitted aspect of behaviour if any.
Given the above problems, it is often criticised that 1) a 
high concentration does not mean much if entry into the 
industry is easy and a concentration measure does not pick up 
an indication of entry barriers 2) the CR does not tell us 
anything about the stability or instability of market shares 
or ranks over time. 3) CR assume that firms are independent, 
in practice some firms may not be independent, there may be 
collusive aggr^raents or common directorshipjetc. 4) CR would 
overstate the level of effective concentration in so far as 
some of the big firms allow some degree of internal 
competition 5) sometimes vertical integration can bestow 
additional market power on big firms this would not be taken
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care of in CR 6) Lastly, the CR does not allow for the 
possibility that some of these firms may be diversified into 
other unrelated industries.
Economies of Scale:
Although there are direct methods of estimating 
thejminimum efficient size (MES) of a firm or plant, all thes 
methods have their difficulties and are sometimes fairly 
complicated to apply. Instead most cross section studies have 
used proxy measures. These measures cannot be strictly 
justified in terms of theory but pick out the
right - Since these proxies are used as indexes of
barriers to entry of a technological kind, the bigger the 
barrier the higher the ratio is supposed to be, and the 
movtdif f icult the entry would be. Clearly it would be a mistake to 
use such proxies as direct or absolute measures of minimum 
efficient siz<=fe>lant. They are proxies and not direct measures, 
but they stand in place of the direct measures in a ranking 
context. Provided the ranking of the proxies is much the same 
as the ranking of the direct measures, then one could use the 
proxies fairly confidently in cross sectionjstudies, however 
one should be careful about a few things. Foij/example, i) there 
must be some reason to suppose that the proxies are fairly 
closely correlated with the direct measures ii) the errors in 
proxies should be randomly distributed in relation to the 
dependent variable. Where the error would be a proxy measure 
minus the direct measure, iii) the nature of the proxy measure 
should be such that it is not definitionally related to the
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, e ,
dependent variable. Because if thre is an identity/v
relationship between the proxy and the dependent variable then 
obviously one is explaining nothing at all. Unfortunately 
mostjcommonly used proxies do not satisfy these conditions 
well, especially where concentration in industry is the 
dependent variable.
Doubt has been cast by Davies [1980] on the use of proxies 
and the following points are made:
1. The proxy measures tend to overstate the MES, however this 
does not mean they are not good proxies.
2. For certain kinds of size distributions the proxies are 
definitionally related to concentration measures. This renders 
the use of the proxies very doubtfull indeed. While it is so -
 , they are not, of course, a reason for rejecting the
proxies themselves. After all, it could be that 'true1 MEP is 
also related in some tautological way to the degree of plant 
concentration. Davies [1988].(P 294).
However , it has been show in that when the size
distribution of firms and of plants are approximately log
normal within each industry then concentration ratios are
determined inversely by the number of firms and positively by
their variance Hart [1980].
Our regression results of Table 4.1-4.2 do not in the
. . .first place give very high R s to reflect near identities and 
cast doubt on the nature of economic relatioship between our 
variables. In particular our regression results of Table 4.3 
give values of I? s very low for a near identity. Furthermore,
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the regression results of changes in concentration and the
and that the estimated relationship between concentration and 
the explanatory variables is not just the result of near 
identity.
We are less confident about the negative and significant 
relationship between CR4 and INS. Wether it is a statistical 
artefact is not known, although the dependent variable CR4 is 
measured in terms of value added and industry size in terms of 
employment and apparently both the variables do not have any 
statistical relationship what so ever even in the log form of 
the variables i.e the log CR4 is measured as:
where VA is the value added of the ith firm in an industry
with i=l n. And E is the employment of the ith firm in an
industry i=l n. The denominator or the numerator of the
dependent variable is not one of the explanatory variables, 
which is the case if CR is also measured in terms of 
employment. Even in this case if the simple correlation 
between logCR and loglNS is very low, the
other explanatory variables will not be affected by loglNS.
Another point is that these proxies imply that half the 
output of any industry is produced by some optimal sized 
plants. Whereas studies like Bain [1956] and Weiss [1964]
explanatory variables once again givejvalues of R not very high
and Log E = INS
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using direct measures have shown that the share of industry 
output accounted for sub-optimal size plants is often less 
than a half and in any case varies greatly from one industry 
to another. So the fit in rankings between direct measures and 
the proxies would be pretty inexact. This introduces 
measurement error which varies greatly from one industry to 
another. Therefore it cannot be assumed that the variation in 
error is random with respect to CR.
Given the above criticism the author himself has no new 
suggestions to make, however he suggests that in both the 
Survivor and Lyon's [1980] methods the problem of measurement 
error to be corrrelated with the CR is less severe. In our 
case the later method cannot be computed because it require 
information regarding number of plants in each size class
which is not available to us. However, the regression equation
using the survivor methods, of estimating MES, mentioned
below, shows
1. Log CR4 - 3.3 6 + 0.05 log EOS R = .009
(0.50)
2. Log CR4 = 4.10 - 0.08 log SV R = .02
(0.70)
3. Log CR4 = 2.60 + 0.2 6 log EOS - 0,4 0 log INS - 0.80 log K/L
(2.72) (4.79) (3.30)
-0.001 IG + 0.0006 EPR 
(0.20) (1.10) R = .50
4. Log CR4 = 6.52 - 0.19 log SV - 0.39 log INS - 0.32 log K/L
(1.45) (3.76) (1.31)
- 0.006 IG + 0.0009 EPR 
(1.06) (1.39) R =.40
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that unexpectedly it has a negative coefficient. Thus we do 
not stress much on the use of survivor method because of a 
great deal of subjective judgement, based on certain 
assumptions, is indeed to assess the efficiency of the size 
class that survived best overtime, but clearly any statistical 
method has to make some assumptions otherwise one cannot 
generate inferences or conclusions ,the method is simple and 
data is available. For example if we know for certain 
industriesAsize of firms in terms of labour and the 
percentage of sales accounted for by each size class at 
different time periods (T). We identify which size class has 
survived best in terms of sales. For example the data given 
below identify that size class 2 as the most efficient size of 
plant, it has increased its sales over time. To have a single 
size point as the range as the MES i.e 101.
Size
(employment)
No
1 1 - 100
2 101 - 300
3 301 - 750
4 751 - 1250
Time 
T1 T2 T3
(percent of sales)
30 15 15
25 55 55
30 20 20
15 10 10
100 100 100
The assumption one makes is that there is a continuous
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process of change of which we are observing the begining and 
the present part. But the problem is one should not infer from 
this information that plant size 2 will continue to be the 
most efficient because we have no particular reason why the 
past changes should repeat. . But that would be true of
other methods also, once one knows the MES plant that would 
remain true whatever the market conditions and factor prices
However some points about the survivor method are note 
worthy: First, what one has observed may simply be not
relative efficiency across plant or firm sizes. May be small 
plants happen to be in regions which have suffered declines or 
smaller increases in demand, such changes have nothing to do 
with efficiency. Or alternatively that by chance size 2 firms 
happen to be in regions of the country where labour cost have 
gone down compared tolpther regions, so again it has no direct 
relation with efficiency. Second, it is quite possible that a 
large number of plants belonging to vertically integrated or 
diversified firms happen to be concentrated in size class 2, 
due to which there is an increase in participation of this 
size class, this may not reflect efficiency within the 
industry, but may reflect the fact that this size class 
happens to fit in with the requirements of vertically 
integrated or diversified firms. Third, possibility is that 
the percentage of output of smallest size class may be fairly 
stable overtime. It suggests that smaller size class is 
efficr ent but that may be due to the fact that many firms try
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Table 1:Pakistan: Gross Coverage of The CMI
Year Number of 
factories on 
the mailing 
list
Number of 
factories 
tabulated
Gross 
coverage 
(2) as a 
% o f m
Gross 
undercoverage 
100 minus 
(3)ay______m________m_____ in
1959-60 3,011 2,758 91. 6
CO
1963-64 5,532 2,978 53.8 46.2
1965-66 5,438 3,252 59.8 40.2
1966-67 5, 098 3, 508 68.8 31.2
1967-68 5,556 3 , 289 59.0 41.2
1970-71 5, 691 3 ,549 62.3 37.6
1975-76 5,336 3 ,248 60.8 39.1
1978-79 5,515 3,715 67.3 32.6
1980-81 5,668 3,815 67. 3 32 .7
1982-83 6,164 3,931 63.7 36.2
1983-84 7,858 4,047 51.5 48.5
1984-85 8,083 4,423 54.7 45.2
Source:1) Taken from Kemal [1978] for 1959-60 to 1967-68.
2) . Calculated from various issues of CMI for 1970- 
71 to 1984-85.
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Table 2: Pakistan: Net Coverage of The CMI.
Year Number of Number of Number of Number of Net
factories untrace- factories factories coverage
on the able actually tabulated (4)%(3)
mailing factories reached
________list______________________________________________________
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1959-60 3,011 nil 3,011 2 , 758 91. 6
1963-64 5,532 1,458 4,047 2,978 73.5
1965-66 5,438 987 4,451 3,252 73.1
1966-67 5, 098 463 4,635 3 , 508 5.7
1967-68 5,556 745 4,811 3,289 68. 3
1970-71 5,691 1,319 4,372 3,549 81.2
1975-76 5,336 514 3 , 607 3 , 248 90.0
1978-79 5,515 437 4,188 3,715 88 . 7
1980-81 5,668 468 4,301 3,815 88.7
1982-83 6,164 1, 631 4,533 3,931 86.7
1983-84 7,858 875 4,604 4, 047 87.9
1984-85 8, 083 1,211 5,150 4,423 85.8
Source: 1). Taken from Kemal [1978] for 1959-60 to 1967-68.
2). Calculated from various issues of CMI for 
1970-71 to 1984-85.
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to enter this industry at a small scale, most of them drop
each year but there are enough of them to keep the number
stable. Those who suceed move to the higher size class, but
a, . ,
the lower size class will show^stability „ is misleading
to associate • with efficiency.
• ft ,From the above consideratios^ some of the attraction of 
the method seems to be reduced. Nevertheless it uses simple 
data, it is often used and may provide a cross check on other 
methods, bearing in mind that unlike the direct measures of 
MES like engineering and statistical cost methods which are 
related to the static concept of efficiency, it relates to the 
overall concept of efficiency.
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Annex l.A :Percentage Share in Manufacturing Value 
Added Employment and Capital Assets 1959- 
84.
share
Industry 
Consumer Goods
1. Food
Value Added
Employment
Capital
2. Vegetable Ghee
Value Added
Employment
Capital
1958
8.3
6.7
2.1
1.6
1970
14.8
9.1
21.02
3.8
1.7
1976
22 . 14 
8.93 
15. 91
8.34 
1.84 
3 .89
1978
19.0
10. 91
11. 95
6.87
2 . 25
3 .58
1984
20.62 
13 .17 
17 . 61
5.35
2.23
2.80
3. Sugar
Value Added 2.8 8.27 9.46 7.3 6 10.85
Employment 1.9 4.80 4.27 5.0 6.71
Capital - 12.24 9.61 3.35 9.06
4. Beverage
Value Added 0.4 0.6 1.51 1.72 2.38
Employment 1.3 0.5 0.59 0.77 0.94
Capital - 0.53 0.65 0.25 0.76
5. Tobacco
Value Added 5.6 9.0 8.28 12.04 13.19
Employment 1.0 2.6 1.49 2.05 2.21
Capital - 6.0 0.77 2.98 3.63
6. Textile
Value Added 40.2 31.4 24.23 17.79 16.13
Employment 50.0 45.2 44.70 45.26 38.17
Capital - 28.73 25.17 23.19 16.47
7. Cotton Spinning
Value Added 32.6 2 6.2 9.93 7.17 7.83
Employment 41.5 37.0 17.89 19.13 18.17
Capital - 6.96 9.56 8.73 6.86
8. Cotton Weaving
Value Added - 9.15 9.93 7.17 7.83
Employment - 13.89 14.32 19.13 18.17
Capital - 12.08 5.72 8.73 6.86
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9. Woolen Textile
Value Added
Employment
Capital
10.Silk & Synthetic
Value Added
Employment
Capital
11.Carpets
Value Added
Employment
Capital
12.Jute Textile
Value Added
Employment
Capital
13.Footwear
Value added
Employment
Capital
Intermediate Goods
14.Leather
Value Added
Employment
Capital
15.Paper
Value Added
Employment
Capital
3.5
3.8
2.59
1.81
1.48
1.24
1.70
1.0
1.0
1.24
2.11
2.40 
3.6 
2 .57
0.27
0.72
0.65
0.32 
0. 65 
0.20
1.18
0.85
0.39
1.30
1.2
4.40
1. 09 
1.35 
1.47
3.23 
4.19 
3 .13
0.52
0.68
0.41
1. 08 
2.55 
0.85
0.13 
0.36 
0.12
1. 05 
2.59 
0.98
1. 64 
1.67 
4.57
0.88 
1.60 
1. 37
1.31
2.27
1.45
0.49 
0. 61 
0.51
0.98 
3 .29 
1.42
0.15 
0. 34 
0.36
2.38 
0.80 
2.19
1.32
1.28
0.99
0.97
1.57
1.27
1.07
1.88
1.18
0.28 
0.45 
0. 68
1.18 
2.93 
1.15
0.11 
0.24 
0.10
1.60
0.98
1.37
1.30
1.59
1.37
16.Printing & Publishing
Value Added
Employment
Capital
17. Drugs
Value Added
Employment
Capital
2.3
1.6
2 .3
1.3
1.2
1.7
1.59
3.5 
1.9 
4 .51
1.13 
1. 67 
0.81
3 . 08 
3.58 
2.22
1.09 
2 . 01 
1.52
3.87
2.30
4.44
1.17
2.17 
1.85
3.93 
2.57 
3 . 91
18.Industrial Chemicals
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Value Added 2.3
Employment 1.3
Capital
19.Fertilizers
Value Added -
Employment -
Capital
20.Alkalies
Value Added 
Employment
Capital -
21.Plastic Products
Value Added
Employment
Capital
22.Other Chemicals
Value Added 2.6
Employment 0.9
Capital
23.Soap
Value Added -
Employment
Capital
24.Petroleum Refinning
Value Added -
Employment
Capital
25.Rubber
Value added 0.34
Emp1oyment 0.37
Capital
26.Tyres & tubes
Value Added
Employment
Capital
27.Glass & Products
Value Added 0.5
Emp1oyment l.3
Capital
3.7 4.89
2.2 2.25
6.2 10.83
2.2 1.92
0.7 0.88
2.05 7.51
0.99 1.45
0.41 2.25
0.85 1.53
0.15 0.19
0.23 0.20
1.84 1.02
1.4 1.92
1.4 4.43
3.74 1.23
0.49 0.96
0.78 1.18
1.49 0.57
1.32 1.25
1.59 1.95
1.24 0.92
0.14 0.25
0.17 0.29
0.43 0.22
0.30 0.24
0.70 0.48
0.73 1.15
5.27 7.3
3.04 3.11
6.06 8.58
3.07 4.49
1.19 1.42
18.61 5.98
0.76 0.66
0.57 0.39
0.56 0.80
0.43 0.55
0.51 0.80
0.73 0.84
5.27 2.60
3.03 1.57
6.07 9.18
0.44 0.61
0.37 0.51
0.47 0.58
4.92 1.5
0.66 0.95
7.16 6.26
1.93 1.62
2.11 2.09
0.35 1.32
0.67 0.48
0.29 0.35
0.35 0.28
0.39 0.62
0.80 0.85
0.53 0.66
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Capital Goods
28.Non Metals
Value Added
Employment
Capital
29.Cement
Value Added
Employment
Capital
30.Iron & Steel
Value Added
Employment
Capital
31.Metal Products
Value Added
Employment
Capital
32.Machinery
Value Added
Employment
Capital
5.9
2.5
4.0
1.6
3.1
3.2
2 . 5 
3.5
2.5
3.2
4.0
3.1 
4.10
3.50 
1. 90 
2.61
2.4
3.4 
3.63
1.20
2.40
2.87
1.2
3.1
0.87
3 .57 
5. 35 
5.91
3 .23 
1.83 
5.53
3.31 
3 .72 
5. 65
1.59 
2 .39 
1.11
2 .90 
2 .99 
5.76
4.69
2.66
3.79
4.27 
1.99 
3 .04
8.97
4.06
4.78
7.43
1.86
6.77
4.80 5.15
3.78 7.33
6.12 12.82
1.52 
2 .27 
1.42
2.13
3.49
5.15
1.17 
1.89 
1 . 68
2.38 
3 .37 
3 .17
3 3.Agricultural Machinery
Value Added -
Employment
Capital
34.Textile Machinery
0. 04 
0.42 
0.25
0.26 
0. 37 
0.15
0.41
0.64
1.21
0. 55 
0. 64 
0.40
Value Added
Employment
Capital
0.20
0.30
0.17 
0.48 
0.10
0.33
0.27
0.20
0.05 
0.19 
0. 06
0.11
0.26
0.20
35.Electrical Machinery
Value Added
Employment
Capital
36.Wires & Cables
Value Added
Employment
Capital
1.10 
1 . 00 
0.87
0.04 
0. 05 
0. 04
3 .15 
3 . 16 
2.26
0.07 
0. 10 
0.26
1.05
0.73
1.34
0.13
0.10
0.20
3.15
3 .58 
5. 04
0.33 
0.18 
0.52
37.Electric Bulbs
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Value Added - 0.30 0.48 0.34 0.51
Employment - 0.17 0.31 0.20 0.32
Capital - 0.18 0.24 0.27 0.38
38.Batteries
Value Added - 0.67 0.31 0.67 0.44
Employment - 0.26 0.12 0.41 0.41
Capital - 0.34 0.39 0.59 0.32
3 9 .Transport
Value Added 0.90 2.59 6.41 3.96 2.71
Employment 2.00 3.66 4.25 4.46 3.75
Capital - 3.40 3.68 9.26 4.60
40.Motor Vehicals
Value Added - 0.66 4.90 2.56 1.73
Employment - 1.02 1.45 1.53 1.60
Capital - 2.32 0.68 8.03 3.61
41.Ship Building
Value Added - - 0.47
Emnployment - - 1.32
Capital - - 1.3 3
42.Cycles
Value Added 0.22 0.52 0.56 0.19 0.24
Employment 0.46 1.0 0.08 0.57 0.70
Capital - 2.32 0.11 0.24 0.28
Source : Calculated from Census of Manufacturing
Industries, Statistucs Division, Government of 
Pakistan, Karachi, Islamabad (various issues).
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Annex l.B : Pakistan List of Closed Textile Mills 
Dec.1986
Number 
Catagory of firms
Number
Spindles
Number
Rotours
Number
Looms
A. Sind Province 25 411,016 1,252
Punjab Province 13 192,172 126
N.W.F.P. 3 37,580 621
Total A. 51 640,768 1,999
B. Sind Province 9 131,643 2,400 498
Punj ab 5 90,616 126
N.W.F.P. 2 99,980 2,200
Total B. 16 322,239 2 ,400 2,824
C. Sind Province 14 80,112 1,391
Punjab 8 45,832 100 228
Total C. 22 125,944 1,491 228
Grand Total 89 1088,951 3,891 5, 051
A. Units which cannot be revived without complete 
replacement.
B. Units which can be revived with new machinery but 
closed due to financial problems.
C. Units which are partially closed.
Source : Textile's Commissioner's Organization as
reported in Pakistan Industrial Regulatory 
Policy Report Vol.II World Bank January 
(1988) .
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Annex l.C : Pakistan Share in World Trade in Textiles
Cotton Yarn Cotton Cloth
Period World Pakistan Pakistan World Pakistan Pakistan
export export share in export export share in
world world
exports exports
1971 388,423 109,557 28.2 680,793 48,397 7.1
1972 510,096 160,703 31.5 774,393 48,086 6.2
1973 536,175 146,920 27.4 778,300 73,813 9.5
1974 497,025 74,567 15. 0 760,075 77,460 10.2
1975 545,918 152,972 28.0 741,774 56,199 7.6
1976 622,180 95,914 15.4 873,469 48,812 5.6
1977 547,506 46,716 8.5 819,043 36,986 4.5
1978 630,040 74,883 11.9 856,968 51,646 6.0
1979 673,424 88,759 13 .2 939,004 58,707 6.2
1980 707,767 97,212 13 .7 884,453 66,560 7.5
1981 677,720 84,625 12.5 746,690 75,075 10.1
1982 697,010 112,534 16.1 830,920 84,020 10. 1
1983 783,770 141,600 18.1 913,520 104,160 11.4
1984 779,860 93,930 12.0 995,560 94,910 9 . 5
Figures in Metric Tons
Source : Textile's Commisioner1s Organization as
reported in Pakistan Industrial Regulatory 
Policy Report No.II World Bank (January, 1988).
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Annex 3.A : Size Distribution of Manufacturing 
Establishments and Value Added 
(Percentages 1959-84).
Establishments Value Added
Labour 1959 1970 1975 1978 1984 1959 1970 1975 1978 1984
9 persons 12 . 3 17.4 20.7 19.2 — 0.4 0. 70 0.52 0.40
10-19 44.2 24 . 3 30.6 29.7 29. 0 4.5 2 . 3 1.90 0.94 1.78
20-49 32.8 35.4 24.8 23 .2 24.4 12.8 6. 6 5.27 7.22 4.66
50-99 10.1 11.1 9.5 9.5 10.2 7.3 6.9 5.20 5.56 6.03
100-249 6.0 8.3 7.5 7.2 7.3 8.7 6.8 9.9 13.7 10.8
250-499 2.6 3.5 4.0 4.3 4.0 13.8 13 .5 16.7 17.7 15.0
500-999 1.7 2.6 3 . 0 2.8 2.7 9.2 21.2 19 .2 20.5 18.9
1000-199 2.3 1.2 2 . 0 1.7 1.8 43 .4 21.4 22 . 1 21.6 31.6
2000-4999 - 1.0 0.9 0.4 0.7 _ 15.7 14 . 0 7.8 7.7
5000& above 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 - 15.2 5.1 2.8 2.9
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
100
Value of Fixed 
Assets(Rs.000)
upto 250 64.7 43 .2 49.3 35.3 - 7.2 4.7 2.3 1.51
250-500 11. 3 11. 3 14.1 14.9 - 4.3 2.4 1.4 1.3
500-1000 - 9.1 8.4 11.0 13 .7 - 5.9 3 .1 2 . 3 2 .44
1000-2000 - n. a 6.0 7.2 10. 0 n. a 5.4 2 . 9 3 . 6
2000-2500 - 9.6 2.1 2 .1 2.8 - 20.8 3 . 3 1.2 0.78
2500-5000 - n. a 4.6 5.1 6.6 n. a 9 . 9 5.7 5.0
5000& above- 5.3 8.5 10.5 16.1 - 61.7 65.4 84.1 85. 3
Rented etc - n. a 15.7 0.4 0.4 n. a 5.2 0.4 0.01
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source : Census of Manufacturing Industries, Federal 
Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Division, 
Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, various 
issues.
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Annex 3.B : Comparison of Selected Ratios Between the 
Small and Top Four Establishments in 2 6 
Sectors 1984.
Ratios
Sectors K/L W/L V/L V/K IC/V
All Average 
Industries
133 17 81 0.60 2.19
Tea : Average 23 18 130 6.0 0.98
Small - - - - -
Large 23 18 130 6.0 0. 98
Tobacco :Average 105 16 479 4.6 0.34
Small 38 10 51 1.4 0.21
Large 84 17 498 5.9 0. 03
Leather :Average 134 14 132 0.98 2.04
Small 81 8 38 0.47 4.15
Large 93 14 179 1.93 1.17
Footwear:Average 56 13 37 0.66 3.60
Small 10 9 19. 6 1.93 0. 65
Large 61 12 35 0. 58 4.30
Ginning :Average 24 8.6 37 1.50 12.50
Small 31 10 48 1.5 13 .00
Large 8.5 3.6 11 1.28 15.00
Paper: Average 98 19 66 0 . 66 1.53
Small 116 15 79 0. 68 1.76
Large 96 19 63 0. 68 1.46
Printing:Average 93 19 43 0.46 1.44
Small 60 16 47 0.78 1. 67
Large 92 21 40 0.43 1.37
Drugs : Average 115 27 123 1.06 1.28
Small 66 16 76 1.10 1.87
Large 85 29 111 1.30 1.27
Wearing: Average 74 19 52 0. 69 3.29
Small 90 18 73 0.81 2.07
Large 56 18 36 0.64 4.20
FertilizerAverage 751 0.36 254 0.33 0.88
Small - - - - -
Large 564 37 67 0.11 3 .50
E (%)
100
100
55
49
49
12
78
51
25
49
63
Petroleum:Average 724 0.35 119 0.16 47
Refining Small - - - -
Large 724 35 119 0.16 47 100
Rubber : Average 48 17 63 1.3 1.52
Small 60 12 32 0.53 2.20
Large 48 19 69 1.45 1.39 78
Tyres : Average 56 23 109 1.98 1.50
Small 28 6. 60 17 0. 58 3.2
Large 60 2 . 60 124 2 .06 1.5 86
Plastic : Average 107 18 56 0. 52 1.96
Small 116 16 42 0.32 2.95
Large 95 17 73 0.76 1.20 37
Pottery : Average 72 11 36 0.49 1.78
Small 57 17 48 0.84 0.63
Large 80 7.80 29 0.36 1.90 61
Glass : Average 170 15 58 0.34 0.94
Small 128 11 41 0.31 1.44
Large 65 13 45 0.70 1. 16 33
Other Non :Average 304 30 246 0.81 0.51
Mettalic Small 74 15 41 0.55 0.30
Minerals Large 301 40 353 1. 17 0.45 41
Iron & : Average 362 25 56 0.15 2.2
Steel Small 69 14 78 1. 10 4.10
Large 425 26 47 0.11 1.50 80
Non-Ferous:Average 32 17 39 1.21 0.93
Small - - - - -
Large 29 19 43 1.50 0.75 82
Fabricated:Average 70 14 50 0.71 1.45
Metal Small 45 11 38 0.84 2.40
Large 57 20 45 0.78 1.24 23
Machinery:Average 106 18 57 0.54 1.57
Small 52 11 34 0.64 2 . 80
Large 128 23 73 0.57 1.21 40
Electric: Average 119 18 71 0. 59 1.80
Goods Small 144 14 79 0.55 2.40
Large 84 16 50 0.59 1.67 40
Ship : Average 94 21 38 0.40 0.42
Building Small - - - - -
Large 94 21 38 0.40 0.42 100
Motor : Average 578 10 136 0.23 1.28
Cycles Small - - - - -
Large 94 21 38 0.40 0.42 100
Scientif ic:Average 45 15 26 0.58 2.40
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Instrument Small 49 13 110 2.20 0.71
Large 43 16 23 0.53 2.30 62
Photograp-: Average 45 16 42 0.92 4.30
Instrument Small - - -
Large 45 16 42 0.92 4.30 100
Notes: K/L = Capital labour ratio, W/L = Wage per head, 
V/L = Value added per head, V/K = Value added
capitalratio, IC/V = Industrial cost value 
added ratio, E = Employment.
Source : Calculated from Census of Manufacturing Industries 
1984,Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistics 
Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
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Annex 4.A : Pakistan : Investments Sanctioned Current and 
Constant 1975-76 Rupees and Actual Investment, 
1977-84 by Industry Group (Rs. millions).
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
1.Food,Tobacco & Beverages.
a .S .cur 3 34 930 593 567 1148 2066 2067 1692
b.S.con 279 734 424 368 722 1222 1083 871
c. Rzd 219 137 331 322 342 423 1055
d. c/a 0.66 0.15 0.56 0.57 0.30 0.20 0. 51
2 .Textiles
a .S .cur 397 1260 1400 1458 1175 1333 1868 1854
b.S.con 3 31 995 1001 947 738 788 979 955
c.Rzd 447 397 776 972 971 686 525
d.c/a 1.13 0.32 0.55 0.67 0.83 0.51 0.28
3.Leather & Leather Goods
a.S.cur 17 9 89 172 2 13 1 61
b.S.con 14 7 64 112 1 8 1 31
c.Rzd 28 4 8 23 196 5 7
d.c/a 1.65 0.44 0.09 0.13 98 0.38 7
4.Rubber & :Rubber Products
a .S .cur 1 2 274 1310 232 69 132 42
b .S .con 1 2 196 850 146 41 69 22
c . Rzd 1 2 83 189 49
d. c/a 0.50 0.36 2 .74 0. 37
5.Paper & Pulp.
a.S.cur 116 276 398 482 1102 108 873 1218
b.S.con 97 218 284 313 693 64 458 627
c.Rzd 19 50 89 591 8 68
d.c/a 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.54 0.07 0. 08
6. Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals,
& Petroleum Products.
a.S.cur2887 1232 717 3608 2377 5608 6197 2532
b.S.con2408 973 512 2342 1494 3317 3248 1304
c.Rzd 66 270 1314 1632 648 872 991
d.c/a 0.02 0.22 1.83 0.45 0. 27 0.16 0.16
7. Cement & Other Non Metallic
Mineral ;Products.
a.S.cur 252 2181 2813 1145 1703 1360 3270 1023
b.S.con 210 1722 2011 743 1070 804 1714 527
c.Rzd 78 250 25 16 581 761 2135
d.c/a 0.31 0.11 0.01 0. 01 0.34 0.56 0.65
662
334
1904
962
77
39
277
140
4718
2383
634
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8 . Basic Metals.
a.S.cur 4 28 8 12 96
b.S.con 3 22 6 8 60
75 1559 99 401
44 817 51 203
321
c.Rzd 222 4 42 10 90 13 98
d.c/a 7.93 0.50 3 .50 0. 10 1.20 0. 01
9. Metal Products
a . S . cur 66 68 99 40 186 225 1127 370
b.S.con 55 54 71 26 117 133 591 191
c. Rzd 15 2 4 29 49 74 40
d.c/a 0.23 0.03 0.04 0.73 0.26 0.33 0. 04
10.Machinery
a .S .cur 11 9 13 170 436 487 178 609
b .S .con 9 7 9 110 274 288 93 314
c.Rzd 5 1 165 83 438
d.c/a 0.45 0.11 0.38 0.17 2.46
107
54
7194
3634
11.Electrical Machinery.
a .S .cur 45 241 50 338 256 147 469 274
b.S.con 38 190 36 219 161 87 246 141
c.Rzd 20 11 46 115 157 115
d.c/a 0 .44 0.05 0.92 0.34 0. 61 0. 25
12.Electronics
a .S .cur 1 20 11 17 22 207 225
b.S.con 1 14 7 11 13 108 226
c.Rzd 7 21 14 54
d.c/a 7 .00 1.24 0. 64 0.26
13.Transport
a .S .cur 8 6 51 19 116 207 140 812 392
b.S.con 72 40 14 75 130 83 426 202
c.Rzd 4 2 20 12 197 39
d.c/a 0.05 0.11 0.17 0. 06 1.41 0. 05
14.Service Etc.
a .S .cur 295 1196 379 89 483 545 982 771
b.S.con 246 944 271 58 304 322 515 397
c.Rzd 61 19 151 99 715 25 290
d.c/a 0.21 0. 02 0.40 1.11 1.48 0. 05 0.30
TOTAL
Current 4512 7483 6872 9518 9420 12198 19742 11162 17901 
Rs.
Constant3763 5907 4912 6179 5920 7214 10347 5749 9042
Rs.
a: current (cur) Rupees 
b: constant (con) 1975-76 Rupees 
c: Realized
Source : Taken from Pakistan Industrial Regulatory Report 
Vol. II, World Bank January (1988).
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